EVOLUTION AND THE COMPLEXITY OF FINITE AUTOMATA
2007 ◽
Vol 09
(04)
◽
pp. 731-743
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Keyword(s):
Prisoner's dilemma played by finite automata is reviewed again using a slightly modified measure of complexity. At a first step, an equilibrium with a large number of possible outcomes is shown to hold. At a second stage, we consider a game of repeated interaction, and show that on (limit) equilibrium only cooperative actions are played. We conclude that cooperation is the result of a (complex) long interaction.
2007 ◽
Vol 11
(7)
◽
pp. 833-841
1986 ◽
Vol 39
(1)
◽
pp. 83-96
◽
1996 ◽
Vol 20
(1-3)
◽
pp. 173-207
◽
2015 ◽
Vol 32
(01)
◽
pp. 1540009
2019 ◽
1999 ◽
Vol 30
(2/3)
◽
pp. 179-193
◽
2016 ◽
Vol 63
(5)
◽
pp. 263-277
◽