Romania and the Beginning of CMEA Controversies over a Common Trade Policy Towards the EEC, 1969–1972

2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 495-523
Author(s):  
Elena Dragomir

This article examines Romania’s opposition to the attempts of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in the early 1970s to adopt a common trade policy towards the European Economic Community (EEC). The article covers the period between 1969, when the CMEA embarked on negotiations regarding the deepening of the intra-bloc cooperation and integration, and 1 January 1973, which is the date marking the end of the derogations that the Eastern European states received with regard to the implementation of the EEC’s Common Commercial Policy. The article focuses on Romania’s reasons and tactics of opposition, but it also outlines its views with regard to the EEC, in general, and the CMEA-EEC relations, in particular. Corroborated by findings involving studies in other Eastern European archives, this article will help to create a better understanding of the CMEA debates on integration, on the CMEA-EEC relations, in general, and on Romania’s opposition to the CMEA’s intended common policy towards the EEC, in particular.

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 79-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Mueller

This article draws on Soviet archival documents as well as Western and Russian publications to analyze the background of Leonid Brezhnev's announcements of 1972 regarding the Soviet Union's possible recognition of the European Economic Community (EEC). The analysis takes into account various factors including the integration process, détente, and Soviet relations with West European states. The article shows that Brezhnev's first initiative toward the EEC in March 1972 was designed to facilitate ratification of the Moscow Treaty with West Germany and did not reflect a genuine desire to establish relations with Brussels. The new Soviet approach toward the EEC became manifest only in Brezhnev's second speech on the topic, in December 1972. This strategy, which included mutual recognition and negotiations between the EEC and the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance, was intended to foster détente in Europe and to pave the way toward the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-380

On January 25, 1949, a communiqué issued in Moscow announced the creation by six eastern European countries of a new Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. The organization was established at an economic conference attended by representatives of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and the USSR.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 564-564

The terms of a protocol signed by the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania in January, 1949, when they formed the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance were released on June 3, 1949. Under the provisions of the agreement the Council was established to coordinate eastern European economy, standardize industrial production of member nations, provide mutual aid through trade, exchange of experience, loans and investments, for a period of twenty years.


1976 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 631-648 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Marer

In analyzing the future of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), it is useful to assess both the centrifugal and centripetal forces affecting regional economic integration. Centrifugal forces include the existing structure of production in Eastern Europe; problems of coordination; and inefficient price systems, among others. Centripetal forces include the worldwide energy crisis; Western inflation and recession; the growing importance of trade blocs; and numerous other factors contributing to the increasing hard-currency indebtedness of the Eastern European countries. Many of these external events have increased the attractiveness for CMEA countries of intrabloc economic relations and provided a momentum for CMEA integration. Analysis of the various forces leads to the conclusion that Soviet economic policy vis-à-vis Eastern Europe will remain crucial in determining the direction and speed of economic integration. Soviet economic involvement with Eastern Europe seems to have been costly for the USSR during the past decade and so it is not obvious that the USSR will attempt to push integration much further than it now stands.


2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
LAURIEN CRUMP ◽  
SIMON GODARD

This article widens the analysis of international organisations by including communist organisations, in particular the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Drawing on archival research in Moscow, Bucharest, Berlin, Geneva and Rome, this article traces the origins, the evolution and the collective actorness of both organisations. Both COMECON and the Warsaw Pact went through a process of institutionalisation, reorganisation and multilateralisation and began to share many characteristics with their Western counterparts, such as the European Economic Community and NATO. Contrary to conventional wisdom these organisations thus developed into multilateral international organisations, which the other members could use to challenge Soviet unilateralism. Comparing COMECON and the Warsaw Pact with each other and with their Western counterparts, this article shows how these Eastern European international organisations contributed to shifting the balance of power within the Soviet Bloc by empowering their members as sovereign states and themselves as collective actors.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Hugo Canihac

This article contributes to the debate about the history of the political economy of the European Economic Community (EEC). It retraces the efforts during the early years of the EEC to implement a form of ‘European economic programming’, that is, a more ‘dirigiste’ type of economic governance than is usually associated with European integration. Based on a variety of archives, it offers a new account of the making and failure of this project. It argues that, at the time, the idea of economic programming found many supporters, but its implementation largely failed for political as well as practical reasons. In so doing, it also brings to light the role of economists during the early years of European integration.


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