A weakest precondition approach to active attacks analysis (abstract only)

2009 ◽  
Vol 44 (8) ◽  
pp. 5-5
Author(s):  
Musard Balliu ◽  
Isabella Mastroeni
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ante Dagelić ◽  
Toni Perković ◽  
Bojan Vujatović ◽  
Mario Čagalj

User’s location privacy concerns have been further raised by today’s Wi-Fi technology omnipresence. Preferred Network Lists (PNLs) are a particularly interesting source of private location information, as devices are storing a list of previously used hotspots. Privacy implications of a disclosed PNL have been covered by numerous papers, mostly focusing on passive monitoring attacks. Nowadays, however, more and more devices no longer transmit their PNL in clear, thus mitigating passive attacks. Hidden PNLs are still vulnerable against active attacks whereby an attacker mounts a fake SSID hotspot set to one likely contained within targeted PNL. If the targeted device has this SSID in the corresponding PNL, it will automatically initiate a connection with the fake hotspot thus disclosing this information to the attacker. By iterating through different SSIDs (from a predefined dictionary) the attacker can eventually reveal a big part of the hidden PNL. Considering user mobility, executing active attacks usually has to be done within a short opportunity window, while targeting nontrivial SSIDs from user’s PNL. The existing work on active attacks against hidden PNLs often neglects both of these challenges. In this paper we propose a simple mathematical model for analyzing active SSID dictionary attacks, allowing us to optimize the effectiveness of the attack under the above constraints (limited window of opportunity and targeting nontrivial SSIDs). Additionally, we showcase an example method for building an effective SSID dictionary using top-N recommender algorithm and validate our model through simulations and extensive real-life tests.


2006 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
ELLIE D'HONDT ◽  
PRAKASH PANANGADEN

We develop a notion of predicate transformer and, in particular, the weakest precondition, appropriate for quantum computation. We show that there is a Stone-type duality between the usual state-transformer semantics and the weakest precondition semantics. Rather than trying to reduce quantum computation to probabilistic programming, we develop a notion that is directly taken from concepts used in quantum computation. The proof that weakest preconditions exist for completely positive maps follows immediately from the Kraus representation theorem. As an example, we give the semantics of Selinger's language in terms of our weakest preconditions. We also cover some specific situations and exhibit an interesting link with stabilisers.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 95-104
Author(s):  
Tianbo Lu ◽  
Pan Gao ◽  
Xiaofeng Du ◽  
Yang Li
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Kannan Balasubramanian

To deal with active attacks in public key encryptions, the notion of security against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack has been defined by Researchers. If an adversary can inject messages into a network, these messages may be ciphertexts, and the adversary may be able to extract partial information about the corresponding cleartexts through its interaction with parties in the network. The Security against chosen ciphertext attack is defined using an “decryption oracle.” Given an encryption of a message the “ciphertext” we want to guarantee that the adversary cannot obtain any partial information about the message. A method of securing Public Key Cryptosystems using hash functions is described in this chapter.


Author(s):  
Yona Lopes ◽  
Natalia Castro Fernandes ◽  
Tiago Bornia de Castro ◽  
Vitor dos Santos Farias ◽  
Julia Drummond Noce ◽  
...  

Advances in smart grids and in communication networks allow the development of an interconnected system where information arising from different sources helps building a more reliable electrical network. Nevertheless, this interconnected system also brings new security threats. In the past, communication networks for electrical systems were restrained to closed and secure areas, which guaranteed network physical security. Due to the integration with smart meters, clouds, and other information sources, physical security to network access is no longer available, which may compromise the electrical system. Besides smart grids bring a huge growth in data volume, which must be managed. In order to achieve a successful smart grid deployment, robust network communication to provide automation among devices is necessary. Therefore, outages caused by passive or active attacks become a real threat. This chapter describes the main architecture flaws that make the system vulnerable to attacks for creating energy disruptions, stealing energy, and breaking privacy.


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