scholarly journals A Class of Two-Person Zero-Sum Matrix Games with Rough Payoffs

2010 ◽  
Vol 2010 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiuping Xu ◽  
Liming Yao
Keyword(s):  
Genetic Algorithm ◽  
Expected Value ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Matrix Games ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Expected Value Operator ◽  
Maximin Equilibrium ◽  
Trust Measure ◽  
Zero Sum

We concentrate on discussing a class of two-person zero-sum games with rough payoffs. Based on the expected value operator and the trust measure of rough variables, the expected equilibrium strategy andr-trust maximin equilibrium strategy are defined. Five cases whether the game existsr-trust maximin equilibrium strategy are discussed, and the technique of genetic algorithm is applied to find the equilibrium strategies. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the practicality and effectiveness of the proposed technique.

scholarly journals The existence and the shape of the equilibrium strategies for some two-person non-zero sum games with the choice of the moment

1970 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 375-389
Author(s):  
D. Sūdžiūtė
Keyword(s):  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Zero Sum

The abstracts (in two languages) can be found in the pdf file of the article. Original author name(s) and title in Russian and Lithuanian: Д. П. Суджюте. Существование и вид равновесных стратегий некоторых не антагонистических игр двух лиц с выбором момента времени D. Sūdžiūtė. Kai kurių neantagonistinių dviejų asmenų lošimų su laiko momento parinkimu pusiausvyros strategijų egzistavimas ir pavidalas

scholarly journals A Fictitious Play Algorithm for Matrix Games with Fuzzy Payoffs

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emrah Akyar
Keyword(s):  
Order Relation ◽  
Fictitious Play ◽  
Matrix Games ◽  
Fuzzy Matrix ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Numerical Example ◽  
Value Of The Game ◽  
Zero Sum

Fuzzy matrix games, specifically two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs, are considered. In view of the parametric fuzzy max order relation, a fictitious play algorithm for finding the value of the game is presented. A numerical example to demonstrate the presented algorithm is also given.

Pareto Optimality in Electoral Competition

1971 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 1141-1145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter C. Ordeshook
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Optimal Policies ◽  
Optimal Allocations ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Pareto Optimal Allocations

The core of welfare economics consists of the proof that, for certain classes of goods, perfectly competitive markets are efficient in that they provide Pareto optimal allocations of these goods. In this paper, the efficiency of competitive elections is examined. Elections are modeled as two-candidate zero-sum games, and three kinds of equilibria for such games are identified: pure, risky, and mixed strategies. It is shown, however, that regardless of which kind of equilibrium prevails, if candidates adopt equilibrium strategies, an election is efficient in the sense that the candidates advocate Pareto optimal policies. But one caveat to this analysis is that while an election is Pareto optimal, citizens can unanimously prefer markets to elections as a mechanism for selecting future policies.

EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES IN STOCHASTIC GAMES WITH ADDITIVE COST AND TRANSITION STRUCTURE

1999 ◽  
Vol 01 (02) ◽  
pp. 131-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
HEINZ-UWE KÜENLE
Keyword(s):  
Weight Function ◽  
Stochastic Games ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Cost Structure ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Transition Structure ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Action Spaces ◽  
Treated State

Two-person stochastic games with additive transition and cost structure and the criterion of expected total costs are treated. State space and action spaces are standard Borel, and unbounded costs are allowed. For the zero-sum case, it is shown that there are stationary deterministic εη-optimal strategies for every ε>0 and a certain weight function η if some semi-continuity and compactness conditions are fulfilled. Using these results, the existence of so-called quasi-stationary deterministic εη-equilibrium strategy pairs under corresponding conditions is proven.

scholarly journals The 3P Challenge: A Serious Game for Reflecting on Partnership in Public-Private Concessions

2020 ◽  
pp. 1087724X2098158
Author(s):  
Camilo Benitez-Avila ◽  
Andreas Hartmann ◽  
Geert Dewulf
Keyword(s):  
Process Management ◽  
Project Managers ◽  
Serious Game ◽  
Public Private Partnerships ◽  
Mixed Group ◽  
Public Project ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Management Literature ◽  
Contractual Obligations ◽  
Zero Sum

Process management literature is skeptical about creating legitimacy and a sense of partnership when implementing concessional Public-Private Partnerships. Within such organizational arrangements, managerial interaction often resembles zero-sum games. To explore the possibility to (re)create a sense of partnership in concessional PPPs, we developed the “3P challenge” serious game. Two gaming sessions with a mixed group of practitioners and a team of public project managers showed that the game cycle recreates adversarial situations where players can enact contractual obligations with higher or lower levels of subjectivity. When reflecting on the gaming experience, practitioners point out that PPP contracts can be creatively enacted by managers who act as brokers of diverse interests. While becoming aware of each other stakes they can blend contractual dispositions or place brackets around some contractual clauses for reaching agreement. By doing so, they can (re)create a sense of partnership, clarity, and fairness of the PPP contract.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document