Skeptical Theism and Rowe's New Evidential Argument from Evil

Noûs ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Bergmann
Keyword(s):  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
Argument From Evil

Skeptical theism and Skepticism About the External World and Past

2017 ◽  
Vol 81 ◽  
pp. 55-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Law
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
The Past ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Evidential Problem Of Evil

AbstractSkeptical theism is a popular - if not universally theistically endorsed - response to the evidential problem of evil. Skeptical theists question how we can be in a position to know God lacks God-justifying reason to allow the evils we observe. In this paper I examine a criticism of skeptical theism: that the skeptical theists skepticism re divine reasons entails that, similarly, we cannot know God lacks God-justifying reason to deceive us about the external world and the past. This in turn seems to supply us with a defeater for all our beliefs regarding the external world and past? Critics argue that either the skeptical theist abandon their skeptical theism, thereby resurrecting the evidential argument from evil, or else they must embrace seemingly absurd skeptical consequences, including skepticism about the external world and past. I look at various skeptical theist responses to this critique and find them all wanting.

A Phenomenological Approach to Skeptical Theism

2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-126
Author(s):  
Steven Nemes
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Approach ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Moral Significance ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Present Essay ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Phenomenological Point

"The purpose of the present essay is to present a version of the evidential argument from evil and to propose a ‘skeptical theistic’ response from a phenomenological point of view. In a word, the problem with the evidential argument from evil is that it attempts to put forth as justified an interpretation of the moral significance of historical events which actually exceeds the limits of human knowledge and which is based on a misinterpretation of experience. The essay also corrects certain analytic-philosophical notions regarding the nature of appearance, terminating with a discussion of the familiar critiques of analytic skeptical theism and the question of whether the belief in the existence of God might not be affected by the apparent skepticism implied by the phenomenological approach to knowledge in general. Keywords: existence of God, argument from evil, skeptical theism, phenomenology, analytic philosophy "

Argument from Chance

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dariusz Łukasiewicz
Keyword(s):  
Evidential Argument ◽  
Theistic Argument ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Small Probabilities

In the article, first I present the atheistic argument from pointless evil and the argument from chance. The essence of the argument from chance consists in the incompatibility of the existence of purposeless events and the existence of a God who planned the universe to the last detail. Second, I would like to show that there is a relation between the evidential argument from evil and the argument from chance. An analysis of the theistic argument from small probabilities is a helpful starting point for the presentation of how the two arguments are related.

God, Suffering, and the Value of Free Will

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura W. Ekstrom
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Religious Life ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Close Investigation ◽  
Traditional Doctrine

This book focuses on arguments from suffering against the existence of God and on a variety of issues concerning agency and value that they bring out. The central aim is to show the extent and power of arguments from evil. The book provides a close investigation of an under-defended claim at the heart of the major free-will-based responses to such arguments, namely that free will is sufficiently valuable to serve as the good, or to serve prominently among the goods, that provides a God-justifying reason for permitting evil in our world. Offering a fresh examination of traditional theodicies, it also develops an alternative line the author calls a divine intimacy theodicy. It makes an extended case for rejection of the position of skeptical theism. The book expands upon an argument from evil concerning a traditional doctrine of hell, which reveals a number of interesting issues concerning fault, agency, and blameworthiness. In response to recent work contending that the problem of evil is defanged since God’s baseline attitude toward human beings is indifference, the book defends the essential perfect moral goodness of God. Finally it takes up the question of whether or not it makes sense to live a religious life as an agnostic or as an atheist.

Gratuitous evil and divine providence

2010 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALAN R. RHODA
Keyword(s):  
Divine Providence ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Definition Of

AbstractDiscussions of the evidential argument from evil generally pay little attention to how different models of divine providence constrain the theist's options for response. After describing four models of providence and general theistic strategies for engaging the evidential argument, I articulate and defend a definition of ‘gratuitous evil’ that renders the theological premise of the argument uncontroversial for theists. This forces theists to focus their fire on the evidential premise, enabling us to compare models of providence with respect to how plausibly they can resist it. I then assess the four models, concluding that theists are better off vis-à-vis the evidential argument if they reject meticulous providence.

scholarly journals Perspectival Skeptical Theism

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-264
Author(s):  
Jonathan Curtis Rutledge ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Reasonable Belief ◽  
Insufficient Attention ◽  
Evidential Argument

Skeptical theists have paid insufficient attention to non-evidential components of epistemic rationality. I address this lacuna by constructing an alternative perspectivalist understanding of epistemic rationality and defeat that, when applied to skeptical theism, yields a more demanding standard for reasonably affirming the crucial premise of the evidential argument from suffering. The resulting perspectival skeptical theism entails that someone can be justified in believing that gratuitous suffering exists only if they are not subject to closure-of-inquiry defeat; that is, a type of defeat that prevents reasonable belief that p even if p is very probable on an agent’s evidence.

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