Legal Aid in South-East Asia and China: Seven Lessons of Bangkok

2000 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-96
Author(s):  

AbstractBetween 10–14 June 1999, Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of Australia took part in, and summed up a forum on legal aid in Asia held in Bangkok, Thailand. Participants were drawn from centres throughout the region. The forum was organised by the Washington-based International Human Rights Law Group and the Hong Kong based Asian Human Rights Commission - two human rights non-governmental organisations. In his summary Justice Kirby drew on the interventions made during the forum by legal practitioners from the participating states. He suggests a number of lessons and themes for future exploration. His chief point is simple. It applies as much in Australia as in its region. Without affordable and effective access to independent, neutral and professional courts, talk of the rule of law is hollow and liable to be deceptive.

Author(s):  
Tomuschat Christian

This article examines the role of the rule of law and democracy in international human rights law. It discusses the legal nature and the formal recognition of the rule of law and democracy. It explains that that rule of law and democracy are elements that constitute essential pillars promoting real enjoyment of human rights but they are dependent on the general conditions prevailing within society. This article highlights the importance of the supervisory roles of international bodies in ensuring the effectiveness of the guarantees set forth in international instruments for the protection of human rights.


Author(s):  
Aryeh Neier

This chapter explores how international humanitarian law and international human rights law initially developed independently, but have converged and are now deeply interwoven. Since ancient times, some who take part in armed combat have recognized that placing certain limits on the way in which they conduct hostilities can be advantageous. It can be a sign of civilized behavior, enhancing their own prestige; it may be a way to encourage their opponents to behave in a similar manner; and it may contribute to the reestablishment of peaceful relations in which the rule of law prevails. Whether or not these limits confer advantages, they do most often have the effect of asserting a commitment to humane principles.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-165
Author(s):  
Joshua W. Dansby

Summary “The rule of law is like the notion of ‘the good’. Everyone is for the good, although we hold different ideas about what the good is.” 1 Two primary ways of viewing the Rule of Law have developed over the years: the “thick” theory of the Rule of Law advocates that, in addition to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, participation in government decisions (democracy) and consistency with international human rights law are essential for the Rule of Law in a society; the “thin” theory of the Rule of Law asserts that democracy and consistency with human rights law, while nice, are not essential for the Rule of Law. While the Rule of Law is often talked about in the context of developing countries that are coming out of conflict, there is little talk about the Rule of Law and its application to countries such as the United States. The past two years have seen the Rule of Law in the United States threatened as it has never been before, with Senators refusing to do their constitutional duty, a President that threatens to disregard the rulings of the judiciary, and judges both politicizing and abdicating their role as the interpreters of the law. Using a definition of the “thin” theory of the Rule of Law formulated by Brian Tamanahan, I ultimately argue that it not only is, but should be the case that a product of the Rule of Law, stability, a combination of security and predictability, is one of the world’s most valued commodities; and that Rule of Law, rather than the Rule of Man, is and should always be the bedrock of the United States of America.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent Chetail

This paper is assessing the legality of border closures decided by a vast number of countries with the view of limiting the spread of Covid-19. Although this issue has raised diverging interpretations in relation to International Health Regulations and regional free movement agreements, international human rights law provides a clear-cut answer: the rule of law stops neither at the border nor in times of emergency. Against this normative framework, border control can and must be carried out with the twofold purpose of protecting public health and individual rights, whereas border closure is unable to do so because it is by essence a collective and automatic denial of admission without any other form of process. This paper argues that blanket entry bans on the ground of public health are illegal under international human rights law. They cannot be reconciled with the most basic rights of migrants and refugees, including the principle of non-refoulement and access to asylum procedures, the prohibition of collective expulsion, the best interests of the child and the principle of non-discrimination. The paper concludes on the ways to better integrate at the borders public health and human rights imperatives in due respect with the rule of law. In both law and practice, public health and migrant's rights are not mutually exclusive. They can reinforce each other within a comprehensive human rights based approach to health and migration policies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kinnari Bhatt

AbstractOne way of understanding the exile of the Chagos Islanders and their inability to return to their ancestral land is through a reading of the case from a perspective of post-colonial legal scholarship. Chagossians have strong legal rights to land and remedies of compensation and return through a purposive application of the international legal definition of Indigenous, Magna Carta right to abode and international human rights law that could address their dispossession. Yet, the inability of those rights to be meaningfully applied has been constrained because of the post-colonial way they are legally interpreted, creating a legal vacuum in which basic fairness and substantive equality have been routinely compromised. Drawing attention to the continued legal denial of return in the context of decolonisation, ongoing colonialism and the rule of law makes sense of the legal record and explains the expulsion of the islanders despite the moral merits of return.


Author(s):  
Lieneke Slingenberg

Abstract Irregular migrants in Europe are increasingly subjected to state coercion, surveillance and spatial restrictions, such as containment, dispersal and forced transfers. Lawyers usually evaluate such practices in the light of human rights law, which only provides limited protection. For this reason, I propose an alternative normative framework to evaluate and assess coercive state practices towards irregular migrants: the concept of freedom as non-domination. In this article, I conceptualize non-domination from a rule of law perspective. To this end, I start from Lovett’s procedural account of arbitrariness; and complement this with Benton’s focus on unaccountable power and Palombella’s argument for ‘duality of law’. In the second part of this article, I apply this normative framework to coercive practices in shelters for irregular migrants in the Netherlands. This allows me to demonstrate the practical relevance and consequences of the theory. It discloses how the protection of freedom as non-domination, conceptualized from a rule of law perspective, sets more demanding criteria for the (courts of) law than the protection of human rights. At the same time, it does not require non-interference or elaborate positive obligations from the state. For irregular migrants, who do not have the right to reside in the territory, but who are entirely under the control of state power, non-domination as conceptualized in this paper provides, in my view, a necessary framework of review that ensures a kind of protection that is currently lacking.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 186-213
Author(s):  
Pamela Stewart ◽  
Anita Stuhmcke

This article examines the application of the rule of law to special leave to appeal applications (‘SLAs’) in the High Court of Australia. SLAs are a fusion of administrative and judicial power. As an administrative tool, determinations of SLAs are a workload filter, limiting the appeals heard by the Court. As an exercise of judicial power, SLA determinations have significant impact upon the parties to litigation and the development of substantive law. Presenting the findings of data analysis of the determination of SLAs in the High Court of Australia from 2013 to 2015, we identify the loss of publicly available information brought about by changes to the High Court Rules in 2016. Using this evidence, we argue that the current administration of SLAs preferences efficiency to the detriment of public confidence in the administration of justice. We suggest facilitating the rule of law through publication of the written submissions for SLAs.


2020 ◽  
pp. 118-157
Author(s):  
Nikita Agarwal

This essay seeks to draw upon the updates of the Jagdalpur Legal Aid Group (JagLAG), a group of women lawyers working in the conflict-torn region of South Chhattisgarh representing adivasis of Bastar at various sites of law and documenting law in conflict. Using the JagLAG updates as archives of the life of law in Bastar, the chapter draws upon the life of law in a terrain of violence, wherein the Rule of Law collapses under the weight of the gun and the subject of law is dehumanized; reduced to a development project of the state requiring uplifting and is denied all human rights. Divided into three parts, the chapter maps out the capacity of law to fashion itself to suit the needs of the state apparatus which grows increasingly offensive and brazenly disregards human rights, silencing any form of dissent as it storms through the forests of Bastar, destroying countless lives in its stead. Notwithstanding the bourgeoisie nature of law which by design seeks to alienate and oppress, the chapter leaves behind questions worth pondering over. Are there possibilities in the law of articulating, ascertaining and asserting the voices of the marginalized, of those who are perceived as enemies of the state, mere casualties in the State’s endeavour of combating a law and order situation or is vesting any energy and hope in such a possibility of law a useless exercise?


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