Evidentialism, Reliabilism, Evidentialist Reliabilism?

Author(s):  
Juan Comesaña

Experientialism is compared and contrasted with Evidentialism, Reliabilism, and Evidentialist Reliabilism. The generality problem for Reliabilism is discussed, as well as the issue of how to measure reliability. A probabilistic understanding of reliability is put forward. In particular, reliability is understood in terms of evidential probabilities, not physical probabilities. An extension to credences is explored. Experientialism is non-Evidentialist insofar as it does not take experience to be evidence, and is non-Reliabilist insofar as it appeals to a normatively loaded notion of evidential probability.

2002 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Adler ◽  
Michael Levin
Keyword(s):  

Diogenes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Ivanova ◽  
◽  
◽  

The article analyses the conflicting views of reliabilism and evidentialism on the following question – What is the leading condition in ascribing justification to beliefs: reliability or evaluation through evidence. The evidentialist view is defended by arguments, derived from the linguistic practices of ascribing justification in complex conditions. The generality problem is interpreted as an exemplification of the complexity of cognitive situations and it is argued that complexity requires reference to the mental states as a means for ascribing justification. Reliability is also recognized as a factor for ascribing justification to some beliefs when it serves as a type of evidence.


1963 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Austin ◽  
G. Kamienski ◽  
P. Kellow ◽  
J. Logan ◽  
I. Massaron

Author(s):  
Nishi Kant Kumar ◽  
Soumya Banerjee

The measurement of the reliability of such IoT based application requires an embedded analysis. The parameters are the number of imprecise or faulty measures as well as the identification of core modules. This article investigates that how far visual introspection can assist in troubleshooting of IoT-based software bugs. This specific requirement improvises a new idea, where the shape of the plots with actual data can indicate the cause of the error and further they can be patched if the software repairing strategies are implemented adjudging the visual analytics. It is quite indifferent to analyze faults for existing applications as a variation of topological and practicing parameters which takes substantial numbers of iterations and observations. Categorically, the present use-case establishes the fact to analyze and infer concerning the shape of the visual plots derived from embedded modules.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Wallbridge ◽  
Keyword(s):  

1979 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 61-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Munro

It is argued, in relation to the cross-cultural equivalence of personality measures, that of the three phases of test development namely construction, establishment of reliability and of validity, the second tends to receive too little attention. Accordingly, Rotter I-E Scale data from black and white students in Zambia and Rhodesia were compared with each other and with data collected in other countries. It is concluded that the Rotter I-E Scale is not a reliable instrument even for American groups; that responses may reflect manifest item content more than underlying cognitions about control; and that while locus-of-control seems a valuable and perhaps valid construct for cross-cultural personality and motivation research, we need better scales to measure reliability.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-109
Author(s):  
Gregory Stoutenburg ◽  

Epistemic probability theories of luck come in two versions. They are easiest to distinguish by the epistemic property they claim eliminates luck. One view says that the property is knowledge. The other view says that the property is being guaranteed by a subject’s evidence. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen defends the Knowledge Account (KA). He has recently argued that his view is preferable to my Epistemic Analysis of Luck (EAL), which defines luck in terms of evidential probability. In this paper, I defend EAL against Steglich-Petersen’s arguments, clarify the view, and argue for the explanatory significance of EAL with respect to some core epistemological issues. My overall goal is to show that an epistemic probability account of luck rooted in the concepts of evidence and evidential support remains a viable and fruitful overall account of luck.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariano Amo-Salas ◽  
María del Mar Arroyo-Jimenez ◽  
David Bustos-Escribano ◽  
Eva Fairén-Jiménez ◽  
Jesús López-Fidalgo

Multiple choice questions (MCQs) are one of the most popular tools to evaluate learning and knowledge in higher education. Nowadays, there are a few indices to measure reliability and validity of these questions, for instance, to check the difficulty of a particular question (item) or the ability to discriminate from less to more knowledge. In this work two new indices have been constructed: (i) the no answer index measures the relationship between the number of errors and the number of no answers; (ii) the homogeneity index measures homogeneity of the wrong responses (distractors). The indices are based on the lack-of-fit statistic, whose distribution is approximated by a chi-square distribution for a large number of errors. An algorithm combining several traditional and new indices has been developed to refine continuously a database of MCQs. The final objective of this work is the classification of MCQs from a large database of items in order to produce an automated-supervised system of generating tests with specific characteristics, such as more or less difficulty or capacity of discriminating knowledge of the topic.


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