scholarly journals KBNN Based on Coarse Mesh to Optimize the EBG Structures

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Yi Chen ◽  
Yu-bo Tian ◽  
Fei-yan Sun

The microwave devices are usually optimized by combining the precise model with global optimization algorithm. However, this method is time-consuming. In order to optimize the microwave devices rapidly, the knowledge-based neural network (KBNN) is used in this paper. Usually, the a priori knowledge of KBNN is obtained by the empirical formulas. Unfortunately, it is difficult to derive the corresponding formulas for the most electromagnetic problems, especially for complex electromagnetic problems; the formula derivation is almost impossible. We use precise mesh model of EM analysis as teaching signal and coarse mesh model as a priori knowledge to train the neural network (NN) by particle swarm optimization (PSO). The NN constructed by this method is simpler than traditional NN in structure which can replace precise model in optimization and reduce the computing time. The results of electromagnetic band-gap (EBG) structures optimally designed by this kind of KBNN achieve increase in the bandwidth and attenuation of the stopband and small passband ripple level which shows the advantages of the proposed KBNN method.

Robotica ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 449-459 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zaryab Hamavand ◽  
Howard M. Schwartz

SummaryThis paper presents a neural network based control strategy for the trajectory control of robot manipulators. The neural network learns the inverse dynamics of a robot manipulator without any a priori knowledge of the manipulator inertial parameters nor any a priori knowledge of the equation of dynamics. A two step feedback-error-learning process is proposed. Strategies for selection of the training trajectories and difficulties with on-line training are discussed.


Author(s):  
Robert Audi

This book provides an overall theory of perception and an account of knowledge and justification concerning the physical, the abstract, and the normative. It has the rigor appropriate for professionals but explains its main points using concrete examples. It accounts for two important aspects of perception on which philosophers have said too little: its relevance to a priori knowledge—traditionally conceived as independent of perception—and its role in human action. Overall, the book provides a full-scale account of perception, presents a theory of the a priori, and explains how perception guides action. It also clarifies the relation between action and practical reasoning; the notion of rational action; and the relation between propositional and practical knowledge. Part One develops a theory of perception as experiential, representational, and causally connected with its objects: as a discriminative response to those objects, embodying phenomenally distinctive elements; and as yielding rich information that underlies human knowledge. Part Two presents a theory of self-evidence and the a priori. The theory is perceptualist in explicating the apprehension of a priori truths by articulating its parallels to perception. The theory unifies empirical and a priori knowledge by clarifying their reliable connections with their objects—connections many have thought impossible for a priori knowledge as about the abstract. Part Three explores how perception guides action; the relation between knowing how and knowing that; the nature of reasons for action; the role of inference in determining action; and the overall conditions for rational action.


Author(s):  
Donald C. Williams

This chapter begins with a systematic presentation of the doctrine of actualism. According to actualism, all that exists is actual, determinate, and of one way of being. There are no possible objects, nor is there any indeterminacy in the world. In addition, there are no ways of being. It is proposed that actual entities stand in three fundamental relations: mereological, spatiotemporal, and resemblance relations. These relations govern the fundamental entities. Each fundamental entity stands in parthood relations, spatiotemporal relations, and resemblance relations to other entities. The resulting picture is one that represents the world as a four-dimensional manifold of actual ‘qualitied contents’—upon which all else supervenes. It is then explained how actualism accounts for classes, quantity, number, causation, laws, a priori knowledge, necessity, and induction.


Author(s):  
Keith DeRose

In this chapter the contextualist Moorean account of how we know by ordinary standards that we are not brains in vats (BIVs) utilized in Chapter 1 is developed and defended, and the picture of knowledge and justification that emerges is explained. The account (a) is based on a double-safety picture of knowledge; (b) has it that our knowledge that we’re not BIVs is in an important way a priori; and (c) is knowledge that is easily obtained, without any need for fancy philosophical arguments to the effect that we’re not BIVs; and the account is one that (d) utilizes a conservative approach to epistemic justification. Special attention is devoted to defending the claim that we have a priori knowledge of the deeply contingent fact that we’re not BIVs, and to distinguishing this a prioritist account of this knowledge from the kind of “dogmatist” account prominently championed by James Pryor.


1995 ◽  
Vol 31 (22) ◽  
pp. 1930-1931 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Anguita ◽  
S. Rovetta ◽  
S. Ridella ◽  
R. Zunino

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