Tacit coordination in close dyads: The use of social focal points

Tacit coordination between individuals has received considerable research attention (Mehta, Starmer & Sugden, 1994; Abele, & Stasser, 2008). However, groups often must coordinate tacitly with other groups, and such intergroup coordination has been rarely studied. In three experiments, we found that interacting groups are more successful at coordinating tacitly than are individuals. This advantage is driven by two types of coordination salience that are uniquely derived from groups deliberating and making collective responses. Consensual salience occurs when groups select a response because a majority of members support it. Majorities efficiently identify popular response tendencies (i.e., focal points) and thereby increase the chances of matching other groups’ responses. Disjunctive salience occurs when at least one member of a group suggests a focal point. We propose that focal points are often demonstratively evident when mentioned, and if proposed by any group member, are likely to be adopted as the group response.

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Focal Moments and Protests in Autocracies: How Pro-democracy Anniversaries Shape Dissent in China

Journal of Conflict Resolution ◽

10.1177/0022002720932995 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 64 (10) ◽

pp. 1796-1827

Author(s):

Erin Baggott Carter ◽

Brett L. Carter

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Focal Points ◽

Social Scientists ◽

Tacit Coordination ◽

The Government

Social scientists have long observed that focal points enable citizens to coordinate collective action. For antiregime protests in autocracies, however, focal points also enable repressive governments to prepare in advance. We propose a theory to explain when citizens are likely to employ focal points to organize antiregime protests. Our key insight is that tacit coordination is most critical when explicit coordination is costly. Empirically, we use our theory to identify a setting where focal points are likely to be salient and then argue that the anniversaries of failed pro-democracy movements satisfy conditions for focality. In China, we find that the anniversaries of failed pro-democracy movements occasion nearly 30 percent more protests than any other day. Protests during pro-democracy anniversaries are more likely to employ “rights-conscious” discourse, which scholars have argued is code for democratic resistance, and to be repressed by the government. We find no similar trends for other holidays.

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FOCAL SOCIAL ACTORS AND TACIT COORDINATION

10.31237/osf.io/beszv ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Christopher R. Chartier

Keyword(s):

Focal Point ◽

Focal Points ◽

Social Actor ◽

Group Project ◽

Coordination Problem ◽

Social Actors ◽

New Type ◽

Group Members ◽

Tacit Coordination ◽

Group Member

Tacit coordination is a fundamental task for interdependent social actors. Everyday examples include negotiating rush hour traffic, working collaboratively on a group project, conversing smoothly, and meeting friends for lunch. Previous research (Schelling, 1960; Mehta, Starmer & Sugden, 1994) has focused extensively on differences between behavioral options that aid in small group coordination. Highly salient options are referred to as structural focal points, and are popular choices for actors. The current work presents a new type of focal point based on differences between social actors in a coordination problem. The focal social actor effect is hypothesized to occur when one group member is more salient than others, and actors correspond to behavioral options in a clear way. Three Experiments explored and ultimately supported this hypothesis. In Experiment 1, social information about group members was manipulated such that one group member was unique. Furthermore, players were identified by color. In a subsequent coordination game, players were more likely to select an option sharing an identifying color with the unique group member than an option corresponding to a common player. In Experiment 2, actors and options corresponded through slight payoff differences between group members across different behavioral options. Once again, players were more likely to select the option corresponding to the unique player. In Experiment 3, uniqueness was manipulated orthogonally to intragroup status by virtue of bogus feedback on a leadership questionnaire. The focal social actor served as a coordination cue, as players were more likely to select the option corresponding to the unique player. The focal social actor cue was found to be effective even in the presence of the previously established status cue for coordination (de Kwaadsteniet & van Dijk, 2010). Focal social actors serve as strong coordination aids for small groups, and may help explain portions of previously published tacit coordination findings.

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