Puzzle corner: Solution to Katy's Piggy Banks

2016 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-97
Author(s):  
Mike Fletcher
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Koji Domon

Abstract Content industries have several profit sources that positively interact with one another, and piracy affects them not only negatively but also positively. For copyright holders, choosing to allow piracy depends upon its total external effects. This paper proves that in such case the profit function is convex with respect to the level of enforcement. This paper shows a convex profit function with respect to the level of enforcement. The convexity leads to a corner solution of optimal enforcement for copyright holders. Which corner solution is selected depends on the relative size of the sub-market, and no enforcement is profitable if the submarket size is relatively large. This result compensates for a shortcoming of discussions that assume only two options regarding the level of enforcement, zero or perfect enforcement.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 344-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandra M. Brown ◽  
David I. Warton ◽  
Nigel R. Andrew ◽  
Matthew Binns ◽  
Gerasimos Cassis ◽  
...  

2015 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 106-106
Author(s):  
K. S. Bhanu ◽  
M. N. Deshpande
Keyword(s):  

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vassilios N. Gargalas

<p class="MsoBlockText" style="margin: 0in 32.6pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-no-proof: no;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">In this paper, we analyze the value of services rendered by tax practitioners,<span dir="rtl"> </span>demonstrating that the conventional single-period solution may be inconsistent with their role. We contend that the value of these services stems from tax practitioners' knowledge of the tax code and not from the signal they convey to tax authorities when they sign the returns. We take the position that taxpayers' actions may not convey a signal to the tax enforcement agent, thereby enabling the latter to set different detection rates for different taxpayers. If taxpayers' actions were to convey a signal, the solution would not be sustainable, since it would eventually lead to a self-revealing &ldquo;corner solution,&rdquo; in which all taxpayers would take the same action. </span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 32.6pt 0pt 0.5in; unicode-bidi: embed; direction: ltr;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-no-proof: no;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: x-small;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 32.6pt 0pt 0.5in; unicode-bidi: embed; direction: ltr;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-no-proof: no;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">In a single-period framework, the taxpayer&rsquo;s decision to hire a practitioner is dependent upon two variables: the practitioners&rsquo; fee, which is known to the tax enforcement agent, and taxpayers' risk attitude. The tax enforcement agent can infer the latter if the taxpayers use practitioners who sign the tax returns.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>If taxpayers use practitioners&rsquo; services, we are able to derive the same exact solution irrespective of whether or not practitioners<strong> </strong>sign the returns.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Thus, we suspect that the value of these services does not stem from the fact that the returns are signed. </span></span></span></p>


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document