Controlling Shareholders’ Incentive and Corporate Tax Avoidance: A Natural Experiment in China

2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 697-727 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Zhen Li ◽  
Hang Liu ◽  
Chenkai Ni



2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-39
Author(s):  
Hsihui Chang ◽  
Xin Dai ◽  
Yurun He ◽  
Maolin Wang

ABSTRACT This paper investigates how effective internal control protects shareholders' welfare in the context of corporate tax avoidance. Prior literature documents a positive association between internal control weakness and low tax avoidance. In this paper, we re-examine this association and complement prior research by finding that the direction of the association between internal control and tax avoidance depends on the level of tax avoidance. Specifically, for firms with low (high) levels of tax avoidance, internal control quality is positively (negatively) associated with tax avoidance. In additional analyses, we further explore how internal control mitigates agency costs for state-owned enterprises and tunneling activities. We show that for state-owned enterprises, which have lower incentives to avoid tax, effective internal control prevents managers from paying more taxes to cater to the controlling shareholders' interests. We also find that the association between tax avoidance and tunneling is reduced by effective internal control systems. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.



2022 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen Feng ◽  
Xingshu Zhu ◽  
Yu Gu ◽  
Yuecheng Liu

Based on the natural experiment of carbon emissions trading pilots in China, this paper investigates the effect of environmental regulation on corporate tax avoidance. The results show that: 1) Market-incentivized environmental regulation significantly increase the level of corporate tax avoidance. 2) Heterogeneity analysis shows that the effect is more obvious on the non-state-owned firms, firms with severe financing constraints, and firms in highly competitive industries. 3) We find that the reduction of cash flow is the channel for environmental regulation to affect corporate tax avoidance. 4) Further analysis shows that government subsidies can alleviate the enhancement of tax avoidance by environmental regulation. The more government subsidies a company receives, the less tax avoidance it has.







Author(s):  
Thomas R. Kubick ◽  
G. Brandon Lockhart ◽  
John R. Robinson


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed K. Alhadi ◽  
Grantley Taylor ◽  
Grant A. Richardson


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