Of Gods and Devils

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 479-511 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas B. Ellis
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Intercourse ◽  
Inclusive Fitness ◽  
Illusion Of Control ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
Lack Of Control ◽  
Human Animal ◽  
Design Stance

Perceiving the lack of control over the natural and social spheres is psychologically averse. The resulting depression has an effect upon the human animal’s inclusive fitness. In moments of despair and depression, sexual intercourse may be impossible. In order to restore a modicum of control, and thus libido, the human animal turns to religion. Religion provides compensatory, and thus adaptive illusions of control. It does this by first turning to the intentional stance and the presence of gods who may be socially manipulated to achieve a desired outcome. This is the nature of worship. Alternatively, religion employs the design stance and the presence of devils that may be mechanically compelled to withdraw. This is the nature of exorcism. Where the latter reflects the “illusion of control,” the former reflects the “illusion of qualified control.” Both cognitive stances are in the service of promoting illusions of power amidst truly random circumstances.

Glossing and T*pping

2016 ◽  
pp. 568-586
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Masten
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Cultural History ◽  
Sexual Intercourse ◽  
Gender And Sexuality ◽  
Sexual Practices ◽  
Editorial Work ◽  
Human Animal ◽  
The Way

Reading a series of textual cruxes and glosses in Othello editions, the essay refocuses attention on the 1622–3 printed texts’ description of what we would call ‘sexual intercourse’, and the way in which modern editions attempt to correct/standardize uses of the sexual verb top to tup. At stake are notions of sexuality, sodomy discourse in relation to early modern ‘race’ and human–animal distinctions, power and positionality in historical sexual practices, the relation of textual ‘gloss’ and textual ‘crux’ in Shakespeare editions, and notions of character and coherence in Shakespeare’s plays. The essay argues for integrating scholarship on the intersecting histories of race, gender, and sexuality into editorial work—work often assumed to be prior to criticism and cultural history.

scholarly journals I Am Looking for Your Mind: Pupil Dilation Predicts Individual Differences in Sensitivity to Hints of Human-Likeness in Robot Behavior

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serena Marchesi ◽  
Francesco Bossi ◽  
Davide Ghiglino ◽  
Davide De Tommaso ◽  
Agnieszka Wykowska
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Humanoid Robot ◽  
Cognitive Conflict ◽  
Humanoid Robots ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Pupil Dilation ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
Artificial Agents ◽  
Intentional Agents ◽  
Design Stance

The presence of artificial agents in our everyday lives is continuously increasing. Hence, the question of how human social cognition mechanisms are activated in interactions with artificial agents, such as humanoid robots, is frequently being asked. One interesting question is whether humans perceive humanoid robots as mere artifacts (interpreting their behavior with reference to their function, thereby adopting the design stance) or as intentional agents (interpreting their behavior with reference to mental states, thereby adopting the intentional stance). Due to their humanlike appearance, humanoid robots might be capable of evoking the intentional stance. On the other hand, the knowledge that humanoid robots are only artifacts should call for adopting the design stance. Thus, observing a humanoid robot might evoke a cognitive conflict between the natural tendency of adopting the intentional stance and the knowledge about the actual nature of robots, which should elicit the design stance. In the present study, we investigated the cognitive conflict hypothesis by measuring participants’ pupil dilation during the completion of the InStance Test. Prior to each pupillary recording, participants were instructed to observe the humanoid robot iCub behaving in two different ways (either machine-like or humanlike behavior). Results showed that pupil dilation and response time patterns were predictive of individual biases in the adoption of the intentional or design stance in the IST. These results may suggest individual differences in mental effort and cognitive flexibility in reading and interpreting the behavior of an artificial agent.

scholarly journals Reasons Things Happen for a Reason: An Integrative Theory of Teleology

2021 ◽  
pp. 174569162199575
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Scott
Keyword(s):  
Systems Theory ◽  
Process Model ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
Social Psychological ◽  
Teleological Reasoning ◽  
Intentional Systems ◽  
Scientific Ideas ◽  
Design Stance

Humans default to functions and purposes when asked to explain the existence of mysterious phenomena. Our penchant for teleological reasoning is associated with good outcomes, such as finding meaning in misfortune, but also with bad outcomes, such as dangerous conspiracy theories and misunderstood scientific ideas, both of which pose important social and health problems. Psychological research into the teleological default has long alluded to Daniel Dennett’s intentional-systems theory but has not fully engaged with the three intellectual stances at its core (intentional, design, physical). This article distinguishes the intentional stance from the design stance, which untangles some of the present knots in theories of teleology, accounts for diverse forms of teleology, and enhances predictions of when teleological reasoning is more likely to occur. This article examines the evidence for a teleological default considering Dennett’s intentional-systems theory, proposes a process model, and clarifies current theoretical debates. It argues that people rationally and often thoughtfully use teleological reasoning in relation to both cognitive and social psychological factors. Implications for theory and future research are discussed.

scholarly journals Reasons Things Happen for a Reason: An Integrative Theory of Teleology

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Scott
Keyword(s):  
Systems Theory ◽  
Process Model ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
Social Psychological ◽  
Teleological Reasoning ◽  
Intentional Systems ◽  
Scientific Ideas ◽  
Design Stance

Humans default to functions and purposes when asked to explain the existence ofmysterious phenomena. Our penchant for teleological reasoning is associated with good outcomes such as finding meaning in misfortune, but also with bad outcomes such as dangerous conspiracy theories and misunderstood scientific ideas, both of which pose important social and health problems. Psychological research into the teleological default has long alluded to Daniel Dennett's intentional systems theory but has not fully engaged with the three intellectual stances at its core (intentional, design, physical). This article distinguishes the intentional stance from the design stance, which untangles some of the present knots in theories of teleology, accounts for diverse forms of teleology, and enhances predictions of when teleological reasoning is more likely to occur. This article examines the evidence for a teleological default considering Dennett’s intentional systems theory, proposes a process model, and clarifies current theoretical debates. It argues that people rationally and often thoughtfully use teleological reasoning in relation to both cognitive and social psychological factors. Implications for theory and future research are discussed.

scholarly journals I am looking for your mind. Pupil dilation predicts individual differences in sensitivity to hints of human-likeness in robot behavior

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serena Marchesi ◽  
Francesco Bossi ◽  
Davide Ghiglino ◽  
Davide De Tommaso ◽  
Agnieszka Wykowska
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Humanoid Robot ◽  
Cognitive Conflict ◽  
Humanoid Robots ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Pupil Dilation ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
Artificial Agents ◽  
Intentional Agents ◽  
Design Stance

The presence of artificial agents in our everyday lives is continuously increasing. Hence, the question of how human social cognition mechanisms are activated when we interact with artificial agents, such as humanoid robots, has been asked. One interesting question is whether humans perceive humanoid robots as mere artefacts (interpreting their behavior with reference to their function, thereby adopting the design stance) or as intentional agents (interpreting their behavior with reference to mental states, thereby adopting the intentional stance). Due to their human-like appearance, humanoid robots might be capable of evoking the intentional stance. On the other hand, the knowledge that humanoid robots are only artefacts should call for adopting the design stance. Thus, observing a humanoid robot might evoke a cognitive conflict between the natural tendency of adopting the intentional stance and the knowledge about the actual nature of robots, which should elicit the design stance. In the present study, we investigated the cognitive conflict hypothesis measuring participants’ pupil dilation during the completion of InStance Test. Prior to each pupillary recording, participants were instructed to observe the humanoid robot iCub behaving in two different ways (either machine-like or human-like behavior). Results showed that pupil dilation and response time patterns were predictive of individual biases in the adoption of the intentional or design stance in the IST. These results may suggest individual differences in mental effort and cognitive flexibility in reading and interpreting the behavior of an artificial agent.

The Illusion of Control

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inmaculada de Melo-Martín
Keyword(s):  
Human Reproduction ◽  
Illusion Of Control ◽  
Human Biology ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Lack Of Control ◽  
Normal Human ◽  
Degree Of Control

One of the most common arguments in favor of reprogenetic technologies is their presumed ability to defy the lack of control and the dangers implicit in the “natural lottery” that results from normal human reproduction. This chapter challenges proponents’ claims about the control that reprogenetic technologies will afford us. By proponents’ own account, human beings lack the intellectual wherewithal to aptly control the so-called natural lottery. Even if one were to concede human beings’ wisdom, the degree of control over the natural lottery that reprogenetic technologies are said to grant is illusory, the result of misunderstanding human biology and the role of genetics.

How is the moral stance related to the intentional stance and group thinking?

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes Rakoczy
Keyword(s):  
Natural History ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Shared Intentionality ◽  
History Of ◽  
Group Thinking ◽  
Moral Stance

Abstract The natural history of our moral stance told here in this commentary reveals the close nexus of morality and basic social-cognitive capacities. Big mysteries about morality thus transform into smaller and more manageable ones. Here, I raise questions regarding the conceptual, ontogenetic, and evolutionary relations of the moral stance to the intentional and group stances and to shared intentionality.

Kognitive Verzerrungen bei pathologischen Sportwettern im Vergleich mit Automatenspielern – eine Analyse unter Anwendung des Gamblers Beliefs Questionnaire

2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Kalke ◽  
Sascha Milin ◽  
Sven Buth
Keyword(s):  
Illusion Of Control ◽  
Eine Analyse ◽  
Dsm Iv

Zusammenfassung. Zielsetzung: Aus der internationalen Glücksspielforschung ist bekannt, dass kognitive Verzerrungen mit einer problematischen Glücksspielteilnahme in Beziehung stehen. Spezielle Spielergruppen, die sich nach ihrer favorisierten Glücksspielart unterscheiden, standen dabei bisher jedoch selten im Fokus wissenschaftlicher Untersuchungen. In dieser Studie werden erstmals die kognitiven Verzerrungen bei pathologischen Automatenspielern und Sportwettern dargestellt und in Form eines Gruppenvergleichs analysiert und diskutiert. Methodik: Es werden die Ergebnisse einer (schriftlichen) Befragung von 72 Automatenspielern und 37 Sportwettern dargestellt. Die befragten Personen erfüllen mindestens 5 Kriterien nach DSM-IV. Die Erfassung der kognitiven Erfahrungen erfolgt unter Anwendung des Gamblers Beliefs Questionaire (GBQ). Dieses Instrument beinhaltet zwei Subskalen, die zwischen den Bereichen „Luck/Perseverance“ (Glaube an das persönliche Glück beim Spielen/irrationale Überzeugungen) und „Illusion of control“ (Glaube, den Ausgang des Spiels beeinflussen zu können) differenzieren. Zudem kann der Gesamtscore (Summe aus den Werten der beiden Subskalen) berichtet werden. Für die Prüfung der statistischen Bedeutsamkeit von Unterschieden zwischen beiden Spielergruppen kamen Chi-Quadrat-Tests (bei ordinal skalierten Variablen) oder Varianzanalysen (bei metrischen Variablen) zur Anwendung. Ergebnisse: Die Sportwetter kommen auf einen signifikant höheren Gesamtscore als die Automatenspieler (96,0 zu 81,4), d. h. die kognitiven Verzerrungen sind bei ihnen deutlich ausgeprägter als bei der zweitgenannten Gruppe. Bezogen auf die beiden Sub-Skalen des GBQ ergeben sich sowohl beim persönlichen Glauben an das Glück (56,9 zu 50,7) als auch bei den Kontroll-Illusionen (39,2 zu 30,7) höhere Werte bei den Sportwettern. Schlussfolgerungen: In der Behandlung der Glücksspielsucht sollte die therapeutische Aufarbeitung von kognitiven Verzerrungen eine bedeutsame Rolle spielen. Das gilt insbesondere für pathologische Sportwetter. Gleichfalls sollten präventive Interventionen durchgeführt werden, mit denen der Entstehung von Trugschlüssen über das Glücksspiel und Kontroll-Illusionen vorgebeugt wird.

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