scholarly journals The Formation of Group Ties in Open Interaction Groups

2019 ◽  
Vol 82 (2) ◽  
pp. 158-181
Author(s):  
Shane Thye ◽  
Edward J. Lawler ◽  
Jeongkoo Yoon

We examine how task jointness and group incentive structures bear on the nature and strength of the affective and cognitive ties that people forge to a group. The argument is that affective group ties have stronger effects on social order than cognitive group ties. There are two general hypotheses. First, joint tasks generate stronger cognitive and affective ties to groups, whereas group incentives generate cognitive but not necessarily affective ties to the group. Second, affective ties more effectively solve two fundamental problems of social order in groups: (1) sustaining membership (also known as stay behavior) and (2) generating the joint gains of further collaboration (cooperation). The theoretical logic is that joint tasks promote a sense of shared responsibility, and this leads members to attribute their individual emotions to the group as an object, whereas alignment of individual and group incentives does not produce such effects. The theory and hypotheses are tested experimentally in four-person open interaction groups, manipulating task jointness (high, low, none) and incentives (individual based vs. group based). The results generally support the hypotheses underlying the theoretical logic. Affective ties to groups are based primarily on levels of task jointness, and such tasks have stronger effects than incentives on the capacity of groups to retain membership and induce cooperation in social dilemmas.

Author(s):  
Edna Ullmann-Margalit

How do people proceed when they cannot act on the basis of reasons, or project likely consequences? How is social order possible? Ullmann-Margalit demonstrates that people have identifiable strategies for making difficult decisions, whether the question is small (what to buy at a supermarket) or big (whether to transform one’s life in some large-scale way). She also shows that social dilemmas are solved by norms; that invisible-hand explanations take two identifiable (and dramatically different) forms; that trust can emerge in seemingly unpromising situations; and that considerateness is the foundation on which our relationships are organized in both the thin context of the public space and the intimate context of the family.


2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 57-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theresa Libby ◽  
Linda Thorne

ABSTRACT: Modern manufacturing settings increasingly rely upon workgroups; however, evidence concerning the best fit among incentive structure, production environment, and group performance has been mixed. Young et al. (1993) examine the effect of group incentives on group performance in cooperative and noncooperative environments. Although theory and evidence from practice indicate that group incentives combined with cooperation should result in higher group performance, their results were contrary to this prediction. To further explore this issue, we examine the effect of individual, group, and mixed incentive structures on group performance in assembly lines and teams. We find no difference in group performance depending on incentive structure for assembly lines; however, group performance is higher under group incentives for teams. Supplemental analysis indicates group incentives support the teams’ ability to implement beneficial task strategies and although mixed incentives are theoretically appealing, they may send confusing signals to employees about where to direct their effort.


2012 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 216-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Venkatesh Iyengar ◽  
Ibrahim Elmadfa

The food safety security (FSS) concept is perceived as an early warning system for minimizing food safety (FS) breaches, and it functions in conjunction with existing FS measures. Essentially, the function of FS and FSS measures can be visualized in two parts: (i) the FS preventive measures as actions taken at the stem level, and (ii) the FSS interventions as actions taken at the root level, to enhance the impact of the implemented safety steps. In practice, along with FS, FSS also draws its support from (i) legislative directives and regulatory measures for enforcing verifiable, timely, and effective compliance; (ii) measurement systems in place for sustained quality assurance; and (iii) shared responsibility to ensure cohesion among all the stakeholders namely, policy makers, regulators, food producers, processors and distributors, and consumers. However, the functional framework of FSS differs from that of FS by way of: (i) retooling the vulnerable segments of the preventive features of existing FS measures; (ii) fine-tuning response systems to efficiently preempt the FS breaches; (iii) building a long-term nutrient and toxicant surveillance network based on validated measurement systems functioning in real time; (iv) focusing on crisp, clear, and correct communication that resonates among all the stakeholders; and (v) developing inter-disciplinary human resources to meet ever-increasing FS challenges. Important determinants of FSS include: (i) strengthening international dialogue for refining regulatory reforms and addressing emerging risks; (ii) developing innovative and strategic action points for intervention {in addition to Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) procedures]; and (iii) introducing additional science-based tools such as metrology-based measurement systems.


1958 ◽  
Vol 3 (6) ◽  
pp. 158-160
Author(s):  
LAWRENCE SCHLESINGER

1946 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georgene H. Seward
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document