scholarly journals Fundraising for Favors? Linking Lobbyist-Hosted Fundraisers to Legislative Benefits

2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 869-880 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy Melissa McKay
Keyword(s):  
Interest Group ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Data Sources ◽  
Compelling Evidence ◽  
Senate Committee ◽  
Home State ◽  
Legislative Amendments ◽  
Lobby Group

Do legislators and lobbyists trade favors? This study uses uncommon data sources and plagiarism software to detect a rarely observed relationship between interest group lobbyists and sitting Members of Congress. Comparison of letters to a Senate committee written by lobby groups to legislative amendments introduced by committee members reveals similar and even identical language, providing compelling evidence that groups persuaded legislators to introduce amendments valued by the group. Moreover, the analysis suggests that these language matches are more likely when the requesting lobby group hosts a fundraising event for the senator. The results hold while controlling for ideological agreement between the senator and the group, the group’s campaign contributions to the senator, and the group’s lobbying expenditures, annual revenue, and home-state connections.

Subverting Administrative Oversight: Campaign Contributions and Nursing Home Inspections

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 441-466
Author(s):  
Frederick J. Boehmke
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Nursing Home ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
State Politics ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Skilled Nursing Facilities ◽  
Large Reduction ◽  
Nursing Facilities ◽  
Skilled Nursing ◽  
Administrative Oversight

I study the consequences of interest group campaign contributions for administrative oversight. Unlike the few previous studies in this area, however, I study the influence in state bureaucracies and at the level of individual groups. Specifically, I test whether campaign contributions to state elected officials influence the outcomes of annual inspections of skilled nursing facilities in 16 states, leveraging the context of state politics in two important ways. First, I consider the differing effects of contributions to the legislative and executive branches. Second, I argue that legislative capacity for oversight influences the efficacy of contributions Regression analysis of inspection results with controls for facility characteristics provides evidence that contributing facilities have better overall inspection results, with a large reduction in citations for severe problems. Furthermore, contributions to legislators reduce overall problems, particularly in less professionalized legislatures, while those to the governor reduce severe ones.

Modeling Interest-Group Campaign Contributions

1989 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 158-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
John H. Goddeeris
Keyword(s):  
Interest Group ◽  
Campaign Contributions

scholarly journals Guidelines for the Cytopathologic Diagnosis of Epithelioid and Mixed-Type Malignant Mesothelioma

2015 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Hjerpe ◽  
Valeria Ascoli ◽  
Carlos W.M. Bedrossian ◽  
Mathilde E. Boon ◽  
Jenette Creaney ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Reference Material ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Malignant Mesothelioma ◽  
Mixed Type ◽  
Cape Town ◽  
Data Sources ◽  
Practical Guidelines ◽  
International Academy

Objective: To provide practical guidelines for the cytopathologic diagnosis of malignant mesothelioma. Data Sources: Cytopathologists with an interest in the field involved in the International Mesothelioma Interest Group (IMIG) and the International Academy of Cytology (IAC) contributed to this update. Reference material includes peer-reviewed publications and textbooks. Rationale: This article is the result of discussions during and after the IMIG 2012 conference in Boston, followed by thorough discussions during the 2013 IAC meeting in Paris. Additional contributions have been obtained from cytopathologists and scientists who could not attend these meetings, with final discussions and input during the IMIG 2014 conference in Cape Town.

scholarly journals Campaign Spending and Lobbying

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Greg Sasso ◽  
Dan Alexander
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Multiple Channels ◽  
Lobbying Effort ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Interest groups can influence governmental policy through multiple channels. First, they may spend money before elections to help elect their preferred candidate. Second, they may also lobby after the election to affect the implemented policy. We analyze a game-theoretic model of campaign spending and lobbying to understand the strategic relationship between these two means of outside influence. We consider how several lobbying environments, each featuring different access to the elected politician, affect both the willingness to spend during the campaign and the final policy. Campaign spending is a function of both expected final policy due to lobbying and also expected lobbying effort costs. We find that increased policy moderation often, but not always, accompanies decreased campaign spending. When extreme interest groups give campaign contributions in exchange for access, campaign spending decreases as policy becomes more extreme. Open-access lobbying, where all interest groups lobby regardless of ideological alignment, is always best for the voter. We then show that caps on campaign contributions may have minimal effect on policy because of later lobbying efficacy. Finally, we highlight comparative statics that predict different empirical patterns of contributions depending on whether politicians grant lobbying access to all interest groups or only to ideologically-aligned groups. Our results demonstrate that interest-group and candidate polarization must be considered relative to one another; the effect of greater interest-group polarization depends to a large extent on whether it implies more or less ideological proximity to the group's aligned candidate.

The impact of legislator attributes on interest-group campaign contributions

1986 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 349-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin B. Grier ◽  
Michael C. Munger
Keyword(s):  
Interest Group ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
The Impact
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