International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Practice in Armed Conflict: Combatant’s Privilege and Kurdish Fighters in Syria

2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-296
Author(s):  
Ilana Rothkopf

Abstract Do fighters associated with non-state armed groups have the combatant’s privilege in armed conflict? Non-state armed groups are commonplace in contemporary armed conflicts. However, international humanitarian law (IHL), particularly the law that pertains to combatant’s privilege and prisoner of war status, was designed with state actors in mind. This article assesses the conditions under which the members of non-state armed groups have combatant’s privilege. Throughout, it uses the case of Kurdish fighters in Syria as an example of the timeliness of this question and its ramifications for conflict actors. This article notes, with support from the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocols, and other sources of IHL, that IHL does not foresee a combatant’s privilege for armed groups in a non-international armed conflict. It contends, however, that the international community should agree to a generalisable rule for the treatment of fighters as combatants regardless of conflict type, if these fighters demonstrate the capability and willingness to adhere to IHL. Such a rule would reduce the need to assess both conflict type and the status of individual fighters should they be captured, and more importantly, it would incentivise continued compliance with IHL.

2014 ◽  
Vol 96 (895-896) ◽  
pp. 1195-1224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ezequiel Heffes ◽  
Marcos D. Kotlik

AbstractCommon Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions encourages the parties to a non-international armed conflict to bring into force international humanitarian law provisions through the conclusion of special agreements. Since armed groups are ever more frequent participants in contemporary armed conflicts, the relevance of those agreements as means to enhance compliance with IHL has grown as well. The decision-making process of special agreements recognizes that all the parties to the conflict participate in the clarification and expansion of the applicable rights and obligations in a way that is consistent with the principle of equality of belligerents. This provides incentives for armed groups to respect the IHL rules they have themselves negotiated. However, even upon the conclusion of such agreements, it remains unclear which legal regime governs them. This paper will argue that special agreements are governed by international law instead of domestic law or asui generislegal regime.


2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Gal

Humanitarian assistance is essential for the survival of the civilian population and peoplehors de combatin the theatre of war. Its regulation under the laws of armed conflict tries to achieve a balance between humanitarian goals and state sovereignty. This balance, reflected in the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, is not as relevant to contemporary armed conflicts, most of which involve non-state armed groups. Even those provisions relating to humanitarian assistance in conflicts involving non-state armed groups fail to address properly the key features of these groups, and especially their territorial aspect. This article proposes a different approach, which takes into consideration and gives weight to the control exercised by non-state armed groups over a given territory. Accordingly, it is suggested that provisions regulating humanitarian relief operations in occupied territories should apply to territories controlled by armed groups. This approach views international humanitarian law first and foremost as an effective, realistic and practical branch of law. Moreover, it has tremendous humanitarian advantages and reflects the aims and purposes of the law, while considering the factual framework of these conflicts.


Author(s):  
Raphaël van Steenberghe

Abstract International humanitarian law provides for fundamental guarantees, the content of which is similar irrespective of the nature of the armed conflict and which apply to individuals even if they do not fall into the categories of specifically protected persons under the Geneva Conventions. Those guarantees, all of which derive from the general requirement of human treatment, include prohibitions of specific conduct against persons, such as murder, cruel treatment, torture, sexual violence, or against property, such as pillaging. However, it is traditionally held that the entitlement to those guarantees depends upon two requirements: the ‘status requirement’, which basically means that the concerned persons must not or no longer take a direct part in hostilities, and the ‘control requirement’, which basically means that the concerned persons or properties must be under the control of a party to the armed conflict. This study argues in favour of breaking with these two requirements in light of the existing icc case law. That study is divided into two parts, with each part devoted to one requirement and made the object of a specific paper. The two papers follow the same structure. They start with general observations on the requirement concerned, examine the relevant icc case law and put forward several arguments in favour of an extensive approach to the personal scope of the fundamental guarantees. The first paper, which was published in the previous issue of this journal, dealt with the status requirement. It especially delved into the icc decisions in the Ntaganda case with respect to the issue of protection against intra-party violence. It advocated the applicability of the fundamental guarantees in such a context by rejecting the requirement of a legal status, on the basis of several arguments. Those arguments relied on ihl provisions protecting specific persons as well as on the potential for humanizing ihl on the matter and also on the approach making the status requirement relevant only when the fundamental guarantees apply in the conduct of hostilities. The second paper, which is published here, deals with the control requirement. It examines several icc cases in detail, including the Katanga and Ntaganda cases, in relation to the issue of the applicability of the fundamental guarantees in the conduct of hostilities. It is argued that the entitlement to those guarantees is not dependent upon any general control requirement, and that, as a result, some of these guarantees may apply in the conduct of hostilities. This concerns mainly those guarantees whose application or constitutive elements do not imply any physical control over the concerned persons or properties.


2018 ◽  
Vol 101 (910) ◽  
pp. 357-363

States party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977 have an obligation to take measures necessary to suppress all acts contrary to their provisions. Moreover, States must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or on their territory, and other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction, such as on the basis of universal jurisdiction, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects. In accordance with these obligations and the limits they impose, States may adopt certain measures during and in the aftermath of armed conflicts to promote reconciliation and peace, one of which is amnesties. International humanitarian law (IHL) contains rules pertaining to the granting and scope of amnesties. Specifically, Article 6(5) of Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) provides that, at the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict. Importantly, under customary IHL (as identified in Rule 159 of the ICRC customary IHL study), this excludes persons suspected of, accused of, or sentenced for war crimes in NIACs.


1992 ◽  
Vol 32 (287) ◽  
pp. 121-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Peter Gasser

Article 75 of Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions lays down with admirable clarity and concision thateven in time of war, or rather especially in time of war, justice must be dispassionate. How does international humanitarian lawpromote this end? What can theInternational Committee of the Red Cross, an independent humanitarian institution, do in the harsh reality of an armed conflict towards maintaining respect for the fundamental judicial guarantees protecting persons accused of crimes, some of them particularly abhorrent?This article will first consider the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols in relation to judicial procedure in time of armed conflicts. Thereafter it will examine the legal bases legitimizing international scrutiny of penal proceedings instituted against persons protected by humanitarian law. The next and principal part of the article will indicate how ICRC delegates appointed to monitor trials as observers do their job. In conclusion the article will try to evaluate this little-known aspect of the ICRC's work of protection.


2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (911) ◽  
pp. 869-949

This is the fifth report on international humanitarian law (IHL) and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (International Conference). Similar reports were submitted to the International Conferences held in 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015. The aim of all these reports is to provide an overview of some of the challenges posed by contemporary armed conflicts for IHL; generate broader reflection on those challenges; and outline current or prospective ICRC action, positions, and areas of interest.


1994 ◽  
Vol 34 (302) ◽  
pp. 450-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Peter Gasser

In its Final Declaration of 1 September 1993, the International Conference for the Protection of War Victims inter alia urged all States to make every effort to:“Consider or reconsider, in order to enhance the universal character of international humanitarian law, becoming party or confirming their succession, where appropriate, to the relevant treaties concluded since the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in particular:—the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977 (Protocol I);—the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977 (Protocol II);—the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons and its three Protocols;—The 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict”.


Author(s):  
Nicole Scicluna

This chapter investigates whether and how the laws that govern armed conflict achieve their objective of minimizing the suffering of combatants and non-combatants alike. International humanitarian law (IHL) reflects the tensions of an international legal order that oscillates between the apologist tendency to reflect state practice and state self-interest and the utopian desire to reflect higher values of justice and human dignity. The chapter begins with a brief overview of the evolution of this body of law, the codification of which dates from the second half of the nineteenth century. It then turns to the question of terminology, analysing the political origins and legal implications of the relatively recent term ‘international humanitarian law’. The chapter focuses on two key questions. Firstly, who or what is a legitimate target during an armed conflict? Secondly, what are legitimate means of conducting armed conflict? The chapter also considers the status of nuclear weapons under international law, a topic that captures well both the possibilities and limits of IHL.


Author(s):  
Thomas Van Poecke ◽  
Frank Verbruggen ◽  
Ward Yperman

Abstract While armed conflicts are principally governed by international humanitarian law (IHL), activities of members of non-State armed groups and their affiliates may also qualify as terrorist offences. After explaining why the concurrent application of IHL and criminal law instruments on terrorism causes friction, this article analyzes the chief mechanism for dissipating this friction: a clause excluding activities governed by IHL from the scope of criminal law instruments on terrorism. Such armed conflict exclusion clauses exist at the international, regional and national level. This article explains how an exclusion clause can best avoid friction between IHL and criminal law instruments on terrorism.


2021 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 292-311
Author(s):  
Elliot Winter

Abstract Non-international armed conflict between States and organised armed groups is a reality of warfare. Since the emergence of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, this form of conflict has been regulated by international humanitarian law. However, a subset of this category known as ‘transnational armed conflict’ has seen aggressive proliferation over recent decades as groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria have taken advantage of the internet and other technologies to expand their reach beyond national frontiers and strike States around the world. This phenomenon has left the geographical extent of international humanitarian law – which has historically relied on State boundaries to determine its ambit – unclear. This article examines the main options for delimiting the geographical reach of the regime in transnational armed conflict. It considers approaches based on international boundaries; ‘hot battlefields’; ‘global application’ and ‘territorial control’ before ultimately concluding that a method based on ‘military presence’ would be the most suitable standard.


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