Progressive and Regressive Equilibria in a Tax Competition Game

2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-333
Author(s):  
James Green-Armytage

This article models interjurisdictional competition over nonlinear taxes on the incomes of mobile individuals. Each individual has exogenous wealth and a location preference that is drawn from a continuous distribution. We find that more concave utility of consumption functions lead to more progressive tax structures, as richer people place less value on marginal consumption relative to location. In the benchmark model, a relative risk aversion coefficient of one is the boundary between progressivity and regressivity. The exercise helps us to understand which types of jurisdictions are more likely to have progressive taxes as their optimal policies.

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Pingping Zhao ◽  
Kaili Xiang ◽  
Peimin Chen

In this paper, we study a dynamic auction for allocating a single indivisible project while different participants have different bid values for the project. When the price rises continuously, the bidders can retreat the auction and obtain the compensation by the difference between the price at retreating time and the previous bid price. The final successful bidder achieves the project and pays compensations to others. We show that the auction of bidders with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) has a unique equilibrium. While the relative risk aversion coefficient approaches to zero, the equilibrium with CRRA bidders would approach to the equilibrium with risk-neutral bidders.


ODEON ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 123-163
Author(s):  
Gastón Milanesi

Las empresas de la nueva economía como start up, empresas de base tecnólogicas, intangibles en I&D, e inversiones en estrategias innovadoras, entre otras, se caracteriza por su dinamismo y flexibilidad. Para su valoración se deben emplear modelos de opciones reales. La principal debilidad de los modelos reside en suponer mercados completos, condición difícil de cumplir en mercados emergentes. Por tal motivo, se desarrolla un modelo que combina la transformación de Edgeworth y funciones isoelásticas de utilidad (CRRA - relative risk aversión coefficient), incorporando grados de aversión al riesgo del agente. Se utiliza el análisis de casos, sobre un proyecto biofarmacéutico con opciones secuenciales; se aplica análisis de sensibilidad sobre el coeficiente de aversión y el valor de la opción. Se concluye sobre las ventajas del modelo, en particular, se incorpora la probabilidad extrema de éxitos y fracasos mediante momentos estocásticos de orden superior y actitudes frente al riesgo.


2008 ◽  
Vol 11 (07) ◽  
pp. 705-716
Author(s):  
JUN SEKINE

Results in He–Leland (1993) are extended and properties of the risk-premium process in an equilibrium are examined in a pure exchange economy with a representative agent: for example, (i) the risk-premium process is characterized by using a martingale representation of the reciprocal of a terminal marginal utility, (ii) it is expressed as a (conditional) expected value including the relative risk aversion coefficient of a terminal utility and the Jacobian matrix process of the state variables, and, (iii) a "mean-reverting" property relates to the monotonic decreasing property of the relative risk aversion coefficient.


2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Muñoz Ceballos ◽  
Esteban Flores Díaz

2021 ◽  
pp. 104346312199408
Author(s):  
Carlo Barone ◽  
Katherin Barg ◽  
Mathieu Ichou

This work examines the validity of the two main assumptions of relative risk-aversion models of educational inequality. We compare the Breen-Goldthorpe (BG) and the Breen-Yaish (BY) models in terms of their assumptions about status maintenance motives and beliefs about the occupational risks associated with educational decisions. Concerning the first assumption, our contribution is threefold. First, we criticise the assumption of the BG model that families aim only at avoiding downward mobility and are insensitive to the prospects of upward mobility. We argue that the loss-aversion assumption proposed by BY is a more realistic formulation of status-maintenance motives. Second, we propose and implement a novel empirical approach to assess the validity of the loss-aversion assumption. Third, we present empirical results based on a sample of families of lower secondary school leavers indicating that families are sensitive to the prospects of both upward and downward mobility, and that the loss-aversion hypothesis of BY is empirically supported. As regards the risky choice assumption, we argue that families may not believe that more ambitious educational options entail occupational risks relative to less ambitious ones. We present empirical evidence indicating that, in France, the academic path is not perceived as a risky option. We conclude that, if the restrictive assumptions of the BG model are removed, relative-risk aversion needs not drive educational inequalities.


2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (3) ◽  
pp. 1163-1194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E Hall ◽  
Susan E Woodward

Entrepreneurship is risky. We study the risk facing a well-documented and important class of entrepreneurs, those backed by venture capital. Using a dynamic program, we calculate the certainty-equivalent of the difference between the cash rewards that entrepreneurs actually received over the past 20 years and the cash that entrepreneurs would have received from a risk-free salaried job. The payoff to a venture-backed entrepreneur comprises a below-market salary and a share of the equity value of the company when it goes public or is acquired. We find that the typical venture-backed entrepreneur received an average of $5.8 million in exit cash. Almost three-quarters of entrepreneurs receive nothing at exit and a few receive over a billion dollars. Because of the extreme dispersion of payoffs, an entrepreneur with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of two places a certainty equivalent value only slightly greater than zero on the distribution of outcomes she faces at the time of her company's launch. (JEL G24, G32, L26, M13)


1982 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 481 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick W. Siegel ◽  
James P. Hoban

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