SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER

2003 ◽  
Vol 05 (01) ◽  
pp. 41-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANNICK LARUELLE ◽  
FEDERICO VALENCIANO

In this paper we revise the axiomatic foundations and meaning of semivalues as measures of power on the domain of simple games, when these are interpreted as models of voting procedures. In this context we characterize the family of preferences on roles in voting procedures they represent, and each of them in particular. To this end we first characterize the family of semivalues and each of them in particular up to the choice of a zero and a unit of scale. As a result a reinterpretation of semivalues as a class of power indices is proposed and critically discussed.

2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
František Turnovec

The paper introduces concept of power indices with constraints on voting configuration formation, so called constrained power indices. It is shown in the paper that some of most frequently used power indices based on extremely simple model of weighted voting game can be extended for more sophisticated models of voting situations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-96
Author(s):  
S.A. Shishkina

The article analyzes the experience of the joint work of a speech therapist and a neuropsychologist using the DIRFloortime concept on a clinical case of a boy L., 3.5 years of age. The following tasks were solved during the sessions: the child’s advancement along the first stages of functional emotional development, taking into account his individual characteristics; work with the family: establishing a partnership, teaching the family members the basics of the DIRFloortime approach. As a result of the sessions, the child’s understanding of speech and implementation of instructions have significantly improved; he started using meaningful words and phrases for communication; his emotional and non-verbal repertoire expanded, the boy learned to play simple games with rules with an adult.


2002 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Leech

Power indices are general measures of the relative a priori voting power of individual members of a voting body. They are useful for both positive and normative analysis of voting bodies particularly those using weighted voting. This paper applies new algorithms for computing the rival Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices for large voting bodies to shareholder voting power in a cross section of British companies. Each company is a separate voting body and there is much variation in ownership between them resulting in different power structures. Because the data are incomplete, both finite and ‘oceanic’ games of shareholder voting are analysed. The indices are appraised, using reasonable criteria, from the literature on corporate control. The results are unfavourable to the Shapley-Shubik index and suggest that the Banzhaf index much better reflects the variations in the power of shareholders between companies as the weights of shareholder blocs vary.


1987 ◽  
Vol 14 (22) ◽  
pp. 49-60
Author(s):  
Yoshinori Tomiyama

1984 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Stenlund ◽  
Jan-Erik Lane
Keyword(s):  

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