Plastic eschatology: On the foundations of Marcuse’s philosophical anthropology

2021 ◽  
pp. 019145372199968
Author(s):  
Robert Grimwade

This article explores the complexities of Marcuse’s philosophical anthropology in light of Foucault’s criticisms of Marcuse and the Frankfurt School. While Marcuse’s theory of human nature is grounded upon a dialectical conception of essential human potentialities striving for realization, it secretes a radically plastic conception of life that undermines all anthropological essentialism. This fundamental tension between essentialist and plastic conceptions of human nature has significant implications for rethinking Marcuse’s project and legacy.

1990 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Oldenquist

By what steps, historically, did morality emerge? Our remote ancestors evolved into social animals. Sociality requires, among other things, restraints on disruptive sexual, hostile, aggressive, vengeful, and acquisitive behavior. Since we are innately social and not social by convention, we can assume the biological evolution of the emotional equipment – numerous predispositions to want, fear, feel anxious or secure – required for social living, just as we can assume cultural evolution of various means to control antisocial behavior and reinforce the prosocial kind. Small clans consisting, say, of several extended families whose members cooperated in hunting, gathering, defense, and child-rearing could not exist without a combination of innate and social restraints on individual behavior.I shall argue for a naturalistic theory of morality, by which I do not mean the definitional claims G.E. Moore sought to refute, but a broader and more complex theory that maintains that a sufficient understanding of human nature, history, and culture can fully explain morality; that nothing is left hanging. A theory that coherently brings together the needed biological, psychological, and cultural facts I shall call a philosophical anthropology; it is a theory that:1) takes the good for humans – both an ultimate good (if there is any) and other important goods – to depend on human nature;2) argues that a rudimentary but improving scientific and philosophical theory of human nature now exists, and thus denies that people are “essenceless”;3) takes this theory to be evolutionary and historical, making the question “How did morality originate?” pivotal for ethical theory, but leaves open the empirical question of the relative importance of biological and cultural evolution; and4) takes the origin of the moral ideas to be explainable in terms of human nature and history.


Author(s):  
Chin-Tai Kim

Philosophers cannot avoid addressing the question of whether philosophical anthropology (that is, specifically philosophical inquiry about human nature and human phenomenon) is possible. Any answer must be articulated in the context of the nature and function of philosophy. In other words, philosophical anthropology must be defined as an account of the nature of the subject of philosophical thinking. I argue that if philosophical thinkers admit that they are beings in nature, culture, and history, then the possibility of a uniquely philosophical theory of human nature and human phenomenon should be discarded. Rather, philosophy's catalytic and integrative role in human cognition should be stressed.


Author(s):  
Noriko Ishida

AbstractThe fact that Veblen was a keen critic of the neo-classical concept of “economic man” is well known. However, the following issues have not been discussed in enough depth: how he rebuilt the traditional theory of human nature through his new methodology of economics, how much his methodological revision broadened the scope of economics, and what kind of phenomena Veblen’s economic theory elucidates. This article examines these issues and aims to show the logical connection between Veblen’s controversial proposal on the methodology of economics and his analysis of economic phenomena. Specifically, it reconsiders Veblen’s analysis of economic action using a unique concept of instincts, his logic of explaining the relation between society and human nature, his way of drawing history from the relativistic worldview, and his characteristic method of grasping the cause and effect of economic phenomena. Finally, it highlights the importance of modifying the concept of “economic man” by focusing on the qualitative aspect. Particular reference is made to the economic concepts of utility, efficiency, and intangibility.


2015 ◽  
Vol 166 ◽  
pp. 655-659
Author(s):  
Elena Rubanova ◽  
Vitalij Rubanov ◽  
Yuliya Zeremskaya

1979 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Ho Hwang

Psychiatry ◽  
1949 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Wolstein

Author(s):  
Andrew Biro

This chapter assesses the relevance of Frankfurt School critical theory for contemporary environmental political theory. Early Frankfurt School thinkers such as Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse developed a critique of instrumental rationality that provides a powerful framework for understanding the domination of nature in modernity, including an inability to articulate and defend human needs. Habermas subsequently attempts to mitigate this totalizing critique, countering instrumental rationality with a focus on communicative rationality. This Habermasian turn both provides new openings and forecloses certain possibilities for environmental political theory; deliberative democracy is emphasized, but with a renewed commitment to anthropocentrism. The chapter then explores whether Habermas’s communicative turn could be “greened,” either through an expansion of the subjects of communicative rationality, or by critically examining the extent to which human beings themselves can articulate their genuine needs.


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