Constitutional Competition Between the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal and the Chinese National People's Congress Standing Committee: A Game Theory Perspective

2014 ◽  
Vol 39 (04) ◽  
pp. 824-848 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric C. Ip

The competition between the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, a cosmopolitan common law supreme court, and the Chinese National People's Congress Standing Committee, a Leninist parliamentary body, over the “proper meaning” of the Hong Kong Basic Law constituted a very important facet of the territory's constitutional history since the end of British rule in 1997. This article applies the insights of game theory to explain why constitutional stability, in the sense that the two players have never entered into an open collision with each other despite the ambiguity of the Basic Law and the “One Country, Two Systems” formula, endured until the present day. It is argued that successful coordination between the two resulted from the strong aversion of the Court and the Standing Committee to constitutional crises, as well as from the fact that neither entity was capable of credibly signaling its commitment to an aggressive strategy all the time.

Ethnicities ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
André Lecours ◽  
Jean-François Dupré

Using a historical institutionalist framework emphasizing the importance of transformative events, this paper seeks to explain the sudden emergence of self-determination claims in Hong Kong and their transformation into separatist ones in Catalonia. The paper argues that the inflexibility of the state in addressing moderate demands for regional autonomy has played a major role in the emergence and radicalization of these demands. In Hong Kong, the 1997 Handover from British to Chinese sovereignty was originally presented as an opportunity for self-governance under the principle of “Hong Kong People ruling Hong Kong” and the “One Country, Two Systems” formula. If Hong Kong nationalism was practically unheard of in the early years of the Handover, the unconciliatory attitude of the central government towards moderate demands for the actualization of the autonomy and democratization frameworks vested in Hong Kong’s Basic Law has directly contributed to the formation of today’s emerging self-determination movement. In Catalonia, the 2010 decision of the Spanish Constitutional Court to annul some articles of the reform to the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia and to interpret others narrowly represented a transformative event that took Catalonia onto the pathway of secessionist politics. The secessionist turn was then further fed by the on-going refusal of the central government to negotiate with the Catalan government, notably on the notion of a popular consultation on the political future of the Autonomous Community.


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric C. IP

AbstractRecurrent proposals to establish a constitutional supervisory committee have been pertinaciously rejected in spite of widespread recognition of the Chinese Constitution’s ineffectiveness. And yet, the Hong Kong Basic Law Committee has long epitomized in practice a prototypic form of constitutional supervision. Vested with quasi-judicial competences, the Committee seemed destined for a central role under the “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement. The tight secrecy imposed on its proceedings and the suppression of its potential to act consistently and with a distinct identity have fatally undermined the Committee’s ability to modulate constitutional tensions by way of coordinating expectations of the Basic Law’s proper meaning. The experience of the Basic Law Committee reveals the recalcitrance of the Party-state toward constitutional interpretation by any specialized body, even one whose powers are heavily circumscribed and whose membership is tightly controlled.


2000 ◽  
Vol 161 ◽  
pp. 221-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lo Shiu Hing

Before the transfer of Hong Kong's sovereignty from Britain to the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 July 1997, the politics of interpreting the Basic Law had already become apparent. This article aims to use the debate over the Court of Final Appeal (COFA), which was set up in July 1997 to replace the Privy Council in Britain as the court of final adjudication in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), to analyse how the Basic Law had already been interpreted by PRC officials, their British counterparts and the Hong Kong people. The interpretation of the Basic Law involves many people from both Hong Kong and China. As one legal scholar writes: “In one sense all kinds of people [in the HKSAR] will have to interpret the Basic Law: civil servants and other administrators and lawyers in their day-today work, legislators to ensure that their legislation and motions are consistent with it, the State Council [in the PRC], the National People's Congress Standing Committee, even private parties since some provisions affect private acts.” The debate over the COFA may also help towards an understanding of the ongoing interpretation of various provisions of the Basic Law, which serves as the mini-constitution of the HKSAR.


PMLA ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 131 (5) ◽  
pp. 1527-1530
Author(s):  
Sharanya Jayawickrama

As 2016 Draws to a Close, the Most Hotly Debated Topic in Hong Kong is the Controversial Behavior of Two Newly elected legislators of a localist political party during their oath taking at the Legislative Council earlier this year. The proindependence advocates roused anger among mainland Chinese and local Hong Kong officials and citizens alike when they declared allegiance to the “Hong Kong nation” and pronounced “China” in a way that painfully echoed for many the derogatory pronunciation used by the Japanese forces that occupied Hong Kong in World War II. Ironically, in their attempts to lobby for the Hong Kong people's interests and right to self-determination, the legislators were accused of ignoring Hong Kong's history and disrespecting those who had perished during or survived those dark days. Subsequently, China's National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) issued an interpretation of Hong Kong's Basic Law that disqualified the pair from government service and preempted any ruling by a local Hong Kong court. This decision prompted thirteen thousand Hong Kong people to take to the streets in protest against what is widely perceived as the mainland's tightening of control over its special administrative region.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yang Liao ◽  
Li Meng

The basic meaning of "patriots ruling Hong Kong" is that Hong Kong people who love China and love Hong Kong govern Hong Kong society to ensure the smooth implementation of the "One Country, Two Systems" system and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in Hong Kong and maintain the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong society.


Author(s):  
Moser Michael J ◽  
Choong John

This chapter evaluates the merits of Hong Kong as a venue for international arbitration proceedings. Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (PRC). British rule ended in 1997, with the PRC assuming sovereignty under the ‘one country, two systems’ principle. Hong Kong has long been one of the leading arbitral seats in Asia. Its prominence as a leading arbitral seat is due in large part to the establishment of the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) in 1985 and adoption in 1990 of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. Arbitration law and practice has remained unaffected by the handover to the PRC. Today Hong Kong continues to be widely regarded as one of the leading arbitral venues in Asia, particularly for China-related disputes. In addition, Hong Kong is also increasingly seen as one of the leading international arbitration seats worldwide.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janis Wong

The proposal of the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assis- tance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019 (2019年逃犯及刑事事宜相互法律協助法例(修訂)條例草 案) (FOMLA) by the Hong Kong government, aimed at closing the gap for extradition to Taiwan, Macau, and Mainland China, sparked dozens of city-wide protests as demonstrators feared it would erode Hong Kong’s legal system, including rights to privacy and data protection, under the Hong Kong Basic Law (HKBL).Facilitated by technology, the leaderless, decentralised demonstrations furthered the anti-extradition bill protests by establishing legitimacy, participation, trust, and privacy be- tween citizens under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ frame- work. Based on these themes, this paper assesses how Hong Kong protesters found novel uses of technology such as Tele- gram, Apple Airdrop, cash and untraceable transactions, LIHKG Forum, and protest livestreams to self-organise, demon- strate their support for the movement, and maintain its mo- mentum. The protesters’ use of technology also shaped Twit- ter, Facebook, and Youtube policies, removing bot accounts and state-sponsored disinformation from their platforms.Learning from the city’s past protests, arrests, and convic- tions, this paper illustrates how Hong Kong protesters trans- formed their use of technology as a means to protect their personal identities, preserve their rights enshrined under the HKBL, and strive for democratic freedoms.


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