Productivity, crises and imports in the loss of manufacturing jobs

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-61
Author(s):  
Kim Moody

The massive loss of manufacturing jobs in the United States even as manufacturing output continued to increase has been a source of debate between those who see this primarily as a result of globalization and trade, on one hand, and those for whom the dynamics of capitalism with its economic turbulence, job-displacing technology and productivity increases is the major cause, on the other. It is a debate with political implications. In the United States, those who see trade imbalances as the major cause of job loss compose a broad spectrum including many liberal economists, trade union leaders, related think tanks and the Trump Administration who place the blame on a foreign ‘other’ rather than multinational capital. Supporting this analysis are a series of recent academic articles that largely ignore economic crises and reject productivity, in particular, as reasons for declining manufacturing employment. This article will critically analyse their arguments and propose a different explanation rooted in the turbulence, competition and class conflict inherent in capitalism as these have unfolded in the United States during the neoliberal era.

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-170
Author(s):  
V. I. Bartenev

This paper identifi es and explains key changes in the U.S. aid policies towards Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) under Donald Trump. It seeks to validate two widespread arguments — the one about the current administration’s revision of pivotal principles of providing foreign assistance, and the other one — about an accelerated disengagement of the United States from the MENA region since 2017. The paper consists of four sections. The fi rst section explores the transformation of the U.S. strategic thinking and regional context under the Trump administration and then posits fi ve hypotheses about possible changes in the volume and composition of the U.S. assistance to the MENA region (in comparison with the fi nal two years of the Obama administration), as well as the diff erences in the executive branch and the Congress’s positions. The second section explains particularities of the statistical data and the methods of its exploration, the third section presents the results of hypothesis testing using aggregated data on aid fl ows to the region, and the fi nal section explains these results, sometimes unexpected, using the data disaggregated by country. Three of fi ve hypotheses proved wrong based on the aggregate data. First, the Trump administration did not cut assistance to the MENA more substantially than to other regions of the globe. Second, it did not ringfence aid accounts which helped yield direct dividends to the U.S. businesses. Third, the Republican Congress was clearly less willing to support the executive’s aid chocies under a new Republican President than during the last years of a Democrat Barack Obama’s second term. Only two hypotheses proved correct — one about a prioritization of security and military assistance under Donald Trump and the other one — about disproportionate cuts of democracy promotion assistance. Such an unexpected result calls for refi ning both aforementioned arguments and taking into account the dissimilarities in the dynamics of assistance to diff erent countries. The United States tends to practice a diff erentiated approach in dealing with two largest Arab aid recipients (Egypt and Jordan) and with other Arab countries. The assistance to Cairo and Amman is ringfenced and protected, while aid to other recipients, including security assistance and FMF grants, is prone to quite drastic cuts. This diff erentiation is explained by the fact that cooperation with Egypt and Jordan rests not only on more solid strategic foundations but also on a strong support within the United States — both from the defense contractors interested in large export contracts and from an infl uential pro-Israel lobby. The U.S. will not abandon this highly diff erentiated approach after the 2020 elections but the structure of assistance to the MENA region might undergo quite a dramatic transformation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-67
Author(s):  
Paul Julian Smith

FQ Columnist Paul Julian Smith explores the latest trends in Mexican cinema, which encompasses such divergent genres as the rom-com and horror. Illustrating the former is the office comedy Mirreyes vs. Godinez (dir. Chava Cartas, 2019), which pits the spoiled offspring of the leisured class against the workers at their family company, a class conflict that predictably resolves through romantic alliances. In stark contrast is Belzebuth (dir. Emilio Portes, 2017), a disturbing film about the Satanic murder of children set in the tense and traumatic territory of Mexico's border with the United States. Finally, Smith looks at two productions—one an independent film, the other a televised sit-com—that use narratives about house shares to explore the theme of national reconciliation.


Author(s):  
Evan Renfro ◽  
Jayme Neiman Renfro

Since before the founding of the United States through slavery, the extermination of the native populace, war after war, regime overthrow, and more wars, popular media have been used to stir resentments and produce violent fantasies in the general citizenry that often allow for policies of actual violence to be applied against “the other.” This chapter will analyze the affective coordinates of this system in the post-9/11 context, focusing especially on how nationalist-jingoism has now triumphed in the age of the Trump Administration. Crucial interrogations addressed in this chapter include: Why are white southern/rural males particularly susceptible to popular culture induced affective violence? What are the mechanics of profit and neoliberal imperatives of this structure? What is new about the linkage of these phenomena with the first Twitter-President? In pursuing these questions, the authors will use case studies involving the popular media vectors of television, film, and music.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 367-370
Author(s):  
Pasha L. Hsieh

The Trump administration declared the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy as the new U.S. policy on Asia in 2017. This new strategy will have far-reaching implications for U.S.-Asia relations and global governance. The FOIP is conventionally perceived to focus on security dimensions. By “free,” the United States expects all countries “to exercise their sovereignty free from coercion by other countries.”1 The qualifier, “open,” is meant to refer to regional connectivity, in particular including freedom of navigation.2 Notably, the economic dimensions of this component also envision “fair and reciprocal trade” and “transparent agreements.”


Author(s):  
Adam M. Howard

During the late 1920s and early 1930s, some Bundists began to identify as non-Zionists. Although they viewed Zionism as a nationalist distraction from their socialist values, they believed assisting a fellow labor movement in Histadrut a worthy cause. Additionally, they saw Palestine as a practical option for persecuted Jews to emigrate. With immigration restriction quotas passed by congress in 1921 and 1924 that several restricted Eastern and Southern Europeans from immigrating to the United States, these non-Zionists in the labor movement viewed Palestine as a reasonable alternative for persecuted Jews to go and begin new lives with a strong labor movement to help absorb them into the growing Jewish society there. To help Histadrut absorb these new immigrants, Jewish trade-union leaders expanded beyond the fundraising of the Gewerkschaften Campaign to specifically raise money for colonization. They raised money for the purchase of land in two places where housing was built for these new settlers, naming one the Leon Blum colony and the other the Louis Brandeis colony. This demonstrated the power of these non-government organizations (NGOs) operating transnationally to develop the infrastructure of burgeoning nation. However, in 1939, the British government’s McDonald White Paper would drastically reduce Jewish immigration to Palestine for the next five years and then eliminate it altogether after 1944.


1986 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-130
Author(s):  
Rolf Rundfelt

This paper looks at insider trading regulation in Europe and finds a broad spectrum. Two countries, the United Kingdom and Sweden, have insider regulations very similar to those in the United States. The author attributes this to well-developed stock markets and the Swedish search for confidence in their stocks. At the other extreme, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Switzerland have no regulation at present.


2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 193-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Ashworth

Abstract This paper introduces arguments from Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic1 to suggest that the Civil War arose ultimately because of class-conflict between on the one hand, Southern slaves and their masters and, on the other, Northern workers and their employers. It does not, however, suggest that either in the North or the South these conflicts were on the point of erupting into revolution. On the contrary, they were relatively easily containable. However, harmony within each section (North and South) could be secured only at the cost of intersectional conflict, conflict which would finally erupt into civil war. The Civil War was a ‘bourgeois revolution’ not only because it destroyed slavery, an essentially precapitalist system of production, in the United States but also because it resulted in the enthronement of Northern values, with the normalisation of wage-labour at their core.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 1053-1056

As the civil war in Syria continues, some of the key actors have sought ways to reduce the conflict's toll on civilians. In May, 2007, Russia and the United States began exploring the possibility of establishing “safe” or “de-escalation” zones. On July 7, this dialogue yielded a trilateral agreement and memorandum signed by Russia, the United States, and Jordan to establish a ceasefire in southwest Syria. The resulting ceasefire—the first in Syria signed by the Trump administration—governs hostilities between Syrian government forces and associated troops on one side and rebels on the other. It began on July 9.


Author(s):  
James N. Druckman ◽  
Samara Klar ◽  
Yanna Krupnikov ◽  
Matthew Levendusky ◽  
John Barry Ryan

Abstract Affective polarization – partisans’ dislike and distrust of those from the other party – has reached historically high levels in the United States. While numerous studies estimate its effect on apolitical outcomes (e.g., dating and economic transactions), we know much less about its effects on political beliefs. We argue that those who exhibit high levels of affective polarization politicize ostensibly apolitical issues and actors. An experiment focused on responses to COVID-19 that relies on pre-pandemic, exogenous measures of affective polarization supports our expectations. Partisans who harbor high levels of animus towards the other party do not differentiate the “United States’” response to COVID-19 from that of the Trump administration. Less affectively polarized partisans, in contrast, do not politicize evaluations of the country’s response. Our results provide evidence of how affective polarization, apart from partisanship itself, shapes substantive beliefs. Affective polarization has political consequences and political beliefs stem, in part, from partisan animus.


Author(s):  
Tatiana A. Shakleina ◽  

The global strategy of the United States is characterized by a great degree of continuity, adherence to basic ideas of American ideology, aims, tasks, and the methods of realization of national American interests, though different administrations bring tactical minor changes to the real policy and official rhetoric. Similar trend is seen when we describe and analyze the US strategy towards Russia. The hypothesis of the author is the following: American policy towards Russia has been developing within a quite clear historical paradigm of confrontational competition; American actions do not depend on whether the Russian State exists as the USSR or the Russian Federation. The dominant factor defining this kind of confrontational strategy is that Russia remains one of the leading world powers that is playing a very influential role in international relations and the world order formation, demonstrates an opposite to American view of global governance and world development. In the US, it is seen as a serious obstacle to the realization of the American concept of world liberal order – a monocentric /US centric world order. Restoration by Russia of a great power status after the dissolution of the Soviet Union has not been fully predicted and is unacceptable to the US, and first of all, to the ruling political elite. Opposition and criticism of Russia has been growing since 1995, and in the 2010s the deterrence of Russia evolved into a new cold war. Cold war confrontation between the US and Russia during the Trump administration became large scale and multifaceted, and could be characterized as a political, economic, and information war. There is a quite clear consensus on the Russia issue between the representatives of Congress, political parties and the groups of interest, mass media and think tanks, the representatives of intelligence community and some federal agencies. The article suggests the analysis of the views and recommendations of the leading think tanks as their influence on the policy towards Russia has been quite visible during all administrations. Though the Trump administration is in opposition to practically all liberal media (the majority of all mass media) and think tanks, the policy of the United States towards Russia is being formulated within the traditional paradigm. The author suggests a structural realist school of thinking as the most relevant for the better understanding of the situation in the Russian-American relations.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document