Hollow parties and their movement-ization: The populist conundrum

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (9-10) ◽  
pp. 1084-1105
Author(s):  
Jean L. Cohen

This article focuses on the relationship between social movements and political parties in the context of populist challenges to constitutional democracy. There are many reasons for the current plight of democracy but I focus here on one aspect: the decline of mainstream political parties, the emergence of new forms of populist movement parties and the general crisis of political representation in long consolidated Western democracies. This article analyses the specific political logic and dynamics of social movements – the logic of influence, and distinguishes it from that of political parties – the logic of power. It addresses transformations in movements, parties and their relationships. It looks at the shifts in movement and party types that constitute the political opportunity structure for the emergence of new populist movement party forms and relationships, focusing on the hollowing out and movement-ization of political parties. Contemporary populist movement parties are not the cause of the hollowing out or movement-ization of political parties. Rather they are a response to the crisis of political representation exemplified by hollow parties and cartel parties. But it is my thesis that thanks to its specific logic, populism fosters the worst version of movement party relationships, undermining the democratic functions of both.

2020 ◽  
pp. 002190962095488
Author(s):  
Abi Chamlagai

The purpose of this article is to compare Nepal’s two Tarai/Madhesh Movements using the political opportunity structure theory of social movements. Tarai/Madhesh Movement I launched by the Forum for Madheshi People’s Rights in 2007 became successful as Nepal became a federal state. Tarai/Madhesh Movement II launched by the United Democratic Madheshi Front of the Tarai/Madheshi parties and the Tharuhat Joint Struggle Committee of the Tharu organizations failed as political elites disagreed about the need to create two provinces in the Tarai/Madhesh. While Tarai/Madhesh Movement II confirms that a social movement is more likely to fail when political elites align against it, Tarai/Madhesh Movement II refutes the theoretical proposition. Tarai/Madhesh Movement I suggests that the sucess of a social movement is more likely despite the alignment of political elites against it if its central demand consistently sustains the support of its constituents.


2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 499-530 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Franceschet

This article compares the outcomes of first- and second-wave feminism in Chile. The author argues that the double-militancy strategy of second-wave feminists emerged out of shifts in the political opportunity structure that led the movement to adapt its collective action frame. First-wave feminists had constructed a gender frame that depicted women as apolitical. In a context in which political parties were class based and saw little need to address women’s issues, neither the gender frame nor the political opportunity structure invited a double-militancy strategy. The context for second-wave activists was different. The politicization of women’s maternal identities altered the meaning of the maternal gender frame. Because the prodemocracy parties needed the support of women’s movements (and female voters), they invited women’s participation. Thus, the political opportunity structure and a more politicized gender frame encouraged a double-militancy strategy, ultimately leading to the realization of some of the movement’s goals.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Radu Andrei Pârvulescu

Anticorruption campaigns rely on a promise and ideal of rationalisation: public officials should–and will–behave in an impersonal, rule-governed, and ultimately predictable manner. So why do anticorruption drives often increase political and administrative chaos, instead of decreasing it? In this paper I address this puzzle by analysing the simultaneous effects of judicial anticorruption on both the legislative and judicial spheres. Using the case of Romania from 2005 to 2020, I first demonstrate that the successful drive to jail corruption politicians has increased legislative instability by causing waves of party switching, thereby perforating the political opportunity structure and making space for new, populist political parties. I then show how the new structures of judicial anticorruption have fractured the career lines of judges and prosecutors, while at the same time giving magistrates a reason to weaponise their growing professional heterogeneity as they struggle for control over the new and scarce professional resources brought by the anticorruption drive. This increasing complexity in both legislative and judicial spheres results in ever-growing discursive commitment to rule-following coupled with a decreasing ability to actually follow those rules as the set of veto players becomes increasingly unstable, an outcome that, following institutional theorists in sociology, I term “decoupled rationalisation.”


Author(s):  
Luis Felipe Mantilla

There is growing scholarly recognition of the prominent role that religion can play in empowering, shaping, and constraining political mobilization. Conceptually, religion can intersect with political opportunity structure in two general ways. First, it can be a component of the political opportunity structure: degrees of religious diversity, varieties of religion-state relations, levels of religiosity, and prevailing religious norms can substantially affect how social movements mobilize supporters. Second, religion can be an attribute of movements operating within a given political opportunity structure: a set of distinctive frames and resources available to religious actors that are unavailable to their secular counterparts. Understanding the intersection of religion and political opportunity structure requires addressing both of these dimensions of religion. One key challenge derives from the diversity of religious beliefs and organizations across and within faith traditions. There is persistent scholarly disagreement regarding the importance of specific ideological or doctrinal tenets and how these shape the salience of particular religions as both a component of the political opportunity structure and as a set of resources available to social movements. Scholarly understanding of these dynamics is hampered by the limited amount of research across faith traditions. Works focusing on Catholic, Hindu, Islamic, Jewish, or Protestant movements, among others, tend to emphasize different features of religion, in ways that make their findings hard to aggregate. Despite this and other challenges, the consolidation of religion as a topic of scholarly attention has resulted in increasingly sophisticated arguments and improved the scope and quality of data on religion and politics. Scholars now have access to a variety of global, regional, and national surveys that describe patterns of religious belief, behavior, and belonging. There is also a growing repertoire of country-level measures covering religion-state relations, denominational diversity, and religious conflict. In addition, a growing body of in-depth case studies focusing on particular religious movements and organizations has enriched our understanding of the dynamic interaction between religious groups and the institutional, structural, and cultural opportunities they face.


Contention ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-52
Author(s):  
Matthew S. Williams

Political opportunity structure (POS) refers to how the larger social context, such as repression, shapes a social movement’s chances of success. Most work on POS looks at how movements deal with the political opportunities enabling and/or constraining them. This article looks at how one group of social movement actors operating in a more open POS alters the POS for a different group of actors in a more repressive environment through a chain of indirect leverage—how United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) uses the more open POS on college campuses to create new opportunities for workers in sweatshop factories. USAS exerts direct leverage over college administrators through protests, pushing them to exert leverage over major apparel companies through the licensing agreements schools have with these companies.


Author(s):  
Diana Fu ◽  
Greg Distelhorst

How does China manage political participation? This chapter analyzes changing opportunities for participation in the leadership transition from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping. Contentious political participation—where individuals and independent organizations engage in protest and other disruptive behavior—has been further curtailed under Xi’s leadership. Yet institutional participation by ordinary citizens through quasi-democratic institutions appears unaffected and is even trending up in certain sectors. Manipulation of the political opportunity structure is likely strategic behavior on the part of authoritarian rulers, as they seek to incorporate or appease the discontented. The political opportunity structure in non-democracies is therefore multifaceted: one channel of participation can close as others expand.


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