scholarly journals William Ockham on the Scope and Limits of Consciousness

Vivarium ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 197-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Brower-Toland
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Regress Problem ◽  
Perception Theory ◽  
William Ockham ◽  
Limited Scope

William Ockham (ca. 1287-1347) holds what nowadays would be characterized as a “higher-order perception” theory of consciousness. Historically speaking, one of the most persistent objections to this type of theory is the charge that it gives rise to an infinite regress in higher-order states. In this paper, I examine Ockham’s efforts to respond to the regress problem, focusing in particular on his attempts to restrict the scope of consciousness so as to avoid it. In his earlier writings, Ockham holds that we are conscious only of those states to which we explicitly attend. This view, I go on to argue, is inadequate on both phenomenological and philosophical grounds. Interestingly, and perhaps for this very reason, in later works, Ockham goes on to develop an alternative explanation for his account of the limited scope of consciousness.

Frankfurt and the Problem of Self-Control

2020 ◽  
pp. 421-433
Author(s):  
Ryan Cummings ◽  
Adina L. Roskies
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Structural Account ◽  
The Will

Frankfurt’s compatibilist account of free will considers an individual to be free when her first- and second-order volitions align. This structural account of the will, this chapter argues, fails to engage with the dynamics of will, resulting in two shortcomings: (1) the problem of directionality, or that Frankfurtian freedom obtains whenever first- and second-order volitions align, regardless of which desire was made to change, and (2) the potential for infinite regress of higher-order desires. The authors propose that a satisfying account of the genesis of second-order volitions can resolve these issues. To provide this they draw from George Ainslie’s mechanistic account of self-control, which relies on intertemporal bargaining wherein an individual’s self-predictions about future decisions affect the value of her current choices. They suggest that second-order volitions emerge from precisely this sort of process, and that a Frankfurt-Ainslie account of free will avoids the objections previously raised.

scholarly journals Brentanian Inner Consciousness and the Infinite Regress Problem

dialectica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 129-147
Author(s):  
Andrea Marchesi
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Regress Problem

scholarly journals Untangling Infinite Regress and the Origins of Capability

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niklas L. Hallberg ◽  
Teppo Felin
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Management ◽  
Path Dependence ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Theoretical Explanation ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Management Theory ◽  
Regress Problem ◽  
Causal Mechanisms

We argue that strategic management in general—and capability theory in particular—suffers from problems of infinite regress that can be traced to an unsatisfactory specification of initial conditions. We argue, first, that this has led to an overemphasis on path dependence, experience, and history, without sufficient attention on initial conditions: more proximate, decision-oriented punctuation points that can be used for better theoretical explanation. Second, we show how the initial conditions of theories are often not distinctively different from what is being explained, which prevents theory from providing credible specifications of causal mechanisms. Third, we highlight how the regress problem has led to a relatively casual borrowing of concepts from neighboring disciplines, which has created a mismatch between the aims of management theory and relevance to practice. We suggest research heuristics for how to deal with infinite regress problems, in order to develop more rigorous and relevant theories of capability and strategic management.

scholarly journals A Seeming Problem for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness

Dialogue ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
JESSE M. MULDER
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Distinctive Features

Higher-order theories account for intransitive consciousness by using the transitive notion ‘awareness-of.’ I argue that this notion implies a form of ‘seeming’ that the higher-order approach requires, yet cannot account for. I show that, if the relevant kind of seeming is declared to be present in all representational states, the seeming in question is objectionably trivialized; while using the higher-order strategy to capture not only intransitive consciousness but also the relevant kind of seeming results in an infinite regress. Finally, highlighting distinctive features of representations that explain why they display seeming amounts to abandoning the higher-order approach altogether.

scholarly journals Dispositional Evaluations and Defeat

2021 ◽  
pp. 93-115
Author(s):  
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
The Face ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

Subjects who retain their beliefs in the face of higher-order evidence that those very beliefs are outputs of flawed cognitive processes are at least very often criticizable. Many think that this is because such higher-order evidence defeats various epistemic statuses such as justification and knowledge, but it is notoriously difficult to give an account of such defeat. This paper outlines an alternative explanation, stemming from some of my earlier work, for why subjects are criticizable for retaining beliefs in the face of paradigm kinds of putatively defeating higher-order evidence: they manifest dispositions that are bad relative to a range of candidate epistemic successes such as true belief and knowledge. In particular, being disposed to only give up belief in response to higher-order evidence when that evidence is not misleading would require subjects to have dispositions that discriminate between cases in which their original cognitive processes is fine, and cases in which they merely seemed to be fine. But, I argue, such dispositions are not normally humanly feasible. I show that retaining belief in putative cases of defeat by higher-order evidence is problematic irrespective of whether veritism or some form of gnosticism is true. In the end I contrast my account of dispositional evaluations with similar-sounding ideas that have been put forth in the literature, such as consequentialist views that focus on instrumental means to success.

The Strength of Weak Empathy

2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 383-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Turner
Keyword(s):  
Max Weber ◽  
Weak Sense ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Natural Phenomenon ◽  
Philosophical Idea ◽  
Regress Problem ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Franz Brentano

ArgumentThis paper builds on a neglected philosophical idea, Evidenz. Max Weber used it in his discussion of Verstehen, as the goal of understanding either action or such things as logic. It was formulated differently by Franz Brentano, but with a novel twist: that anyone who understood something would see the thing to be understood as self-evident, not something dependent on inference, argument, or reasoning. The only way one could take something as evident in this sense is by being able to treat other people as having the same responses – by empathy with them, in the weak sense of following their thought. Brentano's philosophical claim is that without some stopping point at what is self-evident, justifications fall into infinite regress. This is radically opposed to much of conventional philosophy. The usual solutions to the regress problem rely on problematic claims about the supposed hidden transcendental structure behind reasoning. In contrast, empathy is a genuine natural phenomenon and a better explanation for the actual phenomenon of making sense of the reasoning of others. What is evident to all who are capable of understanding is an empirically-defined subset of this class.

Der Begriff der inneren Erfahrung bei Petrus Johannis Olivi

2008 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 123-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Rode
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Inner Experience ◽  
Striking Resemblance ◽  
First Order ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Modern Self

The concept of inner experience in Peter John Olivi. This article discusses the notion of inner experience and self-knowledge in Peter John Olivi. According to Olivi, each act of cognition is accompanied by some sort of self-awareness or self-experience. Therefore, the problem of an infinite regress of acts of self-awareness arises. Olivi tries to solve this problem by drawing on a theory of reflection which bears a striking resemblance to modern self-representational or dispositional accounts of (self)consciousness. Thus, in order to be said to be »known« or »certain« it is not necessary for each single act of intellect to be followed by a higher-order act; Olivi argues that in many cases a simple first-order cognitive act suffices.

scholarly journals Do You Know That I Know That You Know…? Higher-Order Beliefs in Survey Data*

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Coibion ◽  
Yuriy Gorodnichenko ◽  
Saten Kumar ◽  
Jane Ryngaert
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Information Model ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
First Order ◽  
Noisy Information ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Information Models ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract We implement a new survey of firms, focusing on their higher-order macroeconomic expectations. The survey provides a novel set of stylized facts regarding the relationship between first-order and higher-order expectations of economic agents, including how they adjust their beliefs in response to a variety of information treatments. We show how these facts can be used to calibrate key parameters of noisy-information models with infinite regress as well as to test predictions made by this class of models. We also consider a range of extensions to the basic noisy-information model that can potentially better reconcile theory and empirics. While some extensions like level-k thinking are unsuccessful, incorporating heterogeneous long-run priors can address the empirical shortcomings of the basic noisy-information model.

Dual systems for all: Higher-order, role-based relational reasoning as a uniquely derived feature of human cognition

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Povinelli ◽  
Gabrielle C. Glorioso ◽  
Shannon L. Kuznar ◽  
Mateja Pavlic
Keyword(s):  
Temporal Reasoning ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Important Case ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Relational Reasoning ◽  
Dual Systems ◽  
First Order ◽  
Reasoning System ◽  
Role Based

Abstract Hoerl and McCormack demonstrate that although animals possess a sophisticated temporal updating system, there is no evidence that they also possess a temporal reasoning system. This important case study is directly related to the broader claim that although animals are manifestly capable of first-order (perceptually-based) relational reasoning, they lack the capacity for higher-order, role-based relational reasoning. We argue this distinction applies to all domains of cognition.

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