Who Are Protected by the Fundamental Guarantees under International Humanitarian Law? Part 2: Breaking with the Control Requirement in Light of the icc Case Law

Author(s):  
Raphaël van Steenberghe

Abstract International humanitarian law provides for fundamental guarantees, the content of which is similar irrespective of the nature of the armed conflict and which apply to individuals even if they do not fall into the categories of specifically protected persons under the Geneva Conventions. Those guarantees, all of which derive from the general requirement of human treatment, include prohibitions of specific conduct against persons, such as murder, cruel treatment, torture, sexual violence, or against property, such as pillaging. However, it is traditionally held that the entitlement to those guarantees depends upon two requirements: the ‘status requirement’, which basically means that the concerned persons must not or no longer take a direct part in hostilities, and the ‘control requirement’, which basically means that the concerned persons or properties must be under the control of a party to the armed conflict. This study argues in favour of breaking with these two requirements in light of the existing icc case law. That study is divided into two parts, with each part devoted to one requirement and made the object of a specific paper. The two papers follow the same structure. They start with general observations on the requirement concerned, examine the relevant icc case law and put forward several arguments in favour of an extensive approach to the personal scope of the fundamental guarantees. The first paper, which was published in the previous issue of this journal, dealt with the status requirement. It especially delved into the icc decisions in the Ntaganda case with respect to the issue of protection against intra-party violence. It advocated the applicability of the fundamental guarantees in such a context by rejecting the requirement of a legal status, on the basis of several arguments. Those arguments relied on ihl provisions protecting specific persons as well as on the potential for humanizing ihl on the matter and also on the approach making the status requirement relevant only when the fundamental guarantees apply in the conduct of hostilities. The second paper, which is published here, deals with the control requirement. It examines several icc cases in detail, including the Katanga and Ntaganda cases, in relation to the issue of the applicability of the fundamental guarantees in the conduct of hostilities. It is argued that the entitlement to those guarantees is not dependent upon any general control requirement, and that, as a result, some of these guarantees may apply in the conduct of hostilities. This concerns mainly those guarantees whose application or constitutive elements do not imply any physical control over the concerned persons or properties.

Author(s):  
Raphaël van Steenberghe

Abstract International humanitarian law provides for fundamental guarantees, the content of which is similar irrespective of the nature of the armed conflict, and which are applicable to individuals even if they do not fall into the categories of specifically protected persons under the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Those guarantees, all of which derive from the general requirement of human treatment, include prohibitions of specific types of conduct against persons, such as murder, cruel treatment, torture and sexual violence, or against property, such as pillaging. However, it is traditionally held that entitlement to those guarantees depends upon two requirements: the ‘status requirement’, which basically means that the concerned persons must not or must no longer take a direct part in hostilities, and the ‘control requirement’, which basically means that the concerned persons or properties must be under the control of a party to the armed conflict. This study argues in favour of breaking with these two requirements, in light of the existing ICC case law. The study is divided into two parts, with each part devoted to one requirement and made the object of a specific paper. The two papers follow the same structure. They start with general observations on the requirement concerned, examine the relevant ICC case law and put forward several arguments in favour of an extensive approach to the personal scope of the fundamental guarantees. The first paper, which is published in this issue, deals with the status requirement. It especially delves into the ICC decisions in the Ntaganda case with respect to the issue of protection against intra-party violence. It advocates for the applicability of the fundamental guarantees in such a context by rejecting the requirement of a legal status, on the basis of several arguments. Those arguments rely on IHL provisions protecting specific persons, on the potential for humanizing IHL on the matter and on the approach making the status requirement relevant only when the fundamental guarantees apply in the conduct of hostilities. The second paper, which will be published in a coming issue, deals with the control requirement. It examines several ICC cases in detail, including the Katanga and Ntaganda cases, in relation to the issue of the applicability of the fundamental guarantees in the conduct of hostilities. It is argued that the entitlement to those guarantees is not dependent upon any general control requirement, and that, as a result, some of these guarantees (mainly those whose application or constitutive elements do not imply any physical control over the concerned persons or properties) may apply in the conduct of hostilities.


Author(s):  
Deniz Arbet Nejbir

Abstract This article assesses the applicability of the criteria for non-international armed conflict to the situation in South-Eastern Turkey. It demonstrates that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (also known as the pkk), as a party to the conflict, fulfils the three main criteria laid down in conventional international humanitarian law and developed by indicative factors in international jurisprudence for assessing the existence of a non-international armed conflict in the context of Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions: being an organised armed group, having the ability to engage in ‘protracted violence’, and complying with law of armed conflict. It establishes that the pkk qualifies as an organised armed group under responsible command and has the operational ability, structure and capacity to carry out ‘protracted violence’, to respect fundamental humanitarian norms of international humanitarian law and to control territory. The article also ascertains that Turkey is clearly bound by the provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, including Common Article 3, and customary international humanitarian law. Accordingly, it concludes that the conflict between the pkk and the Turkish security forces qualifies as a non-international armed conflict within the meaning of both Common Article 3 and customary international humanitarian law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-296
Author(s):  
Ilana Rothkopf

Abstract Do fighters associated with non-state armed groups have the combatant’s privilege in armed conflict? Non-state armed groups are commonplace in contemporary armed conflicts. However, international humanitarian law (IHL), particularly the law that pertains to combatant’s privilege and prisoner of war status, was designed with state actors in mind. This article assesses the conditions under which the members of non-state armed groups have combatant’s privilege. Throughout, it uses the case of Kurdish fighters in Syria as an example of the timeliness of this question and its ramifications for conflict actors. This article notes, with support from the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocols, and other sources of IHL, that IHL does not foresee a combatant’s privilege for armed groups in a non-international armed conflict. It contends, however, that the international community should agree to a generalisable rule for the treatment of fighters as combatants regardless of conflict type, if these fighters demonstrate the capability and willingness to adhere to IHL. Such a rule would reduce the need to assess both conflict type and the status of individual fighters should they be captured, and more importantly, it would incentivise continued compliance with IHL.


2008 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 109-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ola Engdahl

AbstractCurrent peace operations often include an element of enforcement. Such operations are based upon Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and are regularly endowed with a right to use ‘all necessary measures’ to fulfil the tasks set down in the particular mandate from the UN Security Council. Such operations, moreover, are often deployed in unstable conditions that border on armed conflict, or in areas of existing conflict. At times, the military forces involved in these operations are also involved in the armed conflict itself.The utilization of military force naturally raises the question of the legal status of personnel in peace operations under international humanitarian law (IHL). They represent the international community and as such are protected personnel. But how should they be treated from the perspective of IHL? Should they, despite their obvious military characteristics, be regarded as civilians? At what point, if any, could they be regarded as combatants? On the issue of change of status under IHL, does the same threshold apply for the operation's military forces as for other military personnel? Does the involvement of peace forces in an armed conflict, made up of contributions from a number of States, automatically cause that conflict to assume an international nature? Are theConvention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personneland IHL, applicable in non-international armed conflicts, mutually exclusive? These dilemmas are well illustrated by the difficulties facing the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.


1987 ◽  
Vol 27 (258) ◽  
pp. 288-292
Author(s):  
Sumio Adachi

International humanitarian law is, so to speak, a legal measure for moral enforcement which in turn bridges the gap between law and politics. It prescribes minimum duties of contending parties in case of an international or non-international armed conflict.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 234-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Artem Sergeev

Following the widespread participation of United Nations (UN) forces in hostile environments, this article aims to expand the obligations of the UN under International Humanitarian Law. The article argues that Additional Protocol II (AP II) to the Geneva Conventions can bind UN forces, even though the UN is not formally a party thereto. The argument is built on three distinct legal issues: the first issue is whether the UN’s involvement in a conflict internationalizes a non-international armed conflict; the second issue is the legal nature of the UN’s obligations under AP II, which will be explained through two legal theories of indirect consent; and the third issue is the conformity of UN forces to the criteria of an armed group outlined in AP II. The article concludes that if UN forces meet certain conditions, as will be outlined herein, they should be bound by the provisions contained in AP II.


2018 ◽  
Vol 101 (910) ◽  
pp. 357-363

States party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977 have an obligation to take measures necessary to suppress all acts contrary to their provisions. Moreover, States must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or on their territory, and other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction, such as on the basis of universal jurisdiction, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects. In accordance with these obligations and the limits they impose, States may adopt certain measures during and in the aftermath of armed conflicts to promote reconciliation and peace, one of which is amnesties. International humanitarian law (IHL) contains rules pertaining to the granting and scope of amnesties. Specifically, Article 6(5) of Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) provides that, at the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict. Importantly, under customary IHL (as identified in Rule 159 of the ICRC customary IHL study), this excludes persons suspected of, accused of, or sentenced for war crimes in NIACs.


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-33
Author(s):  
Joshua Joseph Niyo

The restriction of personal liberty is a critical feature in all conflicts, whether they are of an international character or not. With the increased prevalence of non-international armed conflict and the drastic proliferation of non-state armed groups, it is critical to explore whether such groups can legally detain or intern persons during conflict. This article proposes that there exists a power and a legal basis for armed groups to intern persons for imperative security reasons while engaged in armed conflict. It is suggested that this authorisation exists in the frameworks of both international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as it does for states engaged in such conflicts. It is proposed that such power and legal basis are particularly strong for armed groups in control of territory, and can be gleaned from certain customary law claims, treaty law, as well as some case law on international humanitarian law and human rights. Certain case law of the European Court of Human Rights on detention by de facto non-state entities conceivably reflects a change in traditional thinking on ‘legal’ detention by armed groups.


1992 ◽  
Vol 32 (287) ◽  
pp. 121-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Peter Gasser

Article 75 of Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions lays down with admirable clarity and concision thateven in time of war, or rather especially in time of war, justice must be dispassionate. How does international humanitarian lawpromote this end? What can theInternational Committee of the Red Cross, an independent humanitarian institution, do in the harsh reality of an armed conflict towards maintaining respect for the fundamental judicial guarantees protecting persons accused of crimes, some of them particularly abhorrent?This article will first consider the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols in relation to judicial procedure in time of armed conflicts. Thereafter it will examine the legal bases legitimizing international scrutiny of penal proceedings instituted against persons protected by humanitarian law. The next and principal part of the article will indicate how ICRC delegates appointed to monitor trials as observers do their job. In conclusion the article will try to evaluate this little-known aspect of the ICRC's work of protection.


2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (911) ◽  
pp. 869-949

This is the fifth report on international humanitarian law (IHL) and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (International Conference). Similar reports were submitted to the International Conferences held in 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015. The aim of all these reports is to provide an overview of some of the challenges posed by contemporary armed conflicts for IHL; generate broader reflection on those challenges; and outline current or prospective ICRC action, positions, and areas of interest.


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