Optimal Enforcement for Content Industries under Positive External Effects of Piracy

Content industries have several profit sources that positively interact with one another, and piracy affects them not only negatively but also positively. For copyright holders, choosing to allow piracy depends upon its total external effects. This paper proves that in such case the profit function is convex with respect to the level of enforcement. This paper shows a convex profit function with respect to the level of enforcement. The convexity leads to a corner solution of optimal enforcement for copyright holders. Which corner solution is selected depends on the relative size of the sub-market, and no enforcement is profitable if the submarket size is relatively large. This result compensates for a shortcoming of discussions that assume only two options regarding the level of enforcement, zero or perfect enforcement.

Some aspects on solving transportation problem

In this paper, we consider a class of transportation problems which arises in sample surveys and other areas of statistics. The associated cost matrices to these transportation problems are of special structure. We observe that the optimality of North West corner solution holds for the problem where cost component is replaced by a convex function. We revisit assignment problem and present a weighted version of K?nig-Egerv?ry theorem. Finally, we propose weighted Hungarian method to solve the transportation problem.

Estimation methods in the presence of corner solutions

In this article, I introduce a new command, nehurdle, that collects maximum likelihood estimators for linear, exponential, homoskedastic, and heteroskedastic tobit; truncated hurdle; and type II tobit models that involve explained variables with corner solutions. I review what a corner solution is as well as the assumptions of the mentioned models.

Pricing of Platforms in Two-Sided Markets with Heterogeneous Agents and Limited Market Size

We study a two-sided market represented by network platforms and heterogeneous agents. Our setup departs from Armstrong (2006)’s monopoly model by assuming both (1) a continuum of agents of limited size on each side of the market and (2) heterogeneous utility of agents with Hotelling specification. We show that the monopoly’s optimal pricing strategy always results in a corner solution in terms of the equilibrium market share. We also solve for the social planner’s optimization problem and obtain a similar corner solution result. In addition, the exact values for the equilibrium in the case of duopoly for a two-sided market on two platforms are obtained.

Indifference Curve Analysis: The Correct and the Incorrect

The thesis of this paper is that when the indifference curve is concave to the origin, the optimal point on the budget line is not the corner solution on the highest (most north eastern) indifference curve, the analysis all too often offered in the literature, but, rather, somewhat paradoxically, the lowest (most south western) indifference curve. The economics profession, as articulated through the megaphone of intermediate micro economics texts, offers a mixed result in this regard. Some few do offer a correct analysis, but many do not; others ignore the issue entirely. The contribution of the present paper and the aim of our research is to provide a correction of the widespread but erroneous indifference curve analysis that appears in many of our intermediate microeconomics texts. Our methodology is one of contrast: we offer what we see as both the correct and the incorrect versions of indifference curve analysis.