scholarly journals Effects of Ambiguous Common Uncertainty on Employees’ Preference for Relative Performance Contracts

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2016) ◽  
pp. 65-93
Author(s):  
Ge Bai ◽  
Ranjani Krishnan
Keyword(s):  
Relative Performance ◽  
Performance Contracts

scholarly journals On relative performance contracts and fund manager's incentives

1999 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jürgen Eichberger ◽  
Simon Grant ◽  
Stephen P. King
Keyword(s):  
Relative Performance ◽  
Performance Contracts

scholarly journals CEO Pay and the Rise of Relative Performance Contracts: A Question of Governance?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Bell ◽  
Simone Pedemonte ◽  
John Van Reenen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Relative Performance ◽  
Formal Structure ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Past Performance ◽  
Performance Contracts ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Uk

Abstract We exploit the large rise in relative performance awards in the UK over the last two decades to investigate whether these contracts improve the alignment between CEO pay and performance. We first document that corporate governance appears to be stronger when institutional ownership is greater. Then, using hand-collected data from annual reports on explicit contracts, we show that (1) CEO pay still responds more to increases in the firms’ stock performance than to decreases and, importantly, this asymmetry is stronger when corporate governance is weak as measured by low institutional ownership; (2) “pay-for-luck” persists as remuneration increases with random positive shocks, even when the CEO has equity awards that explicitly condition on firm performance relative to peer firms in the same sector. A major reason why relative performance contracts do not eliminate pay for luck is that CEOs who fail to meet the terms of their past performance awards are able to obtain more generous new equity rewards in the future in weakly governed firms. We show the mechanism operates both through the quantum of shares and the structure of new contracts. These findings suggest that reforms to the formal structure of CEO pay contracts are unlikely to align incentives in the absence of strong corporate governance.

scholarly journals Production Contracts, Risk Shifting, and Relative Performance Payments in the Pork Industry

1997 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura L. Martin
Keyword(s):  
Processing System ◽  
Relative Performance ◽  
Actual Performance ◽  
Pork Production ◽  
Production Contracts ◽  
Performance Contracts ◽  
Weak Evidence ◽  
Market Production ◽  
Income Variability ◽  
Contract Production

AbstractActual performance records of production contract farmers are used to assess the extent to which contract production reduces the risk borne by pork producers. Comparisons of contracting relative to independent market production reveal that farmers who enter into production contracts based on absolute performance measures reduce risks associated with variable income. Weak evidence is found that relative performance contracts, similar to those used in the broiler chicken industry, further reduce income variability. The effectiveness of such relative performance contracts will rely on several factors; among these are increased contract production and a more uniform pork production and processing system.

Evaluating the Operational Performance of Manufacturing Enterprises: An Evaluation Framework and Application to Pakistani Industry

1985 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 703-719 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdul Hafeez Shaikh
Keyword(s):  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Technology Development ◽  
Evaluation Framework ◽  
Relative Performance ◽  
Operational Performance ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
Manufacturing Enterprises ◽  
Private And Public

This study has two objectives; (i) to develop a framework for evaluating the operational performance of manufacturing enterprises, and (ii) to evaluate the trend in the performance of Pakistan's vegetable ghee industry for the 1970- 1980 period, with special focus on its relative performance under private and public ownerships. Section II is devoted to the vegetable ghee industry itself - its technology, development, pricing and distribution policies. In Section III a framework for performance evaluation is developed. In Section IV we evaluate in a series of steps - the performance of Pakistan's vegetable ghee industry. The final section is devoted to concluding comments.

Relative Performance Auctions

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Octavian Carare ◽  
Vlad N. Mares
Keyword(s):  
Relative Performance
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