scholarly journals Dispositional Evaluations and Defeat

2021 ◽  
pp. 93-115
Author(s):  
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
The Face ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

Subjects who retain their beliefs in the face of higher-order evidence that those very beliefs are outputs of flawed cognitive processes are at least very often criticizable. Many think that this is because such higher-order evidence defeats various epistemic statuses such as justification and knowledge, but it is notoriously difficult to give an account of such defeat. This paper outlines an alternative explanation, stemming from some of my earlier work, for why subjects are criticizable for retaining beliefs in the face of paradigm kinds of putatively defeating higher-order evidence: they manifest dispositions that are bad relative to a range of candidate epistemic successes such as true belief and knowledge. In particular, being disposed to only give up belief in response to higher-order evidence when that evidence is not misleading would require subjects to have dispositions that discriminate between cases in which their original cognitive processes is fine, and cases in which they merely seemed to be fine. But, I argue, such dispositions are not normally humanly feasible. I show that retaining belief in putative cases of defeat by higher-order evidence is problematic irrespective of whether veritism or some form of gnosticism is true. In the end I contrast my account of dispositional evaluations with similar-sounding ideas that have been put forth in the literature, such as consequentialist views that focus on instrumental means to success.

The Epistemic Efficacy of Amateurism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Fantl
Keyword(s):  
Academic Writing ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Bayesian Epistemology ◽  
The Face ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

This chapter discusses when knowledge can survive exposure to counterarguments, even if you find each step compelling and can’t expose a flaw. One consequence of Bayesian epistemology is that knowledge can survive if you lack the expertise to reliably evaluate the counterargument. Knowers can retain knowledge in the face of an apparently flawless counterargument as long as the counterargument is too sophisticated for them, and as long as their knowledge has a basis with which they have sufficient facility (this is one of the lessons of the literature on higher-order evidence). This is one reason why it is so important, in academic writing, to emphasize the case for the opposition. If you train your reader adequately, and they still find the steps in your argument compelling and are unable to locate a flaw, then it becomes harder for them to closed-mindedly dismiss your argument while retaining knowledge that you’re wrong.

Inefficient Encoding as an Explanation for Age-Related Deficits in Recollection-Based Processing

2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 148-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Friedman ◽  
Ray Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Older Adults ◽  
Young Adults ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Memory Performance ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Semantic Retrieval ◽  
Age Related ◽  
The Face ◽  
Episodic Memories

A cardinal feature of aging is a decline in episodic memory (EM). Nevertheless, there is evidence that some older adults may be able to “compensate” for failures in recollection-based processing by recruiting brain regions and cognitive processes not normally recruited by the young. We review the evidence suggesting that age-related declines in EM performance and recollection-related brain activity (left-parietal EM effect; LPEM) are due to altered processing at encoding. We describe results from our laboratory on differences in encoding- and retrieval-related activity between young and older adults. We then show that, relative to the young, in older adults brain activity at encoding is reduced over a brain region believed to be crucial for successful semantic elaboration in a 400–1,400-ms interval (left inferior prefrontal cortex, LIPFC; Johnson, Nessler, & Friedman, 2013 ; Nessler, Friedman, Johnson, & Bersick, 2007 ; Nessler, Johnson, Bersick, & Friedman, 2006 ). This reduced brain activity is associated with diminished subsequent recognition-memory performance and the LPEM at retrieval. We provide evidence for this premise by demonstrating that disrupting encoding-related processes during this 400–1,400-ms interval in young adults affords causal support for the hypothesis that the reduction over LIPFC during encoding produces the hallmarks of an age-related EM deficit: normal semantic retrieval at encoding, reduced subsequent episodic recognition accuracy, free recall, and the LPEM. Finally, we show that the reduced LPEM in young adults is associated with “additional” brain activity over similar brain areas as those activated when older adults show deficient retrieval. Hence, rather than supporting the compensation hypothesis, these data are more consistent with the scaffolding hypothesis, in which the recruitment of additional cognitive processes is an adaptive response across the life span in the face of momentary increases in task demand due to poorly-encoded episodic memories.

Time-Based Measures of Monitoring in Association With Executive Functions in Kindergarten Children

2020 ◽  
Vol 228 (4) ◽  
pp. 244-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonja Kälin ◽  
Claudia M. Roebers
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Executive Functions ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Kindergarten Children ◽  
Metacognitive Monitoring

Abstract. Repeatedly, the notion has been put forward that metacognition (MC) and executive functions (EF) share common grounds, as both describe higher order cognitive processes and involve monitoring. However, only few studies addressed this issue empirically and so far their findings are rather inconsistent. Addressing the question whether measurement differences may in part be responsible for the mixed results, the current study included explicitly reported as well as time-based measures of metacognitive monitoring and related them to EF. A total of 202 children aged 4–6 years were assessed in terms of EF (inhibition, working memory, shifting) and monitoring. While there was no significant link between explicitly reported confidence and EF, latencies of monitoring judgments were significantly related to time- and accuracy-based measures of EF. Our findings support the association between EF and MC and the assumption that better inhibition abilities help children to engage in more thorough monitoring.

scholarly journals Alzheimer’s Disease Progressively Reduces Visual Functional Network Connectivity

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Jie Huang ◽  
Paul Beach ◽  
Andrea Bozoki ◽  
David C. Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Visual Cortex ◽  
Lower Order ◽  
Resting State ◽  
Visual Processing ◽  
Network Connectivity ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Functional Network ◽  
Functional Networks ◽  
The Face ◽  
Processing Network

Background: Postmortem studies of brains with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) not only find amyloid-beta (Aβ) and neurofibrillary tangles (NFT) in the visual cortex, but also reveal temporally sequential changes in AD pathology from higher-order association areas to lower-order areas and then primary visual area (V1) with disease progression. Objective: This study investigated the effect of AD severity on visual functional network. Methods: Eight severe AD (SAD) patients, 11 mild/moderate AD (MAD), and 26 healthy senior (HS) controls undertook a resting-state fMRI (rs-fMRI) and a task fMRI of viewing face photos. A resting-state visual functional connectivity (FC) network and a face-evoked visual-processing network were identified for each group. Results: For the HS, the identified group-mean face-evoked visual-processing network in the ventral pathway started from V1 and ended within the fusiform gyrus. In contrast, the resting-state visual FC network was mainly confined within the visual cortex. AD disrupted these two functional networks in a similar severity dependent manner: the more severe the cognitive impairment, the greater reduction in network connectivity. For the face-evoked visual-processing network, MAD disrupted and reduced activation mainly in the higher-order visual association areas, with SAD further disrupting and reducing activation in the lower-order areas. Conclusion: These findings provide a functional corollary to the canonical view of the temporally sequential advancement of AD pathology through visual cortical areas. The association of the disruption of functional networks, especially the face-evoked visual-processing network, with AD severity suggests a potential predictor or biomarker of AD progression.

Higher-Order Evidence

2019 ◽  
pp. 312-344
Author(s):  
Declan Smithies
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Total Evidence ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
Level Splitting ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

Chapter 10 explores a puzzle about epistemic akrasia: if you can have misleading higher-order evidence about what your evidence supports, then your total evidence can make it rationally permissible to be epistemically akratic. Section 10.1 presents the puzzle and three options for solving it: Level Splitting, Downward Push, and Upward Push. Section 10.2 argues that we should opt for Upward Push: you cannot have misleading higher-order evidence about what your evidence is or what it supports. Sections 10.3 and 10.4 defend Upward Push against David Christensen’s objection that it licenses irrational forms of dogmatism in ideal and nonideal agents alike. Section 10.5 responds to his argument that misleading higher-order evidence generates rational dilemmas in which you’re guaranteed to violate one of the ideals of epistemic rationality. Section 10.6 concludes with some general reflections on the nature of epistemic rationality and the role of epistemic idealization.

Can Your Total Evidence Mislead About Itself?

2019 ◽  
pp. 298-316
Author(s):  
Alex Worsnip
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Total Evidence ◽  
Simple Mathematical Model ◽  
First Order ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

It’s fairly uncontroversial that you can sometimes get misleading higher-order evidence about what your first-order evidence supports. What is more controversial is whether this can result in a situation where your total evidence is misleading about what your total evidence supports: that is, where your total evidence is misleading about itself. It’s hard to arbitrate on purely intuitive grounds whether any particular example of misleading higher-order evidence is an example of misleading total evidence. This chapter tries to make progress by offering a simple mathematical model that suggests that higher-order evidence will tend to bear more strongly on higher-order propositions about what one’s evidence supports than it does on the corresponding first-order propositions; and then by arguing that given this, it is plausible that there will be some cases of misleading total evidence.

scholarly journals William Ockham on the Scope and Limits of Consciousness

Vivarium ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 197-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Brower-Toland
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Regress Problem ◽  
Perception Theory ◽  
William Ockham ◽  
Limited Scope

William Ockham (ca. 1287-1347) holds what nowadays would be characterized as a “higher-order perception” theory of consciousness. Historically speaking, one of the most persistent objections to this type of theory is the charge that it gives rise to an infinite regress in higher-order states. In this paper, I examine Ockham’s efforts to respond to the regress problem, focusing in particular on his attempts to restrict the scope of consciousness so as to avoid it. In his earlier writings, Ockham holds that we are conscious only of those states to which we explicitly attend. This view, I go on to argue, is inadequate on both phenomenological and philosophical grounds. Interestingly, and perhaps for this very reason, in later works, Ockham goes on to develop an alternative explanation for his account of the limited scope of consciousness.

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