scholarly journals Information disclosure and environmental regulation: Green lights and gray areas

2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eungkyoon Lee
Author(s):  
Stuart Bell ◽  
Donald McGillivray ◽  
Ole W. Pedersen ◽  
Emma Lees ◽  
Elen Stokes

This chapter introduces the system of environmental regulation by building upon Ch. 4, which examined the sources of environmental law. In practice, environmental regulation involves more than the use of legal rules that forbid pollution and other forms of environmental harm. ‘Regulation’ is used to describe a wide range of different tools used in both legal and non-legal contexts—for example, it covers mandatory rules contained in environmental legislation, as well as non-binding environmental standards. The chapter outlines some of the reasons for regulating to protect the environment, before explaining how such regulation is introduced, applied, enforced, and reviewed. It examines the characteristics, strengths, and weaknesses of different approaches to standard-setting and the various instruments used to regulate potentially environmentally damaging activities. The chapter discusses several trends in modern environmental regulation, including the policy emphasis on deregulation and the use of information disclosure as a means of governing group or individual behaviour.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 194008291983991 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Tao Chen ◽  
Wei Han ◽  
Mao Lin An

The race to the bottom theory of environmental regulation mainly refers to state or local governments competing to lower their environmental regulation standards in pursuit of their own interests. Since the reform of the Chinese tax distribution system in 1994, local governments have encouraged economic competition through various industrial subsidies and tax preferences. Moreover, in China’s political system, which promotes fiscal decentralization and economic competition, competition has provided local governments with the opportunity to race to the bottom by secretly reducing the environmental regulations of enterprises to obtain financial returns and promote capital. Using the race to the bottom theory of environmental regulation, this article identifies the land revenue data and environmental information disclosure (EID) quality data of listed companies in China from 2012 to 2014 and uses the hierarchical linear model to study the direct and indirect effects of local governments’ financial competition on the EID of listed companies in their jurisdictions. It was found that (a) Regional financial competition does not directly influence the quality of an enterprise’s EID but has a significant negative regulatory effect. (b) The higher the degree of regional competition, the more obvious the negative regulatory effect. (c) The financial competitiveness of tropical and subtropical regions in China is higher than that of other regions, and the EID quality of enterprises in these regions is lower. (d) Governmental financial competition in tropical and subtropical regions regulates the quality of EID of listed companies in their jurisdictions through indirect effects on enterprises with different ownership and profitability; However, with the exception of tropical and subtropical regions, this phenomenon is not significant in other provinces.


2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andie F. Lueck ◽  
Mayia Corcoran ◽  
Maureen Casey ◽  
Sarah Wood ◽  
Ross Auna

2014 ◽  
pp. 99-122
Author(s):  
M. Levin ◽  
K. Matrosova

The paper considers monitoring of environmental change as the central element of environmental regulation. Monitoring, as each kind of principalagent relations, easily gives rise to corruptive behavior. In the paper we analyze economic models of environmental monitoring with high costs, incomplete information and corruption. These models should be the elements of environmental economics and are needed to create an effective system of nature protection measures.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document