scholarly journals Skeptical Theism and the Threshold Problem

1970 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-92
Author(s):  
Yishai A. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Weak Version ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Cognitive Faculties ◽  
Threshold Problem

In this paper I articulate and defend a new anti-theodicy challenge to Skeptical Theism. More specifically, I defend the Threshold Problem according to which there is a threshold to the kinds of evils that are in principle justifiable for God to permit, and certain instances of evil are beyond that threshold. I further argue that Skeptical Theism does not have the resources to adequately rebut the Threshold Problem. I argue for this claim by drawing a distinction between a weak and strong version of Skeptical Theism, such that the strong version must be defended in order to rebut the Threshold Problem. However, the skeptical theist’s appeal to our limited cognitive faculties only supports the weak version.

scholarly journals Is preregistration worthwhile?

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aba Szollosi ◽  
David Kellen ◽  
Danielle Navarro ◽  
Rich Shiffrin ◽  
Iris van Rooij ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Models ◽  
Statistical Tests ◽  
Error Rates ◽  
Statistical Techniques ◽  
Weak Version ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Statistical Problems

Proponents of preregistration argue that, among other benefits, it improves the diagnosticity of statistical tests [1]. In the strong version of this argument, preregistration does this by solving statistical problems, such as family-wise error rates. In the weak version, it nudges people to think more deeply about their theories, methods, and analyses. We argue against both: the diagnosticity of statistical tests depend entirely on how well statistical models map onto underlying theories, and so improving statistical techniques does little to improve theories when the mapping is weak. There is also little reason to expect that preregistration will spontaneously help researchers to develop better theories (and, hence, better methods and analyses).

scholarly journals Considerations for Goldbach's Strong Conjecture

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carleilton Severino Silva
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Prime Numbers ◽  
Weak Version ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Leonhard Euler

Since 1742, the year in which the Prussian Christian Goldbach wrote a letter to Leonhard Euler with his Conjecture in the weak version, mathematicians have been working on the problem. The tools in number theory become the most sophisticated thanks to the resolution solutions. Euler himself said he was unable to prove it. The weak guess in the modern version states the following: any odd number greater than 5 can be written as the sum of 3 primes. In response to Goldbach's letter, Euler reminded him of a conversation in which he proposed what is now known as Goldbach's strong conjecture: any even number greater than 2 can be written as a sum of 2 prime numbers. The most interesting result came in 2013, with proof of weak version by the Peruvian Mathematician Harald Helfgott, however the strong version remained without a definitive proof. The weak version can be demonstrated without major difficulties and will not be described in this article, as it becomes a corollary of the strong version. Despite the enormous intellectual baggage that great mathematicians have had over the centuries, the Conjecture in question has not been validated or refuted until today.

Testing the Hypothesis of Labelled Detectors

Perception ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 26 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 113-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
A I Cogan
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
Relative Depth ◽  
Weak Version ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Specific Mechanism ◽  
Detection And Identification ◽  
Uncrossed Disparity ◽  
Complex Shapes ◽  
Neural Substrate ◽  
Additional Processing

The hypothesis of labelled detectors (or ‘lines’) is the present-day version of the basic Müller - Helmholtz doctrine. Müller's dictum of specific energy of nerves stated: “the same internal cause excites (…) in each sense the sensation peculiar to it”. Helmholtz made ‘the cause’ external to the body and postulated that all knowledge about the world thus comes through the senses. The key word is specificity. The strong version of the hypothesis must treat detection - identification as a single task: a stimulus would be identified whenever it is detected. The weak version requires only that we identify a specific mechanism by which both detection and identification are achieved, even though the latter may require additional processing. In the general case, the strong version (with its ludicrous ‘grandmother cell’ as the neural substrate) finds little support. Detection and recognition of complex shapes (letters, faces, etc) aside, even discrimination between simple increments and decrements of luminance is difficult to attribute directly to a specific mechanism (in this case, the activity in either ON or OFF systems, respectively). This is demonstrated by experiment 1 reported here. However, perception of relative depth seems to conform to the strong version of the hypothesis, as experiment 2, also reported here, indicates. Thus, at least some specific neural mechanisms (in this case, probably the crossed and uncrossed disparity detectors) may be indeed linked directly to perception.

The Strong Version of Underdetermination of Theories by Empirical Data.

2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-117
Author(s):  
Mostafa Taqavi ◽  
Mohammad Zarepour
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Data ◽  
Weak Version ◽  
Strong Version

The Polish researcher in the field of logic and philosophy, Jan Woleński, in one of his recent articles, “Metalogical Observations About the Underdetermination of Theories by Empirical Data,” logically formalized two weak and strong versions of the underdetermination of theories by empirical data (or UT by abbreviation) and with these formalization has metalogically analyzed these two versions. Finally he has deducted that the weak version is defensible while the strong version is not. In this paper we will critically study Woleński's analysis of the strong version of UT.

scholarly journals Examining the Continuity between Life and Mind: Is There a Continuity between Autopoietic Intentionality and Representationality?

Philosophies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 18
Author(s):  
Wanja Wiese ◽  
Karl J. Friston
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Living System ◽  
Living Systems ◽  
Weak Version ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Strong Continuity ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Continuity Thesis ◽  
As If

A weak version of life-mind continuity thesis entails that every living system also has a basic mind (with a non-representational form of intentionality). The strong version entails that the same concepts that are sufficient to explain basic minds (with non-representational states) are also central to understanding non-basic minds (with representational states). We argue that recent work on the free energy principle supports the following claims with respect to the life-mind continuity thesis: (i) there is a strong continuity between life and mind; (ii) all living systems can be described as if they had representational states; (iii) the ’as-if representationality’ entailed by the free energy principle is central to understanding both basic forms of intentionality and intentionality in non-basic minds. In addition to this, we argue that the free energy principle also renders realism about computation and representation compatible with a strong life-mind continuity thesis (although the free energy principle does not entail computational and representational realism). In particular, we show how representationality proper can be grounded in ’as-if representationality’.

scholarly journals Weighted Envy-freeness in Indivisible Item Allocation

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-39
Author(s):  
Mithun Chakraborty ◽  
Ayumi Igarashi ◽  
Warut Suksompong ◽  
Yair Zick
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Polynomial Time ◽  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Arbitrary Number ◽  
Fair Division ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Weak Version ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Two Agents ◽  
Allocation Of Indivisible Items

We introduce and analyze new envy-based fairness concepts for agents with weights that quantify their entitlements in the allocation of indivisible items. We propose two variants of weighted envy-freeness up to one item (WEF1): strong , where envy can be eliminated by removing an item from the envied agent’s bundle, and weak , where envy can be eliminated either by removing an item (as in the strong version) or by replicating an item from the envied agent’s bundle in the envying agent’s bundle. We show that for additive valuations, an allocation that is both Pareto optimal and strongly WEF1 always exists and can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time; moreover, an allocation that maximizes the weighted Nash social welfare may not be strongly WEF1, but it always satisfies the weak version of the property. Moreover, we establish that a generalization of the round-robin picking sequence algorithm produces in polynomial time a strongly WEF1 allocation for an arbitrary number of agents; for two agents, we can efficiently achieve both strong WEF1 and Pareto optimality by adapting the adjusted winner procedure. Our work highlights several aspects in which weighted fair division is richer and more challenging than its unweighted counterpart.

scholarly journals Considerations for Goldbach's Strong Conjecture

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carleilton Severino Silva
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Prime Numbers ◽  
Weak Version ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Leonhard Euler

Since 1742, the year in which the Prussian Christian Goldbach wrote a letter to Leonhard Euler with his Conjecture in the weak version, mathematicians have been working on the problem. The tools in number theory become the most sophisticated thanks to the resolution solutions. Euler himself said he was unable to prove it. The weak guess in the modern version states the following: any odd number greater than 5 can be written as the sum of 3 primes. In response to Goldbach's letter, Euler reminded him of a conversation in which he proposed what is now known as Goldbach's strong conjecture: any even number greater than 2 can be written as a sum of 2 prime numbers. The most interesting result came in 2013, with proof of weak version by the Peruvian Mathematician Harald Helfgott, however the strong version remained without a definitive proof. The weak version can be demonstrated without major difficulties and will not be described in this article, as it becomes a corollary of the strong version. Despite the enormous intellectual baggage that great mathematicians have had over the centuries, the Conjecture in question has not been validated or refuted until today.

scholarly journals Skeptical Theism and the Threshold Problem

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yishai Cohen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Threshold Problem

The Right-Based Criticism of the Doctrine of Double Effect

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-233
Author(s):  
Stephen Kershnar ◽  
Robert Kelly ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Double Effect ◽  
Moral Rights ◽  
Weak Version ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Doctrine Of Double Effect ◽  
The Common ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
The Right ◽  
Do So

If people have stringent moral rights, then the doctrine of double effect is false or unimportant, at least when it comes to making acts permissible or wrong. There are strong and weak versions of the doctrine of double effect. The strong version asserts that an act is morally right if and only if the agent does not intentionally infringe a moral norm and the act brings about a desirable result (perhaps the best state of affairs available to the agent or a promotion of the common good). The weak version asserts that, other things being equal, it is deontically worse to intentionally infringe a norm than to foreseeably do so. A person’s intention or mere foresight might still be relevant to his or her blameworthiness or virtue, but this is a separate issue.

Legal Pluralism: An Adequate Instrument for the Recognition of Multiculturalism?

ICR Journal ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Giordano
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Legal Pluralism ◽  
Weak Version ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
State Law ◽  
Extra State

According to the most authoritative experts, there are two principal types of legal pluralism, which can be identified as minimalist and maximalist. This is why legal anthropologist Norbert Rouland speaks of a weak version and a strong version. The weak version simply refers to the presence of different juridical mechanisms applied to identical circumstances within a given society. A further differentiation is that the weak version implies a plurality of legal solutions that may be applied within a legal system guaranteed by specific state provisions. In order to define the strong version of legal pluralism we need to bear in mind that several concurrent legal orders, i.e., state law as well as extra-state systems, meet and clash within a given society. The various juridical orders may either converge or diverge, i.e., they may have normative similarities or differences.

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