Obama and the use of force: a discursive institutionalist analysis of Libya and Syria

2021 ◽  
pp. 004711782110339
Author(s):  
Morgan Thomas Rees
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Chemical Weapon ◽  
Comprehensive Understanding ◽  
Mass Atrocity ◽  
Types Of Information ◽  
Policy Variation ◽  
Part Model

What factors explain variation in decisions to use force in American foreign policy? Consider the Obama administration’s decision to intervene in Libya. Upon assuming office, Obama outlined a foreign policy marked by a self-professed doctrine, ‘don’t do stupid shit’. In short, Obama sought to avoid the unnecessary use of military force, but when the threat of mass atrocity emerged, despite strong protests from senior advisers, he became drawn into the 2011 Libya intervention. By contrast, following chemical weapon attacks in Syria in 2013, Obama reneged on upholding his so-called ‘red-line’, pursuing diplomatic measures even though support for a military response was strong. But what explains this variation? Rationalist perspectives across the board have tended to overrate interpretive efficiency. Yet, such assumptions obscure the capacity for interests to be interpreted in different ways. To redress this issue, I build on discursive institutionalist insights, developing a model to show how principled and cognitive ideas act as weapons in institutional debates, serving to repress or displace information. To show how agents come to rely on principled or cognitive ideas, I develop a three-part model offering two mechanisms – cognitive repression and normative displacement – by which agents displace and repress certain types of information, depending on the ‘form’ in which that information is presented. This enables a more comprehensive understanding of how different interpretations lead to policy variation at critical moments of decision.

6. Obama and smart power 1

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph S. Nye
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soft Power ◽  
Public Diplomacy ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
Information Age ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Policy Agenda ◽  
Global Information ◽  
Smart Power ◽  
Power Resources

This chapter examines Barack Obama’s foreign policy agenda. The Obama administration referred to its foreign policy as ‘smart power’, which combines soft and hard power resources in different contexts. In sending additional troops to Afghanistan, his use of military force in support of a no-fly zone in Libya, and his use of sanctions against Iran, Obama showed that he was not afraid to use the hard components of smart power. The chapter first considers power in a global information age before discussing soft power in U.S. foreign policy. It then explains how public diplomacy came to be incorporated into American foreign policy and concludes by highlighting problems in wielding soft power.

Peacemakers

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. Pardew
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
National Security ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Former Yugoslavia ◽  
Military Force ◽  
International Crisis ◽  
The Balkans ◽  
Multilateral Cooperation ◽  
The Us

Peacemakers is a candid, inside account of the US response to the disintegration of Yugoslavia by James Pardew, an official at the heart of American policy-making, diplomacy, and military operations, from the US-led negotiations on Bosnia in 1995 until Kosovo declared independence in 2008. The book describes in colorful detail the drama of war and diplomacy in the Balkans and the motives, character, talents, and weaknesses of the heroes and villains involved. The US engagement in the former Yugoslavia is a major American foreign policy and national security success with lasting implications for the United States, Europe, and the Balkan region. It involves aggressive diplomacy, the selective use of military force and extensive multilateral cooperation. The experience demonstrates the value of American leadership in an international crisis and the critical importance of America’s relationship with European democracies. US engagement in the former Yugoslavia shows the overwhelming benefits of the shared costs and the international legitimacy of multilateral cooperation when responding to a crisis. A capable and determined US-led coalition restores stability and gives the new nations of Southeastern Europe the chance to become successful democracies in the European mainstream. Peacemakers concludes with lessons learned from the Balkan experience and insights on international crisis management of potential value to envoys and foreign policy and national security decision-makers in the future.

Rallies and the “First Image”

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 417-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis M. Foster ◽  
Jonathan W. Keller
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Political Psychology ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Direct Reference ◽  
Important Predictor ◽  
Psychological Study ◽  
Unexpected Findings ◽  
Policy Behavior

Despite considerable scholarship regarding the degree to which the international use of force generates popular rallies, no work has addressed the possibility that leaders’ managerial philosophies and psychological predispositions systematically influence their assessments of whether or not diversion “works”. In this article, we test hypotheses—conceived through direct reference to work in political psychology—which suggest that the degree to which presidents are innately concerned with the maintenance of the American “in-group” is an important predictor of whether they scapegoat international “out-groups” and, by extension, whether they choose strategies of diversionary foreign conflict or more cordial foreign engagement when facing domestic problems. Several analyses of American foreign policy behavior for the period 1953—2000 produce findings that clearly are at odds with these hypotheses, in that in-group biased presidents are actually less likely to use force and more likely to attend superpower summits when faced with a poor economy. We believe that these unexpected findings have serious implications for both the psychological study of international conflict and the plausibility of the “traditional” diversionary hypothesis.

Who Fights for Reputation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Impression Management ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Self Monitoring ◽  
National Leaders ◽  
Foreign Policy Crises ◽  
Image Enhancing ◽  
Military Engagement

This book provides an original framework, based on insights from psychology, to explain why some political leaders are more willing to use military force to defend their reputation than others. Rather than focusing on a leader's background, beliefs, bargaining skills, or biases, the book draws a systematic link between a trait called self-monitoring and foreign policy behavior. It examines self-monitoring among national leaders and advisers and shows that while high self-monitors modify their behavior strategically to cultivate image-enhancing status, low self-monitors are less likely to change their behavior in response to reputation concerns. Exploring self-monitoring through case studies of foreign policy crises during the terms of US presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton, the book disproves the notion that hawks are always more likely than doves to fight for reputation. Instead, it demonstrates that a decision-maker’s propensity for impression management is directly associated with the use of force to restore a reputation for resolve on the international stage. This book offers a brand-new understanding of the pivotal influence that psychological factors have on political leadership, military engagement, and the protection of public prestige.

Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy

1999 ◽  
Vol 114 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
BARRY M. BLECHMAN ◽  
TAMARA COFMAN WITTES
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Defining Moment

240 Years of Foreign Policy Moods in a Democracy Which Grew Into a Superpower: What It Means for IR Theory

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack E. Holmes
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Additional Research ◽  
Common Interest ◽  
Domestic Policy ◽  
Original Research ◽  
Ir Theory ◽  
Ww Ii ◽  
Policy Variation

In 1952, Frank L. Klingberg identified U.S. foreign policy moods since 1776 as alternating between an average of 21 years of introversion and 27 years of extroversion. The last extrovert phase had started in 1940, and it changed to introversion by 1968. By 1989, extroversion had returned. By 2016, it looks like introversion came back again. This is an excellent record of projection that calls for increased research by scholars. In 1985, Jack Holmes related Klingberg’s moods to American Liberalism and argued that mood changes were required by tendencies of introversion and extroversion to reach extremes too far removed from the realist interests that a nation must pursue. Frank was kind enough to write the preface of my 1985 work, and we continued to meet annually at conventions to explore research possibilities through the last two decades of his life. Although he was from the liberal pre-WW II generation and I was from the realist post-WW II generation, we shared a common interest in American foreign policy moods since 1776 and the need for research by the community of scholars. What do these moods mean? They consider one liberal democratic country while it grew from a peripheral power to a superpower over 240 years, and additional research regarding other countries would be beneficial. Given the concentration of major U.S. foreign policy assertiveness during extrovert phases as well as surprises and changes during mood transitions, moods need to be researched until they become part of the regular conversation regarding American Foreign Policy and IR theory. The evidence is strong and has been mostly developed by two authors. Klingberg deserves full credit for the original research and idea. The evidence has been expanded and placed in context by Holmes who analyzed Klingberg’s original idea as two different liberal preferences of the American people and related it to interests of nations. This liberal foreign policy variation (between introversion and extroversion) differs from the domestic policy variation (between reform liberal [often called liberal] and business liberal [often called conservative]) variation mentioned by Samuel Huntington in 1957. While individual domestic policy preferences usually stay the same, the United States as a whole varies on its introvert or extrovert foreign policy preference. Additional research on these moods is needed to enrich the literature.

Morality and the Use of Force in a Unipolar World: The “Wilsonian Moment”?

2000 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 11-22
Author(s):  
Tony Smith
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
National Security ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Democratic Government ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
The World

When, where, and how should the promotion of human rights and democracy abroad figure in American foreign policy? A compelling way for liberals to influence this debate is to underscore a Wilsonian agenda's relevance to national security. To the extent that stability in a region is grounded in a commitment to liberal democratic government, American security interests are served directly and powerfully. Nevertheless, liberals must also recognize that in some regions their agenda may be irrelevant, even quixotic. Not every part of the world is ready for the liberal democratic message, and the failure to recognize this fundamental truth has often undercut efforts to advance a Wilsonian agenda.

IR-Theory and Transformation in the Greater Middle East: the Role of the United States

2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 57-86
Author(s):  
Henk Houweling ◽  
Mehdi Parvizi Amineh
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Middle East ◽  
International Relations ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Liberal Theory ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Policy Choices

AbstractThis article analyzes why post-Cold War American foreign policy regarding the Greater Middle East (GME) changed course and why the United States having a virtual military monopoly fails to achieve its war aim in Iraq. To that end, the authors consult realist and liberal theory in international relations. Realists have a security-driven policy agenda. They fail to create a micro-level foundation in political man for the posited collective interest at the level of the state. Realists therefore produce indeterminate results. Liberal theory in international relations does have a micro-foundation in explanations of foreign policy choices in the form of the economic man. Liberal scholars therefore inquire into domestic sources of foreign policy decisions. However, the liberal national interest is not just a summation of private actor interests. These dominant approaches therefore fail to explain US foreign policy choices and policy outcomes in the region under study.The three quotations below create the problematic of this study:Today we are presented with a unique strategic opportunity. For more than 50 years we were constrained by a bipolar rivalry with a superpower adversary. Today and tomorrow, we have an opportunity to pursue a strategy of engagement and to design a military force to help the strategy succeed. I fully agree with the defense strategy of helping to shape the environment to promote US interests abroad.John Shalikashvili, Clinton's Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1997)[Y]ou live now in the Mohammedan nation which, if the traveler's accounts are to be believed, is intelligent and even refined. What is this irredeemable decadence dragging it down through the centuries? Is it possible that we have risen while they remain static? I do not think so. I rather think that the dual movement has occurred in opposite directions […] European races are often the greatest rogues, but at least they are rogues to whom God gave the will and the power and whom he seems to have destined for some time to be at the head of mankind […] the European is to other races of mankind what man himself is to the lower animals: he makes them subservient to his use, and when he cannot subdue he destroys them.Alexis de Tocqueville (1962: 75-76)Why is it that we did not complete our cultural journey, and how is it that we have ended up today in the very worst of times? What is it that made our predecessor pore over their desks, writing down and recording the marvels of mathematics and sciences and searching out the skies with the stars and constellations in order to discover their secrets, and driven by the love of knowledge, to study medicine and to devise medicaments even from the stomachs of bees […] Andalus became a lost place, then Palestine became Andalus.Mahmud Darwish (2004)

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