Management of Ultimate Risk of Nuclear Power Plants by Source Terms: Lessons Learned from the Chernobyl Accident

Author(s):  
Genn Saji

The term ‘ultimate risk’ is used here to describe the probabilities and radiological consequences that should be incorporated in siting, containment design and accident management of nuclear power plants for hypothetical accidents. It is closely related with the source terms specified in siting criteria which assures an adequate separation of radioactive inventories of the plants from the public, in the event of a hypothetical and severe accident situation. The author would like to point out that current source terms which are based on the information from the Windscale accident (1957) through TID-14844 are very outdated and do not incorporate lessons learned from either the Three Miles Island (TMI, 1979) nor Chernobyl accident (1986), two of the most severe accidents ever experienced. As a result of the observations of benign radionuclides released at TMI, the technical community in the US felt that a more realistic evaluation of severe reactor accident source terms was necessary. In this background, the “source term research project” was organized in 1984 to respond to these challenges. Unfortunately, soon after the time of the final report from this project was released, the Chernobyl accident occurred. Due to the enormous consequences induced by then accident, the one time optimistic perspectives in establishing a more realistic source term were completely shattered. The Chernobyl accident, with its human death toll and dispersion of a large part of the fission fragments inventories into the environment, created a significant degradation in the public’s acceptance of nuclear energy throughout the world. In spite of this, nuclear communities have been prudent in responding to the public’s anxiety towards the ultimate safety of nuclear plants, since there still remained many unknown points revolving around the mechanism of the Chernobyl accident. In order to resolve some of these mysteries, the author has performed a scoping study of the dispersion and deposition mechanisms of fuel particles and fission fragments during the initial phase of the Chernobyl accident. Through this study, it is now possible to generally reconstruct the radiological consequences by using a dispersion calculation technique, combined with the meteorological data at the time of the accident and land contamination densities of 137Cs measured and reported around the Chernobyl area. Although it is challenging to incorporate lessons learned from the Chernobyl accident into the source term issues, the author has already developed an example of safety goals by incorporating the radiological consequences of the accident. The example provides safety goals by specifying source term releases in a graded approach in combination with probabilities, i.e. risks. The author believes that the future source term specification should be directly linked with safety goals.

10.2172/29438 ◽  
1995 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Soffer ◽  
S.B. Burson ◽  
C.M. Ferrell ◽  
R.Y. Lee ◽  
J.N. Ridgely

2014 ◽  
Vol 986-987 ◽  
pp. 564-571
Author(s):  
Xin Hua Liu ◽  
Lan Fang ◽  
Zhao Wen Zhu

The problems occurring in the fission product source term calculations for M310/CPR1000, EPR and AP1000 are briefly analyzed, based on the related regulations and standards, as well as operational feedback, review experiences and recent research achievements for nuclear power plants in China. The framework of fission product source term proper to China has been first studied and proposed in perspective of the purpose of source terms. The calculation processes of fission product source term are rearranged and the requirements for deferent reactor types are specified. The proposed framework can be taken as a foundation for solution of the long-standing problems in the calculation of fission product source term and provide reference for source term calculation.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Villaran ◽  
◽  
Meng Yue ◽  
Robert Lofaro ◽  
Athi Varuttamaseni ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Thomas G. Scarbrough

In a series of Commission papers, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) described its policy for inservice testing (IST) programs to be developed and implemented at nuclear power plants licensed under 10 CFR Part 52. This paper discusses the expectations for IST programs based on those Commission policy papers as applied in the NRC staff review of combined license (COL) applications for new reactors. For example, the design and qualification of pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints through implementation of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Standard QME-1-2007, “Qualification of Active Mechanical Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Plants,” as accepted in NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.100 (Revision 3), “Seismic Qualification of Electrical and Active Mechanical Equipment and Functional Qualification of Active Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants,” will enable IST activities to assess the operational readiness of those components to perform their intended functions. ASME has updated the Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code) to improve the IST provisions for pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints that are incorporated by reference in the NRC regulations with applicable conditions. In addition, lessons learned from performance experience and testing of motor-operated valves (MOVs) will be implemented as part of the IST programs together with application of those lessons learned to other power-operated valves (POVs). Licensee programs for the Regulatory Treatment of Non-Safety Systems (RTNSS) will be implemented for components in active nonsafety-related systems that are the first line of defense in new reactors that rely on passive systems to provide reactor core and containment cooling in the event of a plant transient. This paper also discusses the overlapping testing provisions specified in ASME Standard QME-1-2007; plant-specific inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria; the applicable ASME OM Code as incorporated by reference in the NRC regulations; specific license conditions; and Initial Test Programs as described in the final safety analysis report and applicable RGs. Paper published with permission.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Andreas Schumm ◽  
Madalina Rabung ◽  
Gregory Marque ◽  
Jary Hamalainen

We present a cross-cutting review of three on-going Horizon 2020 projects (ADVISE, NOMAD, TEAM CABLES) and one already finished FP7 project (HARMONICS), which address the reliability of safety-relevant components and systems in nuclear power plants, with a scope ranging from the pressure vessel and primary loop to safety-critical software systems and electrical cables. The paper discusses scientific challenges faced in the beginning and achievements made throughout the projects, including the industrial impact and lessons learned. Two particular aspects highlighted concern the way the projects sought contact with end users, and the balance between industrial and academic partners. The paper concludes with an outlook on follow-up issues related to the long term operation of nuclear power plants.


Author(s):  
Jingxi Li ◽  
Gaofeng Huang ◽  
Lili Tong

The major threat that nuclear power plants (NPPs) pose to the safety of the public comes from the large amount radioactive material released during design-basis accidents (DBAs). Additionally, many aspects of Control Room Habitability, Environmental Reports, Facility Siting and Operation derive from the design analyses that incorporated the earlier accident source term and radiological consequence of NPPs. Depending on current applications, majority of Chinese NPPs adopt the method of TID-14844, which uses the whole body and thyroid dose criteria. However, alternative Source Term (AST) are commonly used in AP1000 and some LWRs (such as Beaver Valley Power Station, Units No. 1 and No. 2, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 And 2, Kewaunee Power Station and so on), so it is attempted to adopt AST in radiological consequence analysis of other nuclear power plants. By introducing and implementing the method of AST defined in RG 1.183 and using integral safety analysis code, a pressurized water reactor (PWR) of 900 MW nuclear power plant analysis model is constructed and the radiological consequence induced by Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) accident is evaluated. For DBA MSLB, the fractions of core inventory are assumed to be in the gap for various radionuclides and then the release from the fuel gap is assumed to occur instantaneously with the onset of assumed damage. According to the assumptions for evaluating the radiological consequences of PWR MSLB, dose calculation methodology is performed with total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) which is the criteria of dose evaluation. Compared with dose criteria of RG 1.183, the dose of control room, exclusion area boundary and outer boundary of low population zone are acceptable.


Author(s):  
Omid Malekzadeh ◽  
Matthew Monid ◽  
Michael Huang

Abstract Three-Dimensional (3D) CAD models are utilized by many designers; however, they are rarely utilized to their full potential. The current mainstream method of design process and communication is through design documentation. They are limited in depth of information, compartmentalized by discipline, fragmented into various segments, communicated through numerous layers, and finally, printed onto an undersized paper by the stakeholders and end-users. Large nuclear projects, such as refurbishments and decommissioning, suffer from spatial, interface, and interreference challenges, unintentional cost and schedule overruns, and quality concerns that can be rooted to the misalignments between designed and in-situ or previously as-built conditions that tend to stem from inaccessibility and lack of adequate data resolution during the transfer of technical information. This paper will identify the technologies and the methodology used during several piping system modifications of existing nuclear power plants, and shares the lessons learned with respect to the benefits and shortcomings of the approach. Overall, it is beneficial to leverage available multi-dimensional technologies to enhance various engineering and execution phases. The utilization and superposition of various spatial models into 3D and 4D formats, enabled the modification projects to significantly reduce in-person plant walkdown efforts, provide highly accurate as-found data, and enable stakeholders of all disciplines and trades to review the as-found, as-designed, and simulated as-installed modification; including the steps in between without requiring significant plant visits. This approach will therefore reduce the field-initiated changes that tend to result in design/field variations; resulting in less reliance on Appendix T of ASME BPVC Section III, reduction in the design registration reconciliations efforts, and it aligns with the overarching goal of EPRI guideline NCIG-05. Beyond the benefits to design and execution, the multidimensional approach will provide highly accurate inputs to some of the nuclear safety’s Beyond Design Basis Assessments (BDBA) and allowed for the incorporation of actual design values as input and hence removing the unnecessary over-conservatisms within some of the inputs.


Author(s):  
Ronald Farrell ◽  
L. Ike Ezekoye

Safety related valves in nuclear power plants are required to be qualified in accordance with the ASME QME-1 standard. This standard describes the requirements and the processes for qualifying active mechanical equipment that are used in nuclear power plants. It does not cover the qualification of electrical components that are addressed using IEEE standards; however, QME-1 recognizes that both mechanical and electrical components must be qualified when they are interfaced as an assembly. Qualifying both mechanical and electrical valve assemblies can be challenging. Considerable amount of judgment is used when developing the plan to qualify any valve with an electric motor actuator. If the wrong steps are taken in planning the tests, the results from the tests may not be useful thus triggering the need to perform additional tests to comply with QME-1 requirements. This paper presents lessons learned in the process of qualifying valve assemblies to meet QME-1 requirements. The lessons include the decision processes associated with planning and executing valve testing, analysis of the valve assemblies for natural frequency determination, and missed opportunities to capture relevant test data during the tests. Finally, the paper will discuss challenges associated with justifying the tests and extending the results of the tests to cover untested valve assemblies.


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