The Nature and Possibility of Philosophical Anthropology

Author(s):  
Chin-Tai Kim

Philosophers cannot avoid addressing the question of whether philosophical anthropology (that is, specifically philosophical inquiry about human nature and human phenomenon) is possible. Any answer must be articulated in the context of the nature and function of philosophy. In other words, philosophical anthropology must be defined as an account of the nature of the subject of philosophical thinking. I argue that if philosophical thinkers admit that they are beings in nature, culture, and history, then the possibility of a uniquely philosophical theory of human nature and human phenomenon should be discarded. Rather, philosophy's catalytic and integrative role in human cognition should be stressed.

2015 ◽  
Vol 166 ◽  
pp. 655-659
Author(s):  
Elena Rubanova ◽  
Vitalij Rubanov ◽  
Yuliya Zeremskaya

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-24
Author(s):  
Grant Farred

Philosophical anthropology is a tradition that is as old as philosophy itself, so much so that it might be said to be indistinguishable from philosophy itself. Philosophical anthropology, extending as it does from Socrates to Sartre, best describes the work of V.Y. Mudimbe. Anthropology, broadly conceived as the science that studies human origins, the material and cultural development of humanity (philosophical anthropology concerns itself with human nature, particularly what it is that distinguishes human beings from other creatures and how philosophy allows human beings to understand themselves), is always Mudimbe’s first line of philosophical inquiry. It is certainly Mudimbe’s interest in anthropology that allows him to conduct his investigations into Africa, its modes of thinking, and colonialism and its continuing effects on the continent. Writing on the latter issue in The Invention of Africa, Mudimbe, with his customary deftness of mind, argues that colonialism and its aftermath cannot by itself account for the continent’s extant condition: “The colonizing structure, even in its most extreme manifestations . . . might not be the only explanation for Africa’s present-day marginality. Perhaps this marginality could, more essentially, be understood from the perspective of wider hypotheses about the classification of beings and societies.”[ Making sense of Africa, in Mudimbe’s terms, must begin with a hypothesization that explicates how “beings and societies” come to be classified, the anthropological undertaking par excellence, which also requires a study of the forces that construct, implement and maintain these classifications.


2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 634-648
Author(s):  
Mara-Daria Cojocaru

Abstract Mary Midgley belongs to a small group of most inspiring women philosophers of the 20th and early 21st century. Her impressive oeuvre, characterised by an exceptionally clear and witty style, combines contributions to such different fields of philosophical inquiry as moral philosophy, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of science in general and of biology in particular, as well as philosophy of religion. With her early article “The Concept of Beastliness”, we have something like a germ cell of her philosophy, introducing a range of concerns that will remain central to her work. The commentary focuses on five of them, traces how they show up in later works of Midgley’s, and suggests how they could inform philosophizing about humans and (other) animals today. These are, first, Midgley’s adherence to the concept of ‘human nature’. Second, her insistence that a comparative, ethologically informed perspective on humans and (other) animals helps to refute myths about both the (generically understood) animal and the human animal. Third, her alerting us to the fact that concepts of ‘human nature’ always influence our moral self-understanding. Fourth, her focus on the positive, open instincts in humans like caring, friendship, loyalty, or sociality that exist not only alongside but in a complex interplay with negative, open instincts such as aggression, and the idea that both classes of instincts can be shaped to some extent. And, finally, her focus on the conditions of social life that are important for people to be able to structure their lives in meaningful ways.


2020 ◽  
pp. 105-122
Author(s):  
David Baumeister

This chapter provides an overview of Kant’s conception of the animality (or Tierheit) of human beings. Though human animality is treated in a wide range of Kant’s writings, it has received relatively little attention from scholars, perhaps because Kant wrote no text principally devoted to the subject. With the aim of establishing its systematic unity, I track the status and role of animality across three distinct but interrelated domains of Kant’s theory of human nature—his account of animality as one of three basically good original human predispositions in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, his account of animality as the target of discipline in the pedagogy lectures, and his account of animality as simultaneously a driver of and hindrance to the progress of history in ‘Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Aim’. I argue that these accounts, taken together and in light of the teleological vision of human development that connects them, manifest a distinctively Kantian vision of the human as an actively rational, but at the same time ineliminably animal, being. Far from denying that humans are animals or seeking to repress human animality wholesale, Kant in fact offers a nuanced and robust, though still problematic, defence of the necessity, innocence, and originality of the human’s animal side.


1990 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Oldenquist

By what steps, historically, did morality emerge? Our remote ancestors evolved into social animals. Sociality requires, among other things, restraints on disruptive sexual, hostile, aggressive, vengeful, and acquisitive behavior. Since we are innately social and not social by convention, we can assume the biological evolution of the emotional equipment – numerous predispositions to want, fear, feel anxious or secure – required for social living, just as we can assume cultural evolution of various means to control antisocial behavior and reinforce the prosocial kind. Small clans consisting, say, of several extended families whose members cooperated in hunting, gathering, defense, and child-rearing could not exist without a combination of innate and social restraints on individual behavior.I shall argue for a naturalistic theory of morality, by which I do not mean the definitional claims G.E. Moore sought to refute, but a broader and more complex theory that maintains that a sufficient understanding of human nature, history, and culture can fully explain morality; that nothing is left hanging. A theory that coherently brings together the needed biological, psychological, and cultural facts I shall call a philosophical anthropology; it is a theory that:1) takes the good for humans – both an ultimate good (if there is any) and other important goods – to depend on human nature;2) argues that a rudimentary but improving scientific and philosophical theory of human nature now exists, and thus denies that people are “essenceless”;3) takes this theory to be evolutionary and historical, making the question “How did morality originate?” pivotal for ethical theory, but leaves open the empirical question of the relative importance of biological and cultural evolution; and4) takes the origin of the moral ideas to be explainable in terms of human nature and history.


2021 ◽  
pp. 019145372199968
Author(s):  
Robert Grimwade

This article explores the complexities of Marcuse’s philosophical anthropology in light of Foucault’s criticisms of Marcuse and the Frankfurt School. While Marcuse’s theory of human nature is grounded upon a dialectical conception of essential human potentialities striving for realization, it secretes a radically plastic conception of life that undermines all anthropological essentialism. This fundamental tension between essentialist and plastic conceptions of human nature has significant implications for rethinking Marcuse’s project and legacy.


1998 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 71-95
Author(s):  
Mustapha Achoui

This paper seeks to advance an understanding of Human Naturethrough Islamic Sources. The paper also seeks to adopt a self-consciouslycomparative approach to psychology, comparing Islamic perspectivewith Western views. The author explores Islamic views on thethree dimensions of psychology - the spiritual, the physiological andthe behavioral. The paper concludes by emphasizing the need for atheoretical basis to define the psychological vision of human nature andto identify the subject matter of psychology within Islamic framework.Psychology cannot be separated from religious, philosophical andmoral issues, the paper insists, therefore it is important that they be integratedin the efforts to articulate Islamic psychology.


Author(s):  
Yu.V. Kupriyanova ◽  
I.M. Vasilyanova

The article summarizes the key points in the development of the metadialogue phenomenon from a linguistic point of view. Some stages of the development of this concept and the difficulties associated with its structuring are covered. The main research findings of modern foreign and domestic experts on its study are considered. Some characteristics of the subject of the research from the standpoint of various pragmatic installations are given. On the basis of the dynamic structure of the metadialogue development, certain principles of semantic relations connected with the dialectical nature of human cognition are presented. Excursion into the history and evolution of the concept is presented. Several types of formulation of the subject matter are given. In accordance with the goal of speech exposure, internal problems of the development of metadialogue are highlighted and the critical points related to solving these problems are described. The rules of metadialogue flow are explained at the level of steps, the success/failure of which directly affects the final result of communication. The prospects of development of the concept research in accordance with various types of discourse are indicated.


1992 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 202-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Ramzan Akhtar

IntroductionIslamic teachings envisage a balanced society achieved through thefunctioning of Islamic institutions. This paper visualizes three main institutions:ukhiwah, ‘adl, and ihsan. Ukhuwah (brotherhood) promotes the bonds ofbrotherhood, and ‘adl (justice) enforces a system of individual and socialobligations. Islam stresses the importance of meeting one’s obligations, becauseeach obligation has its corresponding right. Thus, an individual’s effort to meethidher obligations leads to the fulfillment of everyone’s rights. This does notmean that Islam forbids one from demanding hidher rights, even though thisdemand does pose a problem related to human nature: an individual wants his/herrights and also some part of another person’s rights. Therefore, one group’sdemand for its rights tends to encroach upon the rights of another group, whichcauses social friction and disorder. The institution of ihsan (benevolence) goesone step further: it exhorts individuals to forego their rights for the sake of others,which is considered an act of piety.This paper will study employer-employee relationships in the light of thethree institutions mentioned above. A framework for conducting employer-employeerelationships is formulated and is then used to determine, from theIslamic point of view, the proper wages. The findings of this paper show thatan economically efficient and equitable wage structure can evolve within thisframework and that such a wage structure would promote the parties’ mutualrelationships which, in turn, would lead to industrial peace.The body of the paper is organized as follows: a review of the existingliterature on the subject, the development of an Islamic framework for employer-employeerelationships, a discussion of the Islamic approach to wagecompensation, and some concluding remarks ...


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