Is the Generality Problem too General?

2002 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Adler ◽  
Michael Levin
Keyword(s):  
Generality Problem

Is the Use of Evidence Necessary for the Justification of Beliefs?

Diogenes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Ivanova ◽  
◽  
◽  
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Generality Problem ◽  
Linguistic Practices

The article analyses the conflicting views of reliabilism and evidentialism on the following question – What is the leading condition in ascribing justification to beliefs: reliability or evaluation through evidence. The evidentialist view is defended by arguments, derived from the linguistic practices of ascribing justification in complex conditions. The generality problem is interpreted as an exemplification of the complexity of cognitive situations and it is argued that complexity requires reference to the mental states as a means for ascribing justification. Reliability is also recognized as a factor for ascribing justification to some beliefs when it serves as a type of evidence.

scholarly journals Solving the Current Generality Problem

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Wallbridge ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Generality Problem

scholarly journals Algorithm and Parameters: Solving the Generality Problem for Reliabilism

2019 ◽  
Vol 128 (4) ◽  
pp. 463-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack C. Lyons
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Important Case ◽  
Cognitive Penetration ◽  
Generality Problem ◽  
Psychological Variables ◽  
Affect Processing

The paper offers a solution to the generality problem for a reliabilist epistemology, by developing an “algorithm and parameters” scheme for type-individuating cognitive processes. Algorithms are detailed procedures for mapping inputs to outputs. Parameters are psychological variables that systematically affect processing. The relevant process type for a given token is given by the complete algorithmic characterization of the token, along with the values of all the causally relevant parameters. The typing that results is far removed from the typings of folk psychology, and from much of the epistemology literature. But it is principled and empirically grounded, and shows good prospects for yielding the desired epistemological verdicts. The paper articulates and elaborates the theory, drawing out some of its consequences. Toward the end, the fleshed-out theory is applied to two important case studies: hallucination and cognitive penetration of perception.

5. Internalism and externalism

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Nagel
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
First Person ◽  
Generality Problem

Internalism represents the first-person point of view where knowledge is grounded by your own experience and by your own capacity to reason: if you can't see for yourself why you should believe something, you don't actually know it. Externalists say knowledge is a relationship between a person and a fact, and this relationship can be in place even when the person doesn't meet the internalist's demands for first-person access to supporting grounds. ‘Internalism and externalism’ also explains Robert Nozick's externalist tracking theory of knowledge and its difficulty, the ‘Generality Problem’. Many different solutions have been advanced, drawing on everything from patterns in natural language to the science of belief formation.

scholarly journals Process Reliabilism, Prime Numbers and the Generality Problem

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-236
Author(s):  
Frederik J. Andersen ◽  
Klemens Kappel ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Prime Number ◽  
Prime Numbers ◽  
Generality Problem ◽  
Process Reliabilism ◽  
Straightforward Consequence ◽  
Number Case ◽  
Problematic Aspect

This paper aims to show that Selim Berker’s widely discussed prime number case is merely an instance of the well-known generality problem for process reliabilism and thus arguably not as interesting a case as one might have thought. Initially, Berker’s case is introduced and interpreted. Then the most recent response to the case from the literature is presented. Eventually, it is argued that Berker’s case is nothing but a straightforward consequence of the generality problem, i.e., the problematic aspect of the case for process reliabilism (if any) is already captured by the generality problem.

Arguments Against the Representational View

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Berit Brogaard
Keyword(s):  
Visual Experience ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Generality Problem

This chapter defends the representational view of visual experience against objections by Brewer, Siegel, Johnston, and Travis. Four problems are discussed: (1) the generality problem, or how to account for the specificity of visual experience; (2) how to explain illusions; (3) how the representational view can be true of all the visual experiences that we have, including brain grey, pink glow, after-images and phosphenes; and (4) how the phenomenology of visual experience can determine a unique representational content, given that there are indefinitely many different environments that could give rise to any particular look. The author takes on each of these objections and shows why they fail.

Evidentialism, Reliabilism, Evidentialist Reliabilism?

2020 ◽  
pp. 193-210
Author(s):  
Juan Comesaña
Keyword(s):  
Generality Problem ◽  
Evidential Probability ◽  
Measure Reliability

Experientialism is compared and contrasted with Evidentialism, Reliabilism, and Evidentialist Reliabilism. The generality problem for Reliabilism is discussed, as well as the issue of how to measure reliability. A probabilistic understanding of reliability is put forward. In particular, reliability is understood in terms of evidential probabilities, not physical probabilities. An extension to credences is explored. Experientialism is non-Evidentialist insofar as it does not take experience to be evidence, and is non-Reliabilist insofar as it appeals to a normatively loaded notion of evidential probability.

The specificity of the generality problem

2012 ◽  
Vol 163 (3) ◽  
pp. 751-762 ◽  
Author(s):  
Earl Conee
Keyword(s):  
Generality Problem

A defense of parrying responses to the generality problem

2016 ◽  
Vol 174 (8) ◽  
pp. 1935-1957 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Tolly
Keyword(s):  
Generality Problem
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