Heterogeneous Approximate Reasoning with Graded Truth Values

Author(s):  
Francesco Luca De Angelis ◽  
Giovanna Di Marzo Serugendo ◽  
Barbara Dunin-Kęplicz ◽  
Andrzej Szałas
Author(s):  
FRANCESC ESTEVA ◽  
PERE GARCIA-CALVÉS ◽  
LLUÍS GODO

Within the many-valued approach for approximate reasoning, the aim of this paper is two-fold. First, to extend truth-values lattices to cope with the imprecision due to possible incompleteness of the available information. This is done by considering two bilattices of truth-value intervals corresponding to the so-called weak and strong truth orderings. Based on the use of interval bilattices, the second aim is to introduce what we call partial many-valued logics. The (partial) models of such logics may assign intervals of truth-values to formulas, and so they stand for representations of incomplete states of knowledge. Finally, the relation between partial and complete semantical entailment is studied, and it is provedtheir equivalence for a family of formulas, including the so-called free well formed formulas.


1994 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 830-837 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingsheng Ying

Classical logic is not adequate to face the essential vagueness of human reasoning, which is approximate rather than precise in nature. The logical treatment of the concepts of vagueness and approximation is of increasing importance in artificial intelligence and related research. Consequently, many logicians have proposed different systems of many-valued logic as a formalization of approximate reasoning (see, for example, Goguen [G], Gerla and Tortora [GT], Novak [No], Pavelka [P], and Takeuti and Titani [TT]). As far as we know, all the proposals are obtained by extending the range of truth values of propositions. In these logical systems reasoning is still exact and to make a conclusion the antecedent clause of its rule must match its premise exactly. In addition. Wang [W] pointed out: “If we compare calculation with proving,... Procedures of calculation... can be made so by fairly well-developed methods of approximation; whereas... we do not have a clear conception of approximate methods in theorem proving.... The concept of approximate proofs, though undeniably of another kind than approximations in numerical calculations, is not incapable of more exact formulation in terms of, say, sketches of and gradual improvements toward a correct proof” (see pp, 224–225). As far as the author is aware, however, no attempts have been made to give a conception of approximate methods in theorem proving.The purpose of this paper is. unlike all the previous proposals, to develop a propositional calculus, a predicate calculus in which the truth values of propositions are still true or false exactly and in which the reasoning may be approximate and allow the antecedent clause of a rule to match its premise only approximately. In a forthcoming paper we shall establish set theory, based on the logic introduced here, in which there are ∣L∣ binary predicates ∈λ, λ ∈ L such that R(∈, ∈λ) = λ where ∈ stands for ∈1 and 1 is the greatest element in L, and x ∈λy is interpreted as that x belongs to y in the degree of λ, and relate it to intuitionistic fuzzy set theory of Takeuti and Titani [TT] and intuitionistic modal set theory of Lano [L]. In another forthcoming paper we shall introduce the resolution principle under approximate match and illustrate its applications in production systems of artificial intelligence.


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-28
Author(s):  
Sudin Mandal ◽  
Injamam Ul Karim ◽  
Swapan Raha

In this paper, an attempt is made to study approximate reasoning based on a Type-2 fuzzy set theory. In the process, we have examined the underlying fuzzy logic structure on which the reasoning is formulated. We have seen that the partial/incomplete/imprecise truth-values of elements of a type-2 fuzzy set under consideration forms a lattice. We propose two new lattice operations which ultimately help us to define a residual and thereby making the structure of truth- values a residuated lattice. We have focused upon two typical rules of inference used mostly in ordinary approximate reasoning methodology based on Type-1 fuzzy set theory. Our proposal is illustrated with typical artificial examples.


2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serge P Odintsov ◽  
Heinrich Wansing
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Juhani Yli-Vakkuri ◽  
John Hawthorne

In Chapter 2 we argue that internalists are committed to a kind of relativism, and that theirs is a particularly radical form of relativism. Thought experiments involving certain symmetries across space and/or time play a starring role. If the kinds of symmetries featured in them are possible, we argue, the truth values of narrow content must be relative to some very unusual parameters.


Author(s):  
Agustín Rayo

This article is divided into four sections. The first two identify different logicist theses, and show that their truth-values can be established given minimal assumptions. The third section sets forth a notion of “content-recarving” as a possible constraint on logicist theses. The fourth section—which is largely independent from the rest of the article—is a discussion of “neologicism.”


2021 ◽  
pp. 014616722110241
Author(s):  
Tal Moran ◽  
Jamie Cummins ◽  
Jan De Houwer

Research on automatic stereotyping is dominated by the idea that automatic stereotyping reflects the activation of (group–trait) associations. In two preregistered experiments (total N = 391), we tested predictions derived from an alternative perspective that suggests that automatic stereotyping is the result of the activation of propositional representations that, unlike associations, can encode relational information and have truth values. Experiment 1 found that automatic stereotyping is sensitive to the validity of information about pairs of traits and groups. Experiment 2 showed that automatic stereotyping is sensitive to the specific relations (e.g., whether a particular group is more or less friendly than a reference person) between pairs of traits and groups. Interestingly, both experiments found a weaker influence of validity/relational information on automatic stereotyping than on non-automatic stereotyping. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on automatic stereotyping.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document