The Limitations of Pure Skeptical Theism

2013 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Draper
Keyword(s):  
Skeptical Theism

Anti-theodicy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. N. Trakakis
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Model ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Alternative Models ◽  
Absolute Idealism ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Methodological Considerations

First, the nature of ‘anti-theodicy’ is outlined, and some indication is provided as to how this position differs from both theodicy and skeptical theism, and how the anti-theodicy view can be supported on the basis of moral and methodological considerations. Secondly, a possible metaphysical basis for anti-theodicy is sought, and this is achieved by abandoning anthropomorphic conceptions of God in favour of alternative models of divinity that might make possible new and more fruitful perspectives on the problem of evil. The alternative model advanced here for special attention is the Absolute Idealism of F. H. Bradley. The chapter concludes by showing how the problem of evil can be answered from a Bradleian perspective.

Skeptical Theism and Rowe's New Evidential Argument from Evil

Noûs ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Bergmann
Keyword(s):  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
Argument From Evil

scholarly journals Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, and Divine Deception

2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-274
Author(s):  
Joshua Seigal ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Moral Skepticism

scholarly journals Has God Indeed Said? Skeptical Theism and Scriptural Hermeneutics

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 45-66
Author(s):  
Michelle Panchuk
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Divine Commands

This paper demonstrates that the skeptical theist’s response to the problem of evil deprives the analytic theologian of theoretical resources necessary to avoid accepting as veridical merely apparent divine commands that endorse cruelty. In particular, I argue that the same skeptical considerations that lead analytic theologians to endorse skeptical theism also lead to what I call “divine command skepticism”—an inability to make certain kinds of judgements about what a good God would or would not command. The danger of divine command skepticism is not that it generates new reasons to think that God has commanded horrors, but, rather, that it undercuts the defeaters we might otherwise have for thinking that God has commanded those horrors.  It does so both by rendering illicit certain theological and hermeneutical methodologies employed within liberatory frameworks (i.e., various kinds of liberation theologies) and by depriving the theologian of some of the more “traditional” mechanisms for resolving such apparent conflicts.

scholarly journals Skeptical Theism and the Threshold Problem

1970 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-92
Author(s):  
Yishai A. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Weak Version ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Cognitive Faculties ◽  
Threshold Problem

In this paper I articulate and defend a new anti-theodicy challenge to Skeptical Theism. More specifically, I defend the Threshold Problem according to which there is a threshold to the kinds of evils that are in principle justifiable for God to permit, and certain instances of evil are beyond that threshold. I further argue that Skeptical Theism does not have the resources to adequately rebut the Threshold Problem. I argue for this claim by drawing a distinction between a weak and strong version of Skeptical Theism, such that the strong version must be defended in order to rebut the Threshold Problem. However, the skeptical theist’s appeal to our limited cognitive faculties only supports the weak version.

God, Suffering, and the Value of Free Will

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura W. Ekstrom
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Religious Life ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Close Investigation ◽  
Traditional Doctrine

This book focuses on arguments from suffering against the existence of God and on a variety of issues concerning agency and value that they bring out. The central aim is to show the extent and power of arguments from evil. The book provides a close investigation of an under-defended claim at the heart of the major free-will-based responses to such arguments, namely that free will is sufficiently valuable to serve as the good, or to serve prominently among the goods, that provides a God-justifying reason for permitting evil in our world. Offering a fresh examination of traditional theodicies, it also develops an alternative line the author calls a divine intimacy theodicy. It makes an extended case for rejection of the position of skeptical theism. The book expands upon an argument from evil concerning a traditional doctrine of hell, which reveals a number of interesting issues concerning fault, agency, and blameworthiness. In response to recent work contending that the problem of evil is defanged since God’s baseline attitude toward human beings is indifference, the book defends the essential perfect moral goodness of God. Finally it takes up the question of whether or not it makes sense to live a religious life as an agnostic or as an atheist.

Schellenberg's Noseeum Assumption about Nonresistant Nonbelief

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul A. Macdonald Jr.
Keyword(s):  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Good Argument ◽  
Strategy I

In this article, I outline a strategy for challenging J.L. Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument, and specifically the premise within the argument that asserts the existence of what Schellenberg calls nonresistant nonbelief.  Drawing on some of the philosophical resources of skeptical theism, I show how this premise is based on a particular “noseeum assumption”—what I call Schellenberg’s Noseeum Assumption—that underwrites a particular “noseeum argument.” This assumption is that, regarding putative nonresistant nonbelievers, more likely than not we’d detect these nonbelievers’ resistance toward God if there were any.  I give reasons for thinking that it is not more reasonable to affirm than to refrain from affirming Schellenberg’s Noseeum Assumption, and so reason to think that the hiddenness argument is not a good argument for atheism.  I also defend the strategy I outline against several objections.

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