Assessing Expert Evidence in the icj

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 409-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giorgio Gaja

The article considers the different options available to international tribunals, especially the International Court of Justice, when facing cases that raise scientific and technical issues. While international tribunals can sometimes leave it to the parties to seek an agreement on such issues or resort to legal reasoning to avoid making technical and scientific assessments, other methods may need to be adopted. The Court can rely on the expertise provided by the parties, informally consult “invisible” experts – as long as their views are not likely to affect the content of the decision – or proceed to the appointment of experts or assessors, the latter participating in the deliberations without the right to vote. Due process implies that the parties should be able to comment on the views expressed by Court-appointed experts. This requirement may create difficulties for the Court in reaching a decision on scientific or technical issues.

2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-330
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY GORDON

AbstractTraditional conceptions of the international community have come under stress in a time of expanding international public order. Various initiatives purport to observe a reconceived international community from a variety of perspectives: transnational, administrative, pluralist, constitutional, etc. The perspectives on this changing dynamic evidenced by the International Court of Justice, however, have been largely neglected. But as the principal judicial institution tasked with representing the diversity of legal perspectives in the world, the Court represents an important forum by which to understand the changing appreciation of international community. While decisions of the Court have been restrained, an active discourse has been carried forward among individual judges. I look at part of that discourse, organized around one perspective, which I refer to as innate cosmopolitanism, introduced to the forum of the ICJ by the opinions of Judge Álvarez. The innate cosmopolitan perspective reflects an idea of the international community as an autonomous collectivity, enjoying a will, interests, or ends of its own, independent of constituent states. The application of that perspective under international law is put most to test in matters of international security, in particular where the interest in a discrete, global public order runs up against the right to self-defence vested in states. The innate cosmopolitan perspective has not, in these cases, achieved a controlling position – but, over time, it has been part of a dialectical process showing a change in the appreciation of international community before the Court, and a changing perception from the bench of the role of the Court in that community.


2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-180
Author(s):  
Timo Koivurova

AbstractThe article examines how the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has dealt with the concept of peoples and peoples' rights in its jurisprudence. Most prominent has been the Court's role with respect to the right of self-determination and it is this issue that forms the core of the article. A second important question dealt with is the role of indigenous peoples in ICJ case practice, as the struggle by those peoples to gain collective rights is a recent development in international law. Drawing on this analysis, the discussion proceeds to consider the role that the ICJ has played in the development of the rights of peoples in general and what its future role might be in this sphere of international law. The article also examines the way in which the Court has allowed peoples to participate in its proceedings and whether and how its treatment of peoples' rights has strengthened the general foundations of international law.


2011 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Ker-Lindsay

For 60 years, the international community has limited the right of territories to gain independence without the permission of the “parent state.” Such limits were, however, challenged when Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia, in February 2008. As a result, Belgrade referred the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On 22 July 2010, it came back with its long-awaited decision. Taking a narrow view of the question, the majority argued that, in general, declarations of independence, as mere statements, do not violate international law unless stated otherwise by the Security Council. Thus, Kosovo's declaration of independence cannot be considered as being wholly “unique” – as those states that supported its statehood have claimed. On the key questions of whether Kosovo's secession is legal, or if it is even a state, they chose to avoid controversy. On these points, the international community is no clearer now than it was before the case.


2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-40
Author(s):  
Siyuan Chen

AbstractLike many international tribunals, the International Court of Justice subscribes heavily to the principle of free admissibility of evidence. Neither its statute nor rules impose substantive restrictions on the admissibility of evidence, whether by way of exclusionary rules or an exclusionary discretion. Instead, the court’s practice has been to focus on evaluating and weighing the evidence after it has been admitted. There are certainly features of the ICJ that sets it apart from domestic courts and arguably justify such an approach: the ICJ is for settling disputes between sovereign states; it does not use a typical fact-finding system; its rules and practices reflect a mix of civil and common law traditions; and traditional exclusionary rules were not conceived with inter-state dispute resolution in mind. Yet for any judgment to have legitimacy, the evidential foundations must be strong and there should be a coherent and principled mechanism to sieve out problematic evidence at an early stage. Having this mechanism can also ensure that resources are not wasted and rights protected. Through an examination of the court’s rules and jurisprudence and the rules and practices of other international tribunals, this article makes the case for the codification of a provision that gives the ICJ an exclusionary discretion.


2005 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michla Pomerance

It is hardly surprising that the controversial advisor)’ opinion of the International Court of Justice in the case concerning the Israeli security fence raised serious concerns in many quarters, on multiple grounds. Most prominently, as some of the judges and numerous commentators have noted, the restriction of the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to attacks by “states” is unwarranted on the basis of the text. It is also, of course, illogical in an era when the worldwide terrorist threats stem primarily from nonstate actors. Additionally, in the current case, while the Court assimilated “Palestine” to a state for the purpose of granting it certain rights (including procedural rights before the Court), the ICJ made no corresponding acknowledgment of Palestine’s obligation to refrain from engaging in an armed attack. This, as Judge Rosalyn Higgins recognized, was “formalism of an unevenhanded sort.”


2003 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 701-713 ◽  
Author(s):  
SIENHO YEE

The ICJ interpreted Article 36(1) of its Statute – more specifically, the phrase ‘all cases which the parties refer to it’ – as permitting it to adopt the doctrine of forum prorogatum as a jurisdictional principle and to adapt this doctrine to the circumstances of international judicial process, as an informal way of founding its jurisdiction over the merits of a dispute. The resort to this doctrine has given rise to some concerns and has not received the general acceptance of states. The Certain Criminal Proceedings in France case marks the successful return of the doctrine to the ICJ and shows that the doctrine is a valuable tool for nationalists seeking to protect national interests and for internationalists seeking to promote the peaceful settlement of international disputes.


1981 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 903-909 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip C. Jessup

For the first time the International Court of Justice has squarely faced and ruled upon the right of a third state to intervene in a case to which two other states are parties. The litigation was the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Application of Malta for Permission to Intervene, Judgment of April 14, 1981. The Court unanimously denied permission to intervene, but three judges appended separate opinions which contain matters of considerable interest.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon CHESTERMAN

This essay examines the 2013 Decision by the International Court of Justice interpreting its 1962 Judgment in the Temple of Preah Vihear case between Cambodia and Thailand, situating the more recent decision in the context of the Court's evolving role in Asia. Only eight Asian states have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court; only nine have ever appeared before it. The narrowness of the recent decision is of interest in part because of the modest role it ascribes to judicial institutions, but also for what this modesty heralds for the Court's status in Asia. A key conclusion is that Asian states are likely to retain a general preference for bilateral resolution of disputes. For smaller disputes, however, especially those concerning subjects that cannot be divided or traded—such as a temple (and, as we shall see, an island)—the ICJ may play an important role.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-76
Author(s):  
Marco Longobardo

Abstract This article explores the role of counsel before the International Court of Justice, taking into account their tasks under the Statute of the Court and the legal value of their pleadings in international law. Pleadings of counsel constitute State practice for the formation of customary international law and treaty interpretation, and they are attributable to the litigating State under the law on State responsibility. Accordingly, in principle, counsel present the views of the litigating State, which in practice approves in advance the pleadings. This consideration is relevant in discussing the role of counsel assisting States in politically sensitive cases, where there is no necessary correspondence between the views of the States and those of their counsel. Especially when less powerful States are parties to the relevant disputes, the availability of competent counsel in politically sensitive cases should not be discouraged since it advances the legitimacy of the international judicial function.


Author(s):  
Amit KUMAR

Abstract The adoption of the Rome Statute is a significant moment for international criminal law. Before its formulation, the criminal law was governed by the sources mentioned in their statute or Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice [ICJ Statute]. Custom is one of the important sources within the ICJ Statute. The ad hoc tribunals applied custom and even formulated certain customs. The formulation of custom is considered as against the principle of legality. To avoid such criticism, the State Parties inserted Article 21 in the Rome Statute. The provision clarifies the law which the court can apply. The parties chose not to include custom explicitly. However, the wordings of the provision indicate that the custom is still a source for the court. Apart from the wording of Article 21, other provisions of the Statute give ample scope for the application of custom.


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