scholarly journals From Cold Resistor to Secure Key Exchanger

Author(s):  
Jiaao Song ◽  
Laszlo B. Kish

Utilizing a formerly published cold resistor circuitry, a secure key exchange system is conceived and explored. A circuit realization of the system is constructed and simulated. Similar to the Pao-Lo key exchanger, this system is secure in the steady-state limit but crackable in the transient situations.

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Saraswathi ◽  
B. Jayaram ◽  
R. Balasubramanian

2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 321-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laszlo B. Kish ◽  
Claes G. Granqvist

Abstract A recent IEEE Access Paper by Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) proposed a new transient attack against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system. The attack is valid, but it is easy to build a defense for the KLJN system. Here we note that GAA’s paper contains several invalid statements regarding security measures and the continuity of functions in classical physics. These deficiencies are clarified in our present paper, wherein we also emphasize that a new version of the KLJN system is immune against all existing attacks, including the one by GAA.


2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (01) ◽  
pp. 1550011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laszlo B. Kish ◽  
Zoltan Gingl ◽  
Robert Mingesz ◽  
Gergely Vadai ◽  
Janusz Smulko ◽  
...  

A recent paper by Gunn–Allison–Abbott (GAA) [L. J. Gunn et al., Scientific Reports 4 (2014) 6461] argued that the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system could experience a severe information leak. Here we refute their results and demonstrate that GAA's arguments ensue from a serious design flaw in their system. Specifically, an attenuator broke the single Kirchhoff-loop into two coupled loops, which is an incorrect operation since the single loop is essential for the security in the KLJN system, and hence GAA's asserted information leak is trivial. Another consequence is that a fully defended KLJN system would not be able to function due to its built-in current-comparison defense against active (invasive) attacks. In this paper we crack GAA's scheme via an elementary current-comparison attack which yields negligible error probability for Eve even without averaging over the correlation time of the noise.


1988 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Buchmann ◽  
H. C. Williams

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