“For the Contrary View”: Reconsidering the Early Anti-Zoning Decisions”

2021 ◽  
pp. 153851322110475
Author(s):  
Francine S. Romero

When the 1926 Euclid v. Ambler decision found municipal zoning valid under the U.S. Constitution, previous state cases opposing the practice were overruled and subsequently almost forgotten. This investigation analyzes those early State Supreme Court cases to determine systematically the basis of these rejections. After constructing a contextual background of the legal arguments that could have been used by the judges, I assess cases to determine which were used, and find a dominance of concern regarding land use segregation justified by municipalities through an “aesthetics” defense. I conclude by considering links between these cases and current controversies.

2021 ◽  
pp. 131-144
Author(s):  
Michael J. Rosenfeld

Chapter 9 tells the story of Lawrence v. Texas, the 2003 Supreme Court decision that finally struck down the remaining state laws that criminalized sodomy. In 2004 Massachusetts became the first state in the U.S. to have marriage equality, following the state supreme court decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health. Opponents of gay rights fought furiously to overturn marriage equality in Massachusetts, but once straight people saw that marriage equality cost them nothing, the opposition faded away. Gay rights groups in Massachusetts prevailed despite having many institutional disadvantages. In California in 2008, Proposition 8 was passed by voters to reintroduce a same-sex marriage ban.


1990 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Ehi Oshio

The Land Use Act, 1978 is, indeed, a “giant-killer”. In the recent case of Savannah Bank of Nigeria Limited and Another v. Ammel Ajilo and Another a learned Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria seized the opportunity to indict a doyen of the Nigerian Bar for a seeming misapprehension of the revolutionary effect of the Act on the land tenurial system of the country. But we hasten to point out that the Act is not the problem child only of the Bar, for the Bench is not free from the same misapprehension for which this learned gentleman of the Bar was indicted. Indeed, there is mounting evidence from the conflicting opinions of our courts on the Act that the latter is the “Achilles' heel” also of the Bench. One glaring instance: while the Supreme Court in recognition of group holdings under customary law conceded communal title to a right of occupancy under the Act to a community in the case of Chief S.U. Ojeme and Others v. His Highness Momodu II and Others the Court of Appeal expressed the contrary view in the subsequent case of L.S.D.P.C. and Others v.


Author(s):  
J. Scott Carter ◽  
Cameron D. Lippard

This chapter looks at the most recent case to challenge affirmative action in college admissions policies in the U.S. Supreme Court, the Fisher v. The University of Texas at Austin (2013 and 2016). Like chapter 5, the purpose of this chapter is to understand precisely what supporters and opponents are saying about the controversial policy. That is, how are they framing the debate surrounding affirmative action. However, this chapter looks at how framing may have changed over a decade later. We again focus on amicus briefs submitted by social authorities to the U.S. Supreme Court who had interests in the outcome of the cases. While we were interested in variation in types of frames used in these two cases (Fisher I and II) relative to the Gratz and Grutter cases, we mainly focused on authors continued use of both color-blind and group threat frames to state their positions. While some nuanced changes were observed from Gratz/Grutter to Fisher, our findings revealed a great deal of consistency from case to case and that the briefs continued to rely on color-blind and threat frames to characterize the policy. Particularly among opponents’ briefs, threat frames suggested that whites, in general, were losing in a country consumed by liberal agendas of diversification and entitlements only afforded to unqualified and ill-prepared non-whites.


Author(s):  
David Polizzi ◽  
Bruce Arrigo

The practice of solitary confinement has been utilized by the American penitentiary system since its inception. The deleterious health and mental health consequences stemming from this type of correctional practice have led several clinical researchers and legal advocates to call for solitary confinement’s abolition based on constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has not found that the conditions of isolative confinement establish a legal threshold sufficient to legitimate such a ban. In fact, Justice A. Scalia famously argued that although it may be true that solitary confinement is cruel, it is certainly not unusual and is therefore not prohibited by the Constitution. This judicial attitude coincides with the more general proclivity of the Court, which has articulated a position against becoming overly involved in the administration of American penitentiaries. If it is true that the Constitution does not stop at the jail house door, then how do we make sense of the U.S. Supreme Court’s position on solitary confinement? In this article, we explain how solitary confinement reflects the blurring of the legal and the political (a state of exception), and we describe how the Court’s cruel-but-not-unusual justification sustains what Agamben has called a zone of indifference. As we demonstrate, the legal arguments offered by the Court simply reflect the institutionalization of this process. This process reveals the narrative construction of captivity’s laws at the level of U.S. Supreme Court decision making. These laws endorse the ideology of rationalized retribution.


2018 ◽  
Vol 99 (8) ◽  
pp. 76-77
Author(s):  
Julie Underwood

In Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, the U.S. Supreme Court will determine whether unions can compel non-union members to pay “fair share” fees to offset the cost of collective bargaining. Julie Underwood reviews past Supreme Court cases and state law involving union fees.


2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna T. Brougher ◽  
David A. Fazzolare

In June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision upending more than three decades worth of established patent practice when it ruled that isolated gene sequences are no longer patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. Section 101.While many practitioners in the field believed that the USPTO would interpret the decision narrowly, the USPTO actually expanded the scope of the decision when it issued its guidelines for determining whether an invention satisfies Section 101. The guidelines were met with intense backlash with many arguing that they unnecessarily expanded the scope of the Supreme Court cases in a way that could unduly restrict the scope of patentable subject matter, weaken the U.S. patent system, and create a disincentive to innovation. By undermining patentable subject matter in this way, the guidelines may end up harming not only the companies that patent medical innovations, but also the patients who need medical care.  This article examines the guidelines and their impact on various technologies.


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