ENRICHED INTERVAL BILATTICES AND PARTIAL MANY-VALUED LOGICS: AN APPROACH TO DEAL WITH GRADED TRUTH AND IMPRECISION

Author(s):  
FRANCESC ESTEVA ◽  
PERE GARCIA-CALVÉS ◽  
LLUÍS GODO

Within the many-valued approach for approximate reasoning, the aim of this paper is two-fold. First, to extend truth-values lattices to cope with the imprecision due to possible incompleteness of the available information. This is done by considering two bilattices of truth-value intervals corresponding to the so-called weak and strong truth orderings. Based on the use of interval bilattices, the second aim is to introduce what we call partial many-valued logics. The (partial) models of such logics may assign intervals of truth-values to formulas, and so they stand for representations of incomplete states of knowledge. Finally, the relation between partial and complete semantical entailment is studied, and it is provedtheir equivalence for a family of formulas, including the so-called free well formed formulas.

1958 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trevor Evans ◽  
P. B. Schwartz

In [2] E. L. Post defined a many-valued propositional logic to be functionally complete if, for every function on the set of truth-values, there exists a formula of the logic having that function as its associated truth-value function. He proved that the logic with truth-values 1, 2, …, m and (i) a unary connective ∼ such that ∼p has truth-value i+1 (mod m) when p has truth-value i, (ii) a binary connective ∨ such that p ∨ q has truth-value min(i, j) when p, q have truth-values i, j respectively, is functionally complete.The many-valued logics described by Łukasiewicz and Tarski [1] are not functionally complete. These logics have truth-values 1, 2, …, m and (i) a unary connective ~ such that ~p has truth-value m−i+1 when p has truth-value i, (ii) a binary connective → such that if p, q have truth-values i, j respectively, then p → q has truth-value 1 for i ≧ j, and truth-value 1 for i ≧ j. The functional incompleteness of these logics is immediate, since there exists no formula in p having truth-value i (≠ 1 or m) when p has truth-value 1.In [4] Słupecki showed that if a new unary connective T, such that T(p) has truth-value 2 for all truth-values assigned to p, is added to the 3-valued Łukasiewicz-Tarski logic, then the resulting logic is functionally complete. In [3] Rosser and Turquette proved this result for the m-valued (m ≧ 3) logic.


Author(s):  
Jody Azzouni

Some of the many ways that sentences with non-referring terms, such as “witch,” “Frodo,” and “casts spells,” are induced to have truth values are sketched. Three models are the axiomatic model, the fiction model, and the perception model. The general point is that the methods that we use to discover the truth values of sentences with referring terms can be generalized to sentences with non-referring terms. Even though truth-value inducing, in general, does not force a truth value on every sentence in a discourse, a commitment to bivalence is preserved by the use of expressions of ignorance. It’s also argued that traditional truth-conditional semantics should not be required to describe language-world relations. How adopting the coherence theory of truth for certain classes of sentences with non-referring terms avoids traditional objections to coherence views of truth is described.


Author(s):  
Francesco Luca De Angelis ◽  
Giovanna Di Marzo Serugendo ◽  
Barbara Dunin-Kęplicz ◽  
Andrzej Szałas

2005 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
René van Woudenberg

Contextualists explain certain intuitions regarding knowledge ascriptions by means of the thesis that 'knowledge' behaves like an indexical. This explanation denies what Peter Unger has called invariantism, i.e., the idea that knowledge ascriptions have truth value independent of the context in which they are issued. This paper aims to provide an invariantist explanation of the contextualist's intuitions, the core of which is that 'knowledge' has many different senses.


1998 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 1201-1217
Author(s):  
Norman Feldman

In this paper we consider the three-valued logic used by Kleene [6] in the theory of partial recursive functions. This logic has three truth values: true (T), false (F), and undefined (U). One interpretation of U is as follows: Suppose we have two partially recursive predicates P(x) and Q(x) and we want to know the truth value of P(x) ∧ Q(x) for a particular x0. If x0 is in the domain of definition of both P and Q, then P(x0) ∧ Q(x0) is true if both P(x0) and Q(x0) are true, and false otherwise. But what if x0 is not in the domain of definition of P, but is in the domain of definition of Q? There are several choices, but the one chosen by Kleene is that if Q(X0) is false, then P(x0) ∧ Q(x0) is also false and if Q(X0) is true, then P(x0) ∧ Q(X0) is undefined.What arises is the question about knowledge of whether or not x0 is in the domain of definition of P. Is there an effective procedure to determine this? If not, then we can interpret U as being unknown. If there is an effective procedure, then our decision for the truth value for P(x) ∧ Q(x) is based on the knowledge that is not in the domain of definition of P. In this case, U can be interpreted as undefined. In either case, we base our truth value of P(x) ∧ Q(x) on the truth value of Q(X0).


Author(s):  
QINPING ZHAO ◽  
BO LI

A system of multivalued logical equations and its solution algorithm are put forward in this paper. Based on this work we generalize SLD-resolution into multivalued logic and establish the corresponding truth value calculus. As a result, M, an approximate reasoning system, is built. We present the language and inference rules of M. Furthermore, we analyse inconsistency of assignments to truth degrees and give the solving strategies of M.


2007 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eros Corazza

After discussing some difficulties that contextualism and minimalism face, this paper presents a new account of the linguistic exploitation of context, situationalism. Unlike the former accounts, situationalism captures the idea that the main intuitions underlying the debate concern not the identity of propositions expressed but rather how truth-values are situation-dependent. The truth-value of an utterance depends on the situation in which the proposition expressed is evaluated. Hence, like in minimalism, the proposition expressed can be truth-evaluable without being enriched or expanded. Along with contextualism, it is argued that an utterance’s truth-value is context dependent. But, unlike contextualism and minimalism, situationalism embraces a form of relativism in so far as it maintains that semantic content must be evaluated vis-à-vis a given situation and, therefore, that a proposition cannot be said to be true/false eternally.


1994 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 830-837 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingsheng Ying

Classical logic is not adequate to face the essential vagueness of human reasoning, which is approximate rather than precise in nature. The logical treatment of the concepts of vagueness and approximation is of increasing importance in artificial intelligence and related research. Consequently, many logicians have proposed different systems of many-valued logic as a formalization of approximate reasoning (see, for example, Goguen [G], Gerla and Tortora [GT], Novak [No], Pavelka [P], and Takeuti and Titani [TT]). As far as we know, all the proposals are obtained by extending the range of truth values of propositions. In these logical systems reasoning is still exact and to make a conclusion the antecedent clause of its rule must match its premise exactly. In addition. Wang [W] pointed out: “If we compare calculation with proving,... Procedures of calculation... can be made so by fairly well-developed methods of approximation; whereas... we do not have a clear conception of approximate methods in theorem proving.... The concept of approximate proofs, though undeniably of another kind than approximations in numerical calculations, is not incapable of more exact formulation in terms of, say, sketches of and gradual improvements toward a correct proof” (see pp, 224–225). As far as the author is aware, however, no attempts have been made to give a conception of approximate methods in theorem proving.The purpose of this paper is. unlike all the previous proposals, to develop a propositional calculus, a predicate calculus in which the truth values of propositions are still true or false exactly and in which the reasoning may be approximate and allow the antecedent clause of a rule to match its premise only approximately. In a forthcoming paper we shall establish set theory, based on the logic introduced here, in which there are ∣L∣ binary predicates ∈λ, λ ∈ L such that R(∈, ∈λ) = λ where ∈ stands for ∈1 and 1 is the greatest element in L, and x ∈λy is interpreted as that x belongs to y in the degree of λ, and relate it to intuitionistic fuzzy set theory of Takeuti and Titani [TT] and intuitionistic modal set theory of Lano [L]. In another forthcoming paper we shall introduce the resolution principle under approximate match and illustrate its applications in production systems of artificial intelligence.


2021 ◽  

Spread across Brazil and attaining an unparalleled political force, therapeutic communities are as inescapable in the debate on drug policy as they are complex to define. Although they are not a Brazilian creation, they have been operating in that country for decades, and their dissemination intensified in the 1990s. In 2011, they were officially incorporated into Brazil's Psychosocial Care Network (Rede de Atenção Psicossocial, or RAPS). Since then, therapeutic communities have been at the center of public debates about their regulation; about how they should—or even if they should—be a part of the healthcare system; about the level of supervision to which they should be submitted; about their sources of funding, particularly whether or not they should have access to public funding; and, most importantly, about the quality of the services they offer and the many reports of rights violation that have been made public. However, a well-informed public debate can only flourish if the available information is based on sound evidence. The SSRC’s Drugs, Security and Democracy Program is concerned with the policy relevance of the research projects it supports, and the debate around therapeutic communities in Brazil points to a clear need for impartial research that addresses different cross-cutting aspects of this topic in its various dimensions: legal, regulatory, health, and observance of human rights, among others. It is in this context that we publish this working paper series on therapeutic communities in Brazil. The eight articles that compose this series offer a multidisciplinary view of the topic, expanding and deepening the existing literature and offering powerful contributions to a substantive analysis of therapeutic communities as instruments of public policy. Although they can be read separately, it is as a whole that the strength of the eight articles that make up this series becomes more evident. Even though they offer different perspectives, they are complementary works in—and already essential for—delineating and understanding the phenomenon of therapeutic communities in Brazil.


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