The Influence of Social Media on Employee’s Knowledge Sharing Motivation: A Two-Factor Theory Perspective

This study aims to investigate social media (hygiene factor), motivators (allow employees to share knowledge), and employee’s knowledge sharing motivation (KSM). For this purpose, the author introduces two-factor theory as its research framework to propose research hypotheses and construct the theoretical model. Then the model is tested and validated based on a survey of 278 enterprise employees in China, utilizing structural equation modeling through SPSS statistics and AMOS. It is found that first, the three states of knowledge sharing (lack of motivation, intermediate state, and with motivation) constitute two continuums. The satisfaction of motivators and hygiene factors respectively lead to changes in the state of motivation to share, and second, social media affects the staff’s motivation to share through both a direct and an indirect pathway. Directly, as the hygiene factor, the absence of social media will weaken the staff’s motivation to share. However, its usage doesn’t directly increase employees’ sharing motivation. Indirectly, through the mediating effect of self-efficacy social media can influence knowledge sharing motivation of employees.

Entrepreneurship

In this paper, we reconsider the various states of rest within Austrian market process theory. While this theory certainly embodies a superior representation of market processes to the neoclassical general equilibrium theory, it falls short of producing a holistic theory of human action. The analysis left out those human actions that produce changes to the so-called ‘final state of rest,’ which have so far been taken as exogenous to the market process. These exogenous shocks include knowledge generation and preference shifting. However, I argue that these can and ought to be understood as market phenomena, and so belong within the scope of praxeological analysis. To capture these types of human action, I propose that a new and truly ‘final’ state of rest be introduced, which we term the ‘nirvana state of rest.’ This new state represents a ‘true’ final state, in which human action ceases because all needs, and thus all motivation to act, are completely and perpetually assuaged. Introducing this state into the analysis, we can break free from myopic analyses of mere present states of knowledge and values to observe and explain general tendencies in market processes, prices, and entrepreneurship. I also show how quarrels within Austrian circles might be resolved through this expanded, macroscopic lens.

Is Plato an Innatist in the Meno?

Plato in the Meno is standardly interpreted as committed to condition innatism: human beings are born with latent innate states of knowledge. Against this view, Gail Fine has argued for prenatalism: human souls possess knowledge in a disembodied state but lose it upon being embodied. We argue against both views and in favor of content innatism: human beings are born with innate cognitive contents that can be, but do not exist innately in the soul as, the contents of states of knowledge. Content innatism has strong textual support and constitutes a philosophically interesting theory.

Ineffability and Religion

It is argued that, although there are no ineffable truths, the concept of ineffability nevertheless does have application—to certain states of knowledge. Towards the end of the essay this idea is related to religion: it is argued that the language that results from attempting (unsuccessfully) to put ineffable knowledge into words is very often of a religious kind. An example of this is given at the very end of the essay. This example concerns the Euthyphro question: whether what is right is right because God wills it, or whether God wills it because it is right.

Introduction

The introduction begins with an overview of all the essays in the collection. It highlights a tension among them: a thesis that surfaces at various points in the essays in Part I is that some things are ineffable, while a thesis that surfaces at various points in the essays in Part II is that nothing is ineffable. The essays in Part III, deriving their inspiration from the early work of Wittgenstein, indicate how this tension is to be resolved. We can construe the first of these theses as a thesis about states of knowledge or understanding, and the second as a thesis about facts or truths. An outline is then given of the contribution that each essay makes to this Keywords

Language, World, and Limits

This is a collection of previously published essays that are all concerned, at some level, with the nature, scope, and limits of representation, where by representation is meant the act of representing, truly or falsely, how things are. The collection is divided into three parts. The essays in Part I deal with linguistic representation. One thesis that surfaces at various points in these essays is that some things are ineffable. The essays in Part II deal with representation more generally, and with the character of what is represented. They all touch more or less directly on the distinction between perspectival representation, that is representation from a point of view, and absolute representation, that is representation from no point of view. One thesis that surfaces at various points in these essays is that nothing is ineffable. The essays in Part III, deriving their inspiration from the early work of Wittgenstein, indicate how the resulting tension between Parts I and II is to be resolved. We can construe the first of these theses as a thesis about states of knowledge or understanding, and the second as a thesis about facts or truths.

Logical Analogies: Interpretations, Oppositions, and Probabilism

I present two logical systems to show the “analogy of proportionality” common to several interpretations: modality (necessity and possibility), quantification, truth-functional relations, moral attitudes (deontic logic), states of knowledge (epistemic logic), and states of belief (doxastic logic). To display the two underlying analogical relations, I call upon the originally Scholastic convention, recently put to use again, of using squares, hexagons, and octagons “of opposition”. A combined epistemic–deontic logic happens to be found in the traditional “probabilist” theory of the “good conscience”, and I shall then briefly explain how this is so.

States of emergence, states of knowledge: A comparative sociology of international relations in China and India

This article examines the relationship between the geopolitical rise of new powers in international relations and knowledge production in International Relations. It draws on the science studies literature on the ‘co-production’ of science and politics to conceptualise and analyse this relationship between the ‘state of emergence’ and ‘state of knowledge’. I argue that the ‘state of emergence’ should be conceptualised not only as a real-world condition external to science that imposes itself on an otherwise pure internal ‘state of knowledge’, but also as a scholarly sensibility, ethos and motivation that operates ‘within’ it. The article illustrates the argument ethnomethodologically by interviewing International Relations scholars in China and India on how they themselves make sense of the emerging condition and justify their own positions and actions within it. Based on the interviews, I identify four co-productive registers connecting the state of emergence to the state of knowledge (the constitutive, civic, infrastructural and psychological) but also find that scholars in China and India differ in their enactment of these registers.

Dynamic Epistemic Reasoning with Awareness and Its Legal Application

Concerning a software tool of legal reasoning, it is important to describe the prediction about the result of a criminal action, because a crime is often caused by the unpredictability of the result of the defendant. In the court, the judge needs to investigate the predictability and the intention of the agent. Previously, we have formalized the reasoning process of judgment by action model in dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) and have attempted to describe the precedents. However, the prediction in legal cases depends not only on the states of knowledge but also on the limited degree of attention by agents. In this paper, we employ DEL with awareness for multi-agent to represent the predictability and model the typical criminal precedents. We propose a revised semantics of action model with awareness which can define each basic action model to reproduce the agent’s considering process. To describe the legal reasoning we introduce an extension of modeling program DEMO to include the awareness (we call it DEMO[Formula: see text]) and present a GUI in this extended program to calculate the updated epistemic model easily and to classify precedents according to the degree of prediction. In the end, we calculate the epistemic models of typical criminal precedents by this newly developed tool and estimate them.