Location-Price Competition in Airline Networks

This paper addresses location-then-price competition in airline market as a two-stage game ofnplayers on the graph. Passenger’s demand distribution is described by multinomial logit model. Equilibrium in price game is computed through best response dynamics. We solve location game using backward induction, knowing that airlines will choose prices from equilibrium for the second-stage game. Some numerical results for airline market under consideration are presented.

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Duopoly price competition with limited capacity

Economic Theory Bulletin ◽

10.1007/s40505-020-00198-1 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

A. Bërdëllima

Keyword(s):

Price Competition ◽

Small Firms ◽

Common Knowledge ◽

Limited Capacity ◽

Equilibrium Outcome ◽

Second Stage ◽

Duopoly Model ◽

Full Capacity ◽

Stage Game ◽

The Given

AbstractWe study a variation of the duopoly model by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). Firms limited by their capacity of production engage in a two stage game. In the first stage they commit to levels of production not exceeding their capacities which are then made common knowledge. In the second stage after production has taken place firms simultane- ously compete in prices. Solution of this sequential game shows that the unique Cournot equilibrium outcome as in Kreps and Scheinkman is not always guaranteed. However the Cournot outcome is still robust in the sense that given sufficiently large capacities this equilibrium holds. If capacities are sufficiently small, firms decide to produce at their full capacity and set a price which clears the market at the given level of output.

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Analysis of Asymmetric Quantity Commitment in Decentralized Supply Chains

International Journal of Operations Research and Information Systems ◽

10.4018/ijoris.20210401.oa5 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 12 (2) ◽

pp. 83-102

Author(s):

Zhaoqiong Qin ◽

Wen-Chyuan Chiang ◽

Robert Russell

Keyword(s):

Supply Chains ◽

Price Competition ◽

Just In Time ◽

Lead Times ◽

Backward Induction ◽

Multi Stage ◽

Stage Game ◽

Time Systems

Quantity commitment chosen by firms in competition has been demonstrated by previous studies to mitigate price competition. This study demonstrates that asymmetric quantity commitment can always arise when one firm (e-tailer) shortens lead times or adopts just-in-time systems to circumvent quantity commitment while another firm (retailer) does not. To study the asymmetric quantity commitment in decentralization, a multi-stage game is analyzed, and backward induction is adopted. The authors find that the retailer always adopts the quantity commitment in the decentralization to achieve a higher profit.

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Distributed Group Location Update Algorithm for Massive Machine Type Communication

Sensors ◽

10.3390/s20247336 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 20 (24) ◽

pp. 7336

Author(s):

Mincheol Paik ◽

Haneul Ko

Keyword(s):

Outage Probability ◽

Stochastic Game ◽

Location Update ◽

Response Dynamics ◽

Small Energy ◽

Machine Type ◽

Best Response ◽

Machine Type Communication ◽

Iot Devices ◽

The Individual

Frequent location updates of individual Internet of Things (IoT) devices can cause several problems (e.g., signaling overhead in networks and energy depletion of IoT devices) in massive machine type communication (mMTC) systems. To alleviate these problems, we design a distributed group location update algorithm (DGLU) in which geographically proximate IoT devices determine whether to conduct the location update in a distributed manner. To maximize the accuracy of the locations of IoT devices while maintaining a sufficiently small energy outage probability, we formulate a constrained stochastic game model. We then introduce a best response dynamics-based algorithm to obtain a multi-policy constrained Nash equilibrium. From the evaluation results, it is demonstrated that DGLU can achieve an accuracy of location information that is comparable with that of the individual location update scheme, with a sufficiently small energy outage probability.

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