The design stance, intentional stance, and teleological beliefs about biological and nonbiological natural entities.

2021 ◽  
Vol 120 (6) ◽  
pp. 1720-1748
Author(s):  
Andrew J. Roberts ◽  
Simon J. Handley ◽  
Vince Polito
2021 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serena Marchesi ◽  
Francesco Bossi ◽  
Davide Ghiglino ◽  
Davide De Tommaso ◽  
Agnieszka Wykowska

The presence of artificial agents in our everyday lives is continuously increasing. Hence, the question of how human social cognition mechanisms are activated in interactions with artificial agents, such as humanoid robots, is frequently being asked. One interesting question is whether humans perceive humanoid robots as mere artifacts (interpreting their behavior with reference to their function, thereby adopting the design stance) or as intentional agents (interpreting their behavior with reference to mental states, thereby adopting the intentional stance). Due to their humanlike appearance, humanoid robots might be capable of evoking the intentional stance. On the other hand, the knowledge that humanoid robots are only artifacts should call for adopting the design stance. Thus, observing a humanoid robot might evoke a cognitive conflict between the natural tendency of adopting the intentional stance and the knowledge about the actual nature of robots, which should elicit the design stance. In the present study, we investigated the cognitive conflict hypothesis by measuring participants’ pupil dilation during the completion of the InStance Test. Prior to each pupillary recording, participants were instructed to observe the humanoid robot iCub behaving in two different ways (either machine-like or humanlike behavior). Results showed that pupil dilation and response time patterns were predictive of individual biases in the adoption of the intentional or design stance in the IST. These results may suggest individual differences in mental effort and cognitive flexibility in reading and interpreting the behavior of an artificial agent.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174569162199575
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Scott

Humans default to functions and purposes when asked to explain the existence of mysterious phenomena. Our penchant for teleological reasoning is associated with good outcomes, such as finding meaning in misfortune, but also with bad outcomes, such as dangerous conspiracy theories and misunderstood scientific ideas, both of which pose important social and health problems. Psychological research into the teleological default has long alluded to Daniel Dennett’s intentional-systems theory but has not fully engaged with the three intellectual stances at its core (intentional, design, physical). This article distinguishes the intentional stance from the design stance, which untangles some of the present knots in theories of teleology, accounts for diverse forms of teleology, and enhances predictions of when teleological reasoning is more likely to occur. This article examines the evidence for a teleological default considering Dennett’s intentional-systems theory, proposes a process model, and clarifies current theoretical debates. It argues that people rationally and often thoughtfully use teleological reasoning in relation to both cognitive and social psychological factors. Implications for theory and future research are discussed.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Scott

Humans default to functions and purposes when asked to explain the existence ofmysterious phenomena. Our penchant for teleological reasoning is associated with good outcomes such as finding meaning in misfortune, but also with bad outcomes such as dangerous conspiracy theories and misunderstood scientific ideas, both of which pose important social and health problems. Psychological research into the teleological default has long alluded to Daniel Dennett's intentional systems theory but has not fully engaged with the three intellectual stances at its core (intentional, design, physical). This article distinguishes the intentional stance from the design stance, which untangles some of the present knots in theories of teleology, accounts for diverse forms of teleology, and enhances predictions of when teleological reasoning is more likely to occur. This article examines the evidence for a teleological default considering Dennett’s intentional systems theory, proposes a process model, and clarifies current theoretical debates. It argues that people rationally and often thoughtfully use teleological reasoning in relation to both cognitive and social psychological factors. Implications for theory and future research are discussed.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serena Marchesi ◽  
Francesco Bossi ◽  
Davide Ghiglino ◽  
Davide De Tommaso ◽  
Agnieszka Wykowska

The presence of artificial agents in our everyday lives is continuously increasing. Hence, the question of how human social cognition mechanisms are activated when we interact with artificial agents, such as humanoid robots, has been asked. One interesting question is whether humans perceive humanoid robots as mere artefacts (interpreting their behavior with reference to their function, thereby adopting the design stance) or as intentional agents (interpreting their behavior with reference to mental states, thereby adopting the intentional stance). Due to their human-like appearance, humanoid robots might be capable of evoking the intentional stance. On the other hand, the knowledge that humanoid robots are only artefacts should call for adopting the design stance. Thus, observing a humanoid robot might evoke a cognitive conflict between the natural tendency of adopting the intentional stance and the knowledge about the actual nature of robots, which should elicit the design stance. In the present study, we investigated the cognitive conflict hypothesis measuring participants’ pupil dilation during the completion of InStance Test. Prior to each pupillary recording, participants were instructed to observe the humanoid robot iCub behaving in two different ways (either machine-like or human-like behavior). Results showed that pupil dilation and response time patterns were predictive of individual biases in the adoption of the intentional or design stance in the IST. These results may suggest individual differences in mental effort and cognitive flexibility in reading and interpreting the behavior of an artificial agent.


2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 479-511 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas B. Ellis

Perceiving the lack of control over the natural and social spheres is psychologically averse. The resulting depression has an effect upon the human animal’s inclusive fitness. In moments of despair and depression, sexual intercourse may be impossible. In order to restore a modicum of control, and thus libido, the human animal turns to religion. Religion provides compensatory, and thus adaptive illusions of control. It does this by first turning to the intentional stance and the presence of gods who may be socially manipulated to achieve a desired outcome. This is the nature of worship. Alternatively, religion employs the design stance and the presence of devils that may be mechanically compelled to withdraw. This is the nature of exorcism. Where the latter reflects the “illusion of control,” the former reflects the “illusion of qualified control.” Both cognitive stances are in the service of promoting illusions of power amidst truly random circumstances.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes Rakoczy

Abstract The natural history of our moral stance told here in this commentary reveals the close nexus of morality and basic social-cognitive capacities. Big mysteries about morality thus transform into smaller and more manageable ones. Here, I raise questions regarding the conceptual, ontogenetic, and evolutionary relations of the moral stance to the intentional and group stances and to shared intentionality.


Decision ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter C. Pantelis ◽  
Timothy Gerstner ◽  
Kevin Sanik ◽  
Ari Weinstein ◽  
Steven A. Cholewiak ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sajad Fakhri ◽  
Jayanta Kumar Patra ◽  
Swagat Kumar Das ◽  
Gitishree Das ◽  
Mohammad Bagher Majnooni ◽  
...  

Background: As a major cause of morbidity and mortality, cardiovascular diseases (CVDs) are globally increasing. In spite of recent development in the management of cardiovascular complications, CVDs have remained a medical challenge. Numerous conventional drugs are used to play cardioprotective roles; however, they are associated with several side effects. Considering the rich phytochemistry and fewer side effects of herbal medicines, they have gained particular attention to develop novel herbal drugs with cardioprotective potentials. Amongst natural entities, ginger is an extensively used and well-known functional food and condiment, possessing plentiful bioactivities, like antiinflammatory, antioxidant, and antimicrobial properties in several disorders management. Objective: The current review deliberated phytochemical properties as well as the ginger/ginger constituents' biological activities and health benefits in several diseases, with particular attention to cardiovascular complications. Methods: A comprehensive research was conducted using multiple databases, including Scopus, PubMed, Medline, Web of Science, national database (Irandoc and SID), and related articles in terms of the health benefits and cardioprotective effects of ginger/ginger constituents. These data were collected from inception until August 2019. Results: In recent years, several herbal medicines were used to develop new drugs with more potency and also minor side effects. Amongst natural entities, ginger is an extensively used traditional medicine in several diseases. The crude extract, along with related pungent active constituents, is mostly attributed to heart health. The cardioprotective effects of ginger are contributed to its cardiotonic, antihypertensive, anti-hyperlipidemia, and anti-platelet effects. The signaling pathways and molecular mechanisms of ginger regarding its cardioprotective effects are also clarified. Conclusion: This study revealed the biological activities, health benefits, and cardioprotective properties of ginger/ginger constituents along with related mechanisms of action, which gave new insights to show new avenue in the treatment of CVDs.


Dreyfus argues that there is a basic methodological difference between the natural sciences and the social sciences, a difference that derives from the different goals and practices of each. He goes on to argue that being a realist about natural entities is compatible with pluralism or, as he calls it, “plural realism.” If intelligibility is always grounded in our practices, Dreyfus points out, then there is no point of view from which one can ask about or provide an answer to the one true nature of ultimate reality. But that is consistent with believing that the natural sciences can still reveal the way the world is independent of our theories and practices.


Author(s):  
David Rosenthal

Dennett’s account of consciousness starts from third-person considerations. I argue this is wise, since beginning with first-person access precludes accommodating the third-person access we have to others’ mental states. But Dennett’s first-person operationalism, which seeks to save the first person in third-person, operationalist terms, denies the occurrence of folk-psychological states that one doesn’t believe oneself to be in, and so the occurrence of folk-psychological states that aren’t conscious. This conflicts with Dennett’s intentional-stance approach to the mental, on which we discern others’ mental states independently of those states’ being conscious. We can avoid this conflict with a higher-order theory of consciousness, which saves the spirit of Dennett’s approach, but enables us to distinguish conscious folk-psychological states from nonconscious ones. The intentional stance by itself can’t do this, since it can’t discern a higher-order awareness of a psychological state. But we can supplement the intentional stance with the higher-order theoretical apparatus.


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