The Rise of Segmented Neo-Corporatism in South America: Wage Coordination in Argentina and Uruguay (2005-2015)

Argentina and Uruguay are the only democracies in Latin America (among few in the world) that have developed sustained, state-oriented national and sectoral wage bargaining between employers and unions after 2005. The article defines “segmented neo-corporatism” as a new form of centralized incomes policy in the region that applies to a substantial portion (i.e., registered workers), though not to all the labor force. Drawing on neo-corporatist theory, I explain, first, why only Argentina and Uruguay could consolidate a centralized, national wage policy in the context of the Latin American Left-Turn. Second, I test empirically the degree of state-oriented wage coordination. The study argues that monetary policy deterrence and higher levels of bargaining centralization largely explain the greater capacity of Uruguayan neo-corporatism to govern wage-setting compared with its Argentine counterpart. Finally, the article puts segmented neo-corporatism in comparative perspective in the developing world and draws some theoretical implications.

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The UDP Government and the Crisis of the Bolivian Left (1982–1985)

Journal of Latin American Studies ◽

10.1017/s0022216x99005507 ◽

2000 ◽

Vol 32 (1) ◽

pp. 175-205 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

ENRIQUE IBÁÑEZ ROJO

Keyword(s):

Latin American ◽

Financial Policy ◽

New Order ◽

Wage Policy ◽

The Past ◽

Latin American Left ◽

Institutional Decline ◽

American Left ◽

Second Period ◽

Main Distinguishing Feature

This article offers an interpretation of the crisis of the Bolivian Left in the mid-1980s, perhaps the most spectacular of all those suffered by the Latin American Left over the course of the decade. The author shows that the main distinguishing feature of the Bolivian case was the exceptional political power of the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB). It was this that enabled the union federation first to impose a highly expansive wage policy on the Unión Democrática y Popular (UDP) government, and then to veto its attempts to move towards a more realistic financial policy. The author goes on to argue that, in this second period, when the undesired consequences of the government's economic policy were sufficiently obvious to persuade the union to change its original strategies, the institutional structure that the COB had inherited from the past restricted and ultimately eliminated the union's strategic capacity. In this interpretation, the power of the union vis-à-vis a weak government, coupled with the union's own weakness as a corporate actor, gave rise to an accelerated process of institutional decline under the UDP government. This process was marked by the increasing prevalence of particularist and partial rationalities over the collective rationality, taking Bolivia to a Hobbesian situation, in which any actor capable of imposing a new order – however authoritarian or exclusive – would enjoy widespread support and legitimacy.

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(Re-)Designing institutions for EMU wage setting

European Labour Law Journal ◽

10.1177/2031952517744682 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 8 (4) ◽

pp. 281-305

Author(s):

Samuel Dahan¹

Keyword(s):

Global Financial Crisis ◽

Wage Bargaining ◽

Wage Determination ◽

Wage Setting ◽

Wage Policy ◽

Legal Case ◽

Coordination Process ◽

Wage Coordination ◽

The Eu

This article uses the concept of ‘institutional learning’ to make a legal case for a stronger wage policy at the EMU level. This article takes the view that an inherent asymmetry in the EMU, namely the presence of a unified monetary policy without a commensurate coordination of wage-setting mechanisms, contributed to the development of the crisis. The latent consequences of this flaw—diverging (wage) growth and cost competitiveness—were brought into full view when the global financial crisis struck. A unique wage-coordination process has already become institutionalised at the EU level through the European Semester: wage and spending cuts supplant the role of currency depreciation as a means of addressing external economic shocks and competitiveness gaps. We argue that the new wage coordination process constitutes a step in the right direction insofar as the EU has learned from its mistake, namely creating a currency union without any transnational wage determination mechanism. However, this paper makes a legal and institutional case for a more reflexive and solidaristic approach to wage coordination. In order to do so, we take the economic view that stronger EU labour coordination is not likely to diminish competitiveness. While market wisdom would seem to support the view that decentralised collective bargaining systems performs better, evidence suggests that solidaristic wage-setting offers a critical means of channelling economic policy into a model less narrowly focused on labour cost. Beyond the economic debate, there is a legal case to be made in favour of stronger wage bargaining that can reconcile the markets with labour law in the EMU. It is the role of lawyers to investigate possible legal avenues towards achieving a more appropriate solution that is compatible with the Treaty of Lisbon as well as with the goal of competitiveness. Our project does not advocate Treaty changes; instead we use the concept of ‘institutional layering/learning’ to reinforce already-existing reflexive approaches such as the Macroeconomic Dialogue (MED) in order to create a multi-level wage determination strategy that mediates a genuine facilitation process between the Commission, the European Central Bank and the unions.

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