Sensitivity Analysis of Combined Boundedly Rational System Optimal Traffic Assignment and Arterial Green-Wave Signal Control Model

Author(s):  
Shoufeng Lu ◽  
Ximin Liu ◽  
Shiqiang Dai
Electronics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (9) ◽  
pp. 1058 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuanxiang Ren ◽  
Jinbo Wang ◽  
Lingqiao Qin ◽  
Shen Li ◽  
Yang Cheng

Setting up an exclusive left-turn lane and corresponding signal phase for intersection traffic safety and efficiency will decrease the capacity of the intersection when there are less or no left-turn movements. This is especially true during rush hours because of the ineffective use of left-turn lane space and signal phase duration. With the advantages of vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication, a novel intersection signal control model is proposed which sets up variable lane direction arrow marking and turns the left-turn lane into a controllable shared lane for left-turn and through movements. The new intersection signal control model and its control strategy are presented and simulated using field data. After comparison with two other intersection control models and control strategies, the new model is validated to improve the intersection capacity in rush hours. Besides, variable lane lines and the corresponding control method are designed and combined with the left-turn waiting area to overcome the shortcomings of the proposed intersection signal control model and control strategy.


1998 ◽  
Vol 1617 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Owen Chen ◽  
Moshe Ben-Akiva

The dynamic traffic control problem and the dynamic traffic assignment problem are integrated as a noncooperative game between a traffic authority and highway users. The objective of the combined control-assignment problem is to find a mutually consistent dynamic system-optimal signal setting and dynamic user-optimal traffic flow. The combined control-assignment problem is first formulated as a one-level Cournot game: the traffic authority and the users choose their strategies simultaneously. The combined control-assignment problem is subsequently formulated as a bi-level Stackelberg game. The traffic authority is the leader; it determines the signal settings in anticipation of the users’ reactions. The users are followers who choose their routes after the signal settings have been determined. Finally, the system-optimal control-assignment problem is formulated as a Monopoly game. The sole player—the traffic authority—determines both signal settings and traffic flows to achieve a dynamic system-optimal solution. A numerical example is provided to illustrate the equilibria of the games.


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