The European Court of Justice and WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings

Author(s):  
Adrian EMCH
2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (6) ◽  
pp. 1025-1032
Author(s):  
Delphine De Mey

On 1 March 2005, the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ‘ECJ’ or ‘the Court’) got another opportunity to rule on the effect of recommendations and decisions of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter ‘DSB’) in the Community legal order. The ECJ concluded that an individual does not have the right to challenge, before a national court, the incompatibility of Community measures with WTO rules, even if the DSB had previously declared the Community legislation to be incompatible with those rules.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 503-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Riffel

Abstract In Opinion 1/17, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) found the investment court system compatible with European Union (EU) law. The ruling concerned the mechanism in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) but the Court’s reasoning is equally applicable to other investment courts as established, for example, in the EU’s investment protection agreements with Singapore and Vietnam. This outcome was far from clear, given that in the past the accession to international dispute settlement bodies regularly foundered on the autonomy of the EU legal order. The present article parses the CETA Opinion and explores its implications. It particularly focuses on autonomy as a constitutional principle and its advancement in Opinion 1/17. Importantly, the ECJ accepted the superiority of a court created by international agreement in relation to the said agreement. Furthermore, it clarified that it is not prerequisite for the Court to rule first on the meaning to be given to an act of EU law before that act can be the subject matter of an investment dispute. Finally, the pdrerogative of the EU to autonomously set the level of protection of a public welfare goal must be secured in a treaty for the EU to join it.


2003 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafael Leal-Arcas

AbstractThis article explains why the WTOand the various agreements that form an integral part of the Agreement establishing the WTO raise problems and challenges for the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ). It focuses on the role of the ECJ in relation to exclusive and shared competence. The European Community's (EC) specific problems and challenges for the ECJ are partly related to the EC's position in the WTO. In this sense, the opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Hermès International v. FHT Marketing Choice is helpful for understanding the unitary character of the EC's external trade relations. This article includes a discussion of Hermès v. FHT Marketing concerning the interpretation of Article 50 of the Agreement on TRIPS, annexed to the 1994 Agreement establishing the WTO. The new mechanisms introduced by the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding are perhaps not comparable to the full judicial system within the EU, but they have changed both the rules and the legal culture concerning the adjudication and enforcement obligations. Although the WTO is still an intergovernmental organization, powerful private actors have already learned to manipulate the system to reach legal adjudication under the guise of intergovernmental disputes. This paper concludes that the EC wants to deny 'direct effect' to the WTO. This article offers the conclusion that we must aim at the creation of new standards to judge the applicability of international agreements. Otherwise, by allowing policy makers to decide rather than ECJ, the EC legal order may be at risk.


2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 643-713 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonja Boelaert-Suominen

AbstractThe European Community has gradually increased its focus on marine and maritime affairs, starting with the Community's Fishery Policy in the 1970s and culminating recently in the 2007 Blue Book on an Integrated Maritime Policy of the European Union. The Community's increased clout over marine and maritime matters has been reflected also in the case law of the European Court of Justice. From the outset the Court has given great impetus to the Community's efforts to assert its external competence in matters related to fisheries and conservation of biological resources of the sea. Even so, the Court has thus far only occasionally been confronted with public international law questions pertaining to the law of the sea. However, the few cases in which the Court has addressed such issues are worthy of note. For example, the Court has ruled on whether Member States should be allowed to rely on the international law of the sea in order to derogate from obligations under Community law; whether Member States should be allowed to prefer the dispute settlement provisions set out in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea over the Community's own dispute settlement system; and on whether private parties may invoke arguments derived from the customary or conventional international law of the sea to challenge the validity of Community legislation pertaining to marine and maritime matters. The resulting judgments of the European Court of Justice have often turned out to be landmark cases, although some of them have tended to divide academic opinion.


2007 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 463-483 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Churchill

AbstractThis is the third of a projected series of annual surveys reviewing dispute settlement under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The main developments during 2006 were the award of the arbitral tribunal in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Maritime Boundary Case and the judgment of the European Court of Justice relating to the MOX Plant case. No new cases were brought during the year.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dr. Laurens Ankersmit

This article explores the legality of investment arbitration in eu trade agreements under eu law. Investor-state dispute settlement (isds), including the Investment Court System, allows foreign investors to challenge eu acts and decisions before investment tribunals and these tribunals may be faced with questions of eu law. Since this system of dispute resolution operates entirely outside the eu judicial framework and rivals with it, the powers of the courts of the Member States and that of the European Court of Justice may be adversely affected. This in turn could affect the uniform interpretation and effectiveness of eu law and the autonomy of the eu legal order.


Author(s):  
Tobias Lenz

This chapter traces the European Union’s active influence on the establishment of the Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community in 2005—a carbon copy of the European Court of Justice. The Tribunal’s creation is an inferentially powerful case to study active EU influence because it constitutes a least likely case from the perspective of existing explanations of dispute settlement design. Through a detailed process tracing exercise that reconstructs the collective preferences and institutional strategies of national governments and the process of international bargaining, it shows how the European Union, through its threat to withdraw funding from SADC, induced the creation of the SADC Tribunal. In the absence of EU influence, the chapter concludes, the Tribunal would not have been established; active EU influence made a counterfactual difference to SADC’s institutionalization.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (7) ◽  
pp. 71-79
Author(s):  
A. Bolshakov

Sovereignty does not imply regulatory autonomy. After Brexit, the UK should align its regulatory policy with European norms, if it is interested in close partnership with the EU. Compromises must be made by both sides in order to ensure stability of the partnership. The EU will have to acknowledge the UK’s right to diverge from European rules. Britain will have to partly accept the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. The structure of dispute settlement mechanism which will be created under the partnership agreement should be a product of a compromise. The present study shows that optimal structure of dispute settlement mechanism must include two different procedures: one for political issues and the other for commercial issues. The central role for the European Court of Justice must be envisaged as a part of politically oriented procedure. There must be no role for the European Court of Justice or any Union to set the pace of political communication. The latter reflects the interest of Great Britain to simplify economic relations, which means that, firstly, disputes are resolved by independent arbiters; secondly, the EU acknowledges the UK’s right to diverge from European regulations; and thirdly, the UK accepts the EU’s right to impose countervailing duties to compensate for adverse effects of divergence on competition. This article also examines the main problems of future British regulatory policy, especially in the field of state aid. Boris Johnson’s government has decided not to form a full-fledged regulatory regime in the area of state aid. Its stance is politically appropriate since Conservative party manifesto for the 2019 general election promised to support local industries without limitations. But that decision created a great deal of economic risk. Firstly, the absence of a domestic subsidy control regulator can cause chaos within regulation system because workable norms and rules can only be sustained by a tight enforcement mechanism. Secondly, the EU can cite lack of subsidy control as an obstacle for British business to have unrestricted access to the European market.


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