The Australia—China Free Trade Agreement: Some Modelling Issues

2007 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 631-645 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter B. Dixon

General equilibrium modelling has been used to analyse many policy proposals. This article aims to help non-modellers assess general equilibrium analyses, particularly of a potential Australia—China free trade agreement (FTA). General equilibrium modelling is effective in studies of unilateral tariff reductions. However, most general equilibrium modelling assumes given technologies and information. For issues where the essence is technology transfer and new information, general equilibrium models can only produce results after most of the analysis has been done outside the model. In an Australia—China FTA, tariff cuts may be only a small part of the package. The main part may be goodwill, technology transfer and increased mutual awareness. Thus, for analysing FTAs, general equilibrium modelling is of limited value. The only conclusion for Australia that general equilibrium modelling of an Australia—China FTA can deliver with any certainty is that such an agreement will cause significant contraction in the Australian clothing industry.

1993 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-146
Author(s):  
John F. Pfaff ◽  
Juan Garcia Sordo ◽  
Theodore Schwarz ◽  
Salvador Trevino ◽  
Cesar J. M. Sepulveda ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-455
Author(s):  
Yan Wang

AbstractThis article illustrates the power of discourse in free trade agreement (FTA) negotiation, elucidating the concept from the perspective of a country’s abilities of rule control, rule assimilation and rule contestation. To enhance rule control, the G2 (the US and EU) have chosen their FTA partners, designed the FTA rules, and offered offensive-defensive exchange strategically. They have approached weak or trade-dependent parties first in FTA negotiation, innovated new rules to accelerate FTA negotiation, skillfully constructed intentional ambiguity and exemptions to remove rule discrepancies and made offensive-defensive exchange with their negotiating parties. Some of these strategies have been copied by China although in a different way. Further, a template approach for negotiating an FTA and exporting domestic laws and normative values to others contributes to the G2’s rule assimilation. A de facto FTA template has also been established by China recently, but its legal culture and political stance have led it to sign incomplete contracts and tolerate rule differences with its negotiating parties instead of transposition of domestic law. In facing the rival rules adopted by their competitors, the G2 have incorporated counteractive rules in their FTAs with their competitors’ close trading nations. China has also contested rules treating China as a non-market economy in its FTAs, but its stance toward state-owned enterprises (SOE) disciplines and rules forbidding forced technology transfer is milder due to its lack of experience in dealing with unfavourable rules.


2014 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
pp. 33-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sébastien Jean ◽  
Nanno Mulder ◽  
María Priscila Ramos

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