Labor Market Integration and Fiscal Competition

Author(s):  
SERGII KIIASHKO ◽  
PAWEŁ KOPIEC
2000 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
David E Wildasin

This paper presents a general-equilibrium model where human capital investment increases specialization and exposes skilled workers to region-specific earnings risk. Interjurisdictional mobility of skilled labor mitigates these risks; state-contingent migration of skilled labor also improves efficiency. With perfect capital markets, labor-market integration raises welfare and reduces ex post earnings inequality. If instead human capital investment can only be financed through local taxes, labor-market integration leads to interjurisdictional fiscal competition, shifting the burden of taxation to low-skilled immobile workers. Decentralized public provision of human capital investment creates earnings inequalities and is inefficient. (JEL H00)


2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wouter Zwysen

We study whether the acquisition of host country human capital, such as obtaining equivalent qualifications, good language skills, or naturalization, explains differences in labor market integration between migrants depending on their initial motivation. We use cross-national European data from the 2008 ad hoc module of the Labour Force Survey to analyze migrant gaps in labor market participation, employment, occupational status, and precarious employment. We find that different rates of and returns to host country human capital explain a substantial part of the improvements in labor market outcomes with years of residence, particularly for noneconomic migrants who experience faster growth on average.


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