United States, Russia, and Jordan Sign Limited Ceasefire for Syria

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 1053-1056

As the civil war in Syria continues, some of the key actors have sought ways to reduce the conflict's toll on civilians. In May, 2007, Russia and the United States began exploring the possibility of establishing “safe” or “de-escalation” zones. On July 7, this dialogue yielded a trilateral agreement and memorandum signed by Russia, the United States, and Jordan to establish a ceasefire in southwest Syria. The resulting ceasefire—the first in Syria signed by the Trump administration—governs hostilities between Syrian government forces and associated troops on one side and rebels on the other. It began on July 9.

American Civil Wars takes readers away from battlefields and sectional divides to view the conflict from outside the national arena. Contributors to this volume position the conflict squarely in the context of a much wider transnational crisis across the Atlantic world, marked by a multitude of civil wars, European invasions and occupations, revolutionary independence movements, and slave uprisings—all taking place in the tumultuous decade of the 1860s. The multiple conflicts described in these essays illustrate America’s sectional strife, one caught up in a much larger, complex struggle in which nations and empires on both sides of the Atlantic vied for the control of the future. These struggles were all part of a vast web, connecting Washington and Richmond but also Mexico City, Havana, Santo Domingo, and Rio de Janeiro and—on the other side of the Atlantic—London, Paris, Madrid, and Rome. In doing so, this volume breaks new ground by charting a hemispheric upheaval borne of much wider forces. By expanding Civil War scholarships in the realms of transnational and imperial history, the work sheds new light on the interconnectedness of uprising and civil wars in and outside of American borders and places the United States within a global context of other nations, rather than a country acting as if in a vacuum.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-170
Author(s):  
V. I. Bartenev

This paper identifi es and explains key changes in the U.S. aid policies towards Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) under Donald Trump. It seeks to validate two widespread arguments — the one about the current administration’s revision of pivotal principles of providing foreign assistance, and the other one — about an accelerated disengagement of the United States from the MENA region since 2017. The paper consists of four sections. The fi rst section explores the transformation of the U.S. strategic thinking and regional context under the Trump administration and then posits fi ve hypotheses about possible changes in the volume and composition of the U.S. assistance to the MENA region (in comparison with the fi nal two years of the Obama administration), as well as the diff erences in the executive branch and the Congress’s positions. The second section explains particularities of the statistical data and the methods of its exploration, the third section presents the results of hypothesis testing using aggregated data on aid fl ows to the region, and the fi nal section explains these results, sometimes unexpected, using the data disaggregated by country. Three of fi ve hypotheses proved wrong based on the aggregate data. First, the Trump administration did not cut assistance to the MENA more substantially than to other regions of the globe. Second, it did not ringfence aid accounts which helped yield direct dividends to the U.S. businesses. Third, the Republican Congress was clearly less willing to support the executive’s aid chocies under a new Republican President than during the last years of a Democrat Barack Obama’s second term. Only two hypotheses proved correct — one about a prioritization of security and military assistance under Donald Trump and the other one — about disproportionate cuts of democracy promotion assistance. Such an unexpected result calls for refi ning both aforementioned arguments and taking into account the dissimilarities in the dynamics of assistance to diff erent countries. The United States tends to practice a diff erentiated approach in dealing with two largest Arab aid recipients (Egypt and Jordan) and with other Arab countries. The assistance to Cairo and Amman is ringfenced and protected, while aid to other recipients, including security assistance and FMF grants, is prone to quite drastic cuts. This diff erentiation is explained by the fact that cooperation with Egypt and Jordan rests not only on more solid strategic foundations but also on a strong support within the United States — both from the defense contractors interested in large export contracts and from an infl uential pro-Israel lobby. The U.S. will not abandon this highly diff erentiated approach after the 2020 elections but the structure of assistance to the MENA region might undergo quite a dramatic transformation.


1947 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 700-732
Author(s):  
Foster H. Sherwood

The oft-heard argument in behalf of federalism that the states furnish important laboratories for social and political experimentation is illustrated by a good many new constitutional provisions interpreted for the first time this year. Two states, Missouri and Georgia, adopted entirely new constitutions in 1945, important sections of which have come before the highest courts for interpretation. One of these, the Georgia constitution of 1945, provides specifically: “Legislative acts in violation of this constitution or the constitution of the United States, are void, and the judiciary shall so declare them.” Such a provision may very well raise more questions than it settles—for example, what effects can be accorded unconstitutional acts?; can the other agencies of government refuse to perform under statutes they consider unconstitutional?; can the judiciary declare acts of the governor and other officers unconstitutional?; etc. Such questions have not as yet been raised. But there is some evidence that we may be embarking on an era of constitutional revision similar to that which followed the Civil War. If so, the problems of constitutional law now being discussed may furnish a clue to the kind of new documents to be written. This year the emphasis has been on civil rights and methods of adjusting state finances to the rapidly fluctuating value of the dollar—problems which naturally arise out of the intense social and economic conflicts of the past decade.


Author(s):  
Evan Renfro ◽  
Jayme Neiman Renfro

Since before the founding of the United States through slavery, the extermination of the native populace, war after war, regime overthrow, and more wars, popular media have been used to stir resentments and produce violent fantasies in the general citizenry that often allow for policies of actual violence to be applied against “the other.” This chapter will analyze the affective coordinates of this system in the post-9/11 context, focusing especially on how nationalist-jingoism has now triumphed in the age of the Trump Administration. Crucial interrogations addressed in this chapter include: Why are white southern/rural males particularly susceptible to popular culture induced affective violence? What are the mechanics of profit and neoliberal imperatives of this structure? What is new about the linkage of these phenomena with the first Twitter-President? In pursuing these questions, the authors will use case studies involving the popular media vectors of television, film, and music.


Author(s):  
Margaret M. McGuinness

This essay focuses on the work of Dominican Sisters in Memphis and Nashville during the second half of the nineteenth century. To a certain extent, their work often followed the trajectory of other congregations of religious women. They were sought after by priests and bishops, for example, who were anxious to establish schools and orphanages but needed religious women to staff and minister these institutions. On the other hand, the circumstances surrounding the arrival and subsequent work of the Dominicans in Memphis and Nashville differed dramatically from many of their counterparts in other parts of the United States. The sisters’ early years in Tennessee were marked by the devastation resulting from Civil War battles being fought on or perilously close to their properties. Following the war, Memphis and Nashville Dominicans experienced three outbreaks of yellow fever within a decade, as well as financial struggles that placed them in danger of being forced to abandon their schools and orphanages. Today, the Dominicans remain an active presence in both cities.


2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-61
Author(s):  
Kim Moody

The massive loss of manufacturing jobs in the United States even as manufacturing output continued to increase has been a source of debate between those who see this primarily as a result of globalization and trade, on one hand, and those for whom the dynamics of capitalism with its economic turbulence, job-displacing technology and productivity increases is the major cause, on the other. It is a debate with political implications. In the United States, those who see trade imbalances as the major cause of job loss compose a broad spectrum including many liberal economists, trade union leaders, related think tanks and the Trump Administration who place the blame on a foreign ‘other’ rather than multinational capital. Supporting this analysis are a series of recent academic articles that largely ignore economic crises and reject productivity, in particular, as reasons for declining manufacturing employment. This article will critically analyse their arguments and propose a different explanation rooted in the turbulence, competition and class conflict inherent in capitalism as these have unfolded in the United States during the neoliberal era.


Author(s):  
David Armitage

Two assumptions can be made about the American Revolution: it shaped the Atlantic world and was shaped by the Atlantic world. These Atlantic perspectives challenged accounts of it as a specifically American sequence of events, of defining relevance only to the history of United States. Conjuring states out of colonies was the single most radical act of the American Revolution: indeed, it was precisely what turned that sequence of events from a civil war into a revolution as it began the transformation of the Atlantic world into an arena hospitable, first, to independent states on its western shores, then to republicanism (in the sense of non-monarchical government), and finally to the creation of federal republics — the United States, Venezuela, and Mexico, for instance — on a scale undreamed of by classical and early modern thinkers. This article retraces the course of the Revolution from its beginnings in the aftermath of the Seven Years War and places its events into the context of Britain's Atlantic empire and the shifting fortunes of the other European empires of the Atlantic world.


2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 193-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Ashworth

Abstract This paper introduces arguments from Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic1 to suggest that the Civil War arose ultimately because of class-conflict between on the one hand, Southern slaves and their masters and, on the other, Northern workers and their employers. It does not, however, suggest that either in the North or the South these conflicts were on the point of erupting into revolution. On the contrary, they were relatively easily containable. However, harmony within each section (North and South) could be secured only at the cost of intersectional conflict, conflict which would finally erupt into civil war. The Civil War was a ‘bourgeois revolution’ not only because it destroyed slavery, an essentially precapitalist system of production, in the United States but also because it resulted in the enthronement of Northern values, with the normalisation of wage-labour at their core.


2021 ◽  
Vol 115 (4) ◽  
pp. 745-753

Nearly twenty years after the U.S. military began operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan, President Joseph R. Biden reported on August 31, 2021, that the last U.S. combat troops had departed the country. Biden announced on April 14, 2021, that the United States would withdraw combat troops from Afghanistan before the twenty-year anniversary of September 11, 2001, and NATO member states decided to depart the country simultaneously. The withdrawal followed an early 2020 deal between the Taliban and the Trump administration, which conditioned the pullout on Taliban agreement not to harbor terrorists that target the United States and its allies. Over the course of a week and a half in mid-August, the Taliban captured most of Afghanistan's provincial capitals, entering Kabul on August 15. The Afghan government collapsed, and President Ashraf Ghani fled the country. Through the end of August, the United States and other countries conducted a major airlift operation to evacuate their nationals and Afghans considered at risk of Taliban reprisals, though many were left behind amid risks of renewed civil war and humanitarian crisis.


Author(s):  
James N. Druckman ◽  
Samara Klar ◽  
Yanna Krupnikov ◽  
Matthew Levendusky ◽  
John Barry Ryan

Abstract Affective polarization – partisans’ dislike and distrust of those from the other party – has reached historically high levels in the United States. While numerous studies estimate its effect on apolitical outcomes (e.g., dating and economic transactions), we know much less about its effects on political beliefs. We argue that those who exhibit high levels of affective polarization politicize ostensibly apolitical issues and actors. An experiment focused on responses to COVID-19 that relies on pre-pandemic, exogenous measures of affective polarization supports our expectations. Partisans who harbor high levels of animus towards the other party do not differentiate the “United States’” response to COVID-19 from that of the Trump administration. Less affectively polarized partisans, in contrast, do not politicize evaluations of the country’s response. Our results provide evidence of how affective polarization, apart from partisanship itself, shapes substantive beliefs. Affective polarization has political consequences and political beliefs stem, in part, from partisan animus.


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