Book Review: Economic Change, Government and Natural Resource Wealth: The Political Economy of Change in Southern Africa

2002 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 441-443
Author(s):  
Professor D.D. Tewari

Economic Change, Government and Natural Resource Wealth: The Political Economy of Change in Southern Africa, London: Earthscan Publications, 2001, 168 pp.

2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (6) ◽  
pp. 662-688 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan M. Jensen ◽  
Noel P. Johnston

There is a growing literature on how natural resources affect both economic performance and political regimes. In this article the authors add to this literature by focusing on how natural resource wealth affects the incentives of governments to uphold contracts with foreign investors across all sectors. They argue that although all states suffer reputation costs from reneging on contracts, governments in natural-resource-dependent economies are less sensitive to these costs, leading to a greater probability of expropriation and contract disputes. Specifically, leaders weigh the benefits of reneging on contracts with investors against the reputation costs of openly violating agreements with firms. The authors’ theoretical model predicts a positive association between resource wealth and expropriation. Using a data set from the political risk insurance industry, the authors show that resource dependent economies have much higher levels of political risk.


2007 ◽  
Vol 46 (4I) ◽  
pp. 351-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
Syed Mansoob Murshed

I review the relationship between natural resource endowment type and economic growth in developing countries. Certain types of natural resources, such as oil and minerals, tend to exhibit concentrated production and revenue patterns, while revenue flows from other resources such as agriculture are more diffuse. Most developing countries that export products from the first group have been prone to growth failure in recent times. The most important channels are political economy mechanisms, where there are negative relationships between natural resource rents and institutional development. An explicit model of growth collapse with micro-foundations in rent-seeking contests that have increasing returns in rent-seeking outlays is presented.


2019 ◽  
Vol 93 (02) ◽  
pp. 275-317
Author(s):  
Rolv Petter Amdam ◽  
Robert Fredona ◽  
Sophus A. Reinert

Using internal debates and surviving account books, this article traces the eighteenth-century history of the Norwegian glass industry, created to exploit Norway's immense natural resource wealth, and of the chartered company that would later become Norway's iconic Christiania Glasmagasin. The investors in the company, many of them among Norway's “founding fathers,” were individually responsible for its losses and it operated, remarkably, at an annual loss for nearly five decades. The article asks why, beyond the anticipation of a royal import ban on foreign glass, private investors might have continued to accept such losses. It focuses on tensions between cameralist and liberal ideologies in the creation of an important national industry, and on older (and perhaps more sustainable) ways of thinking about profitability.


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