Constructing time in foreign policy-making: Brexit's timing entrepreneurs, malcontemps and apparatchiks

Temporal considerations play a role in many models of foreign policy analysis, particularly those focused on decision-making processes. While time features prominently as a background feature against which sequence, cadence and psychological consequence are measured, little attention has been given to how foreign policy agents actively construct their temporal environments. We propose that different foreign policy-making actors develop distinct relationships with time, and that variations in these relationships can help account for the ways in which ‘events’ are transformed into routine practices, change opportunities or full-blown foreign policy crises. We advance a novel conception of time in foreign policy-making through our development of timing theory and the linguistic constructions of ‘time’ by foreign policy actors. We propose a typology of timing agency, which highlights the impact of these orientations on decision-making processes as well as the characteristics of foreign policy behaviours. Using the case of Brexit, we elaborate differences in actors' temporal orientations and show how such differences impact the making of foreign policy.

The Middle Way

This book explores the shared foreign policy legacies of Dwight Eisenhower, George H. W. Bush, and Barack Obama, and how they exemplify a distinct and underappreciated tradition of political leadership: the Middle Way. The book explores how these three presidents thought about the world and American leadership, and how they grappled with foreign policy crises and navigated politics. Drawing upon new archival research at the Eisenhower and Bush presidential libraries, and interviews with former Obama officials, the book shows how these presidents took a centrist approach to foreign policy and provides a model for America to reinvigorate its role as a global leader. This work of presidential history looks behind the scenes at some of the most important moments in foreign policy since World War II, and it explores the broader lessons for American foreign policy and leadership. The book reflects the author’s unique experience as a senior official at the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon to show how Washington, DC, works from the inside; and in the process, offers a new way of thinking about American global leadership and makes a case for new ways to measure presidential success.

Reputation for Resolve

How do reputations form in international politics? What influence do these reputations have on the conduct of international affairs? This book takes a new approach to answering these enduring and hotly debated questions by shifting the focus away from the reputations of countries and instead examining the reputations of individual leaders. It argues that new leaders establish personal reputations for resolve that are separate from the reputations of their predecessors and from the reputations of their states. The book finds that leaders acquire personal reputations for resolve based on their foreign policy statements and behavior. It shows that statements create expectations of how leaders will react to foreign policy crises in the future and that leaders who fail to meet expectations of resolute action face harsh reputational consequences. The book challenges the view that reputations do not matter in international politics. In sharp contrast, it shows that the reputations for resolve of individual leaders influence the strategies statesmen pursue during diplomatic interactions and crises, and delineates specific steps policymakers can take to avoid developing reputations for irresolute action. The book demonstrates that reputations for resolve do exist and can influence the conduct of international security. Thus, it reframes our understanding of the influence of leaders and their rhetoric on crisis bargaining and the role reputations play in international politics.

Searching for an Exit: The Effects of Context, Process and Structure on Crisis Negotiation

By virtue of their defining criteria, international crises would seem unlikely candidates for conflict management and resolution. However, negotiations among crisis protagonists are not uncommon. Such behavior may reflect a desire to ‘exit’ the crisis dynamic. This article takes up the question of when and in what circumstances actors engaged in crisis situations turn to negotiation. Through an empirical analysis of over 1000 cases of foreign policy crises occurring between 1918 and 2015, this research examines a set of potential contextual, processual and structural correlates of crisis negotiation. The results of this analysis indicate that negotiation is less likely to occur in complex, high stakes, and especially violent crises, suggesting that negotiation is an unlikely and perhaps ill-suited response to more intense and severe crises.

Who Fights for Reputation

This book provides an original framework, based on insights from psychology, to explain why some political leaders are more willing to use military force to defend their reputation than others. Rather than focusing on a leader's background, beliefs, bargaining skills, or biases, the book draws a systematic link between a trait called self-monitoring and foreign policy behavior. It examines self-monitoring among national leaders and advisers and shows that while high self-monitors modify their behavior strategically to cultivate image-enhancing status, low self-monitors are less likely to change their behavior in response to reputation concerns. Exploring self-monitoring through case studies of foreign policy crises during the terms of US presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton, the book disproves the notion that hawks are always more likely than doves to fight for reputation. Instead, it demonstrates that a decision-maker’s propensity for impression management is directly associated with the use of force to restore a reputation for resolve on the international stage. This book offers a brand-new understanding of the pivotal influence that psychological factors have on political leadership, military engagement, and the protection of public prestige.

US diplomatic service will be downsized and degraded

Subject The State Department. Significance The US State Department’s third-ranking official and most senior career diplomat, Tom Shannon, announced his departure on February 1. While the 60-year old Shannon said he was stepping down for personal reasons, he is only the latest in a stream of senior career diplomats who have left since Donald Trump became president a year ago and appointed Rex Tillerson as secretary of state with a mandate to downsize the department. Impacts Minimising the benefits of diplomacy in favour of military action could exacerbate foreign policy crises and conflicts. White House heel-dragging on filling posts both 'streamlines' State and avoids congressional confirmation scrutiny of political nominees. Concerned that State wields little influence with the White House, Congress will be more assertive in the foreign policy process. Other powers -- particularly US allies -- will seek and have increased direct influence on the White House, cutting out State.