The Fundamental Fundamental Attribution Error: Correspondence Bias in Individualist and Collectivist Cultures

1999 ◽  
Vol 25 (10) ◽  
pp. 1208-1219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas S. Krull ◽  
Michelle Hui-Min Loy ◽  
Jennifer Lin ◽  
Ching-Fu Wang ◽  
Suhong Chen ◽  
...  
2001 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-104
Author(s):  
Eric M. Hansen ◽  
Charles E. Kimble ◽  
David W. Biers

In light of previous attribution research, the authors investigated whether individuals make different causal inferences about their own, as opposed to other people's, constrained interpersonal behavior. Fifty-seven male and 59 female introductory psychology students were randomly assigned to act either friendly or unfriendly as they interacted with a same-sex confederate whose behavior was also constrained. Participants assessed their own, and the confederates', behavior during the interaction and general dispositions. Consistent with previous research on the correspondence bias or fundamental attribution error, and the actor-observer bias, dispositional influences played a more prominent role in participants' attributions concerning the confederates. behavior than their own. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed, as are the implications of these findings on interpersonal relations.


2022 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Autumn Edwards ◽  
Chad Edwards

Increasingly, people interact with embodied machine communicators and are challenged to understand their natures and behaviors. The Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE, sometimes referred to as the correspondence bias) is the tendency for individuals to over-emphasize personality-based or dispositional explanations for other people’s behavior while under-emphasizing situational explanations. This effect has been thoroughly examined with humans, but do people make the same causal inferences when interpreting the actions of a robot? As compared to people, social robots are less autonomous and agentic because their behavior is wholly determined by humans in the loop, programming, and design choices. Nonetheless, people do assign robots agency, intentionality, personality, and blame. Results of an experiment showed that participants made correspondent inferences when evaluating both human and robot speakers, attributing their behavior to underlying attitudes even when it was clearly coerced. However, they committed a stronger correspondence bias in the case of the robot–an effect driven by the greater dispositional culpability assigned to robots committing unpopular behavior–and they were more confident in their attitudinal judgments of robots than humans. Results demonstrated some differences in the global impressions of humans and robots based on behavior valence and choice. Judges formed more generous impressions of the robot agent when its unpopular behavior was coerced versus chosen; a tendency not displayed when forming impressions of the human agent. Implications of attributing robot behavior to disposition, or conflating robot actors with their actions, are addressed.


2020 ◽  
pp. 75-78
Author(s):  
Philippe Rochat

We live in a world that is greatly imagined and made of quick and dirty inferences, especially in the social domain that is mined with moral heuristics and other quick moral judgments. A major moral drift is the so-called fundamental attribution error or correspondence bias. This error consists in the propensity to erroneously explain and attribute strongly biased causes to the behaviors of self and others. At least in our individualistic Western cultures, we tend to make attribution and explain our as well as others’ behavior mainly in terms of dispositional features of the individual and much less in terms of the situation in which the person is embedded (e.g., her social class, economic resources, place in society, etc.).


2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas H. Stone ◽  
I. M. Jawahar ◽  
Ken Eastman ◽  
Gabi Eissa

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